The Space of Case by Lestrade, S.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/82611
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
The Space of Case
Sander Lestrade
Printing: Ipskamp drukkers
Cover design: Lotte Holman
ISBN 978-90-9025746-4
NUR 616
Copyright c© 2010 by Sander Lestrade. All rights reserved.
The Space of Case
Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Letteren
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op donderdag 4 november 2010
om 13.30 uur precies
door
Samuel Alexander Maximiliaan Lestrade
geboren op 12 december 1981
te ’s-Hertogenbosch
Promotor:
Mw. prof. dr. Helen de Hoop
Copromotor:
Dr. Joost Zwarts (Universiteit Utrecht)
Manuscriptcommissie:
Mw. prof. dr. Ans van Kemenade
Mw. prof. dr. Miriam Butt (Universita¨t Konstanz)
Prof. dr. Stephen Levinson
“The ability to create language systems through categorization,
analogy, [. . . ] semantic generalization, and pragmatic inferenc-
ing derives from the innate neurocognitive capacities of human
beings. These are largely domain-general capacities that happen
to be used to create language.”
(Bybee, 2008, 110)
“This is not to say that every aspect of syntax should be ex-
plainable in semantic terms. [. . . ] The point of the Grammati-
cal Constraint is only to attempt to minimize the differences of
syntactic and semantic structure.”
(Jackendoff, 1983, 14; emphasis in original)
“The whole point of having a case system, or any morphological
system for that matter, is to provide brief signals for broad
categories that will be sufficient for communication most of the
time.”
(Blake, 1994, 169)
“All else being equal, cross-linguistic agreement in semantic cat-
egorization suggests relative uniformity in the way people read-
ily conceptualize the domain, while disagreement suggests that
the domain is more open to alternative conceptualizations, and
so more in need of language-specific learning.”
(Gentner & Bowerman, 2009, 468)
“It’s the Economy, stupid.”
(Bill Clinton, campaign slogan 1992; emphasis SL)
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siderably between languages. Cases are to an important extent defined by
the paradigm they occur in, which is again something that differs between
languages. This thesis makes use of the WALS classification system for lan-
guages. Finally, all computations are made with R 2.4.1 (R Development
Core Team, 2005).
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Abstract
Case is the result of a grammaticalization process in which frequently used
words develop more general meanings and more economical forms. Since
general meanings apply more often and economical forms are preferably
used, frequency works as a flywheel.
As will be shown in Chapter 2, case expresses the most general and
most frequently used meanings, viz. semantic roles. Semantic roles are gen-
eralizations about event participants necessary for communication. The
semantics of an event participant in a particular event is much richer but
cannot efficiently be communicated as such for all individual participants.
By categorizing arguments into semantic roles, the speaker can use more
economical means of expression, namely the forms corresponding to seman-
tic roles. Using the semantics of the predicate, the hearer can unpack this
information again. For example, the Agent of to hit is a ‘hitter’ and the
Agent of to walk is a ‘walker’. Structural case can be seen as a high-level
generalization about argument functions. It is used to discriminate between
the semantic roles that are most predictable for a particular predicate and
therefore do not need to be identified by a semantic role.
The importance of frequency for the use and development of case also ex-
plains its spatial use, which will be the topic of Chapter 3. Spatial meaning
can be decomposed into a configuration dimension, concerning the relative
position in space between two objects, and a dimension of directionality
that expresses the development of this configuration in time. Directionality
necessarily consists of three basic distinctions. Place directionality is the
absence of a change in configuration; Goal directionality is a change into
some configuration; Source directionality is a change out of some configura-
tion. All other directionality distinctions can be shown to be derived from
this basic set. This analysis correctly predicts (as will be shown) an impli-
cational scale of directionality distinctions in which derived meanings are
only expected to be expressed by spatial case if the more basic distinctions
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are first.
In contrast to the directionality dimension, the configuration domain is
much more complex, organized by various principles that lead to a larger set
of language particular configuration distinctions. As a result, the distinc-
tions of configuration are less frequently used than those of directionality
and therefore less likely case candidates. This prediction is also right, as I
will show by a study on the growth of spatial case inventories, a compari-
son between spatial case and spatial adpositions, a semantic analysis of the
morphosyntactic parts of spatial adpositional constructions, and, finally, by
a study of the case forms of spatial adpositions in Finnish and Hungarian.
Chapter 4 will show how differential case marking, which is relatively
well-known for the structural use of case, similarly applies to the spatial
domain. The study of the optional use of spatial case will be used to ac-
count for the phenomenon in general. I propose that, in principle, all types
of differential case marking can be explained by predictability. The use of
case can be judged unnecessary if its meaning contribution is predictable,
because of which case marking is omitted. This economical use is restricted
by other rules of grammar that can be shown to be the result of fossiliza-
tion, a process in which the outcomes of optimization processes become
independent constraints.
Finally, the extended uses of spatial case will be discussed in Chapter 5;
more specifically its use as a marker of structural arguments. Being the re-
sult of a grammaticalization process, spatial case is a profitable construction
to exploit for other purposes too. In most accounts, the structural use of
spatial case is explained in terms of syntactic markedness only. However, I
argue that the choice of spatial case in the argument domain is semantically
motivated. By forcing a predicate argument with a human referent into a
spatial case construction, a compromise is reached in which the argument
has to give up some properties that are especially incompatible with spatial
meaning. By using a spatial case on an argument, the speaker suspends
animacy inferences like volitionality and sentience.
Thus, I propose a functionally motivated account of spatial case that
starts at its very origin and straightforwardly extends to its metaphorical
use.
xvi
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter the concept of spatial case will be introduced. I
will argue for the relevance of its study for a better understand-
ing of morphological case and spatial meaning.
1.1 The Space of Case
Spatial case is a suffix that expresses spatial meaning. A suffix is a mor-
pheme that is attached to words and cannot be used independently in a
sentence; a morpheme is the smallest unit in language with meaning, and
spatial meaning, at least in this definition, concerns the position of things
with respect to other things.
To make matters more concrete consider the following example from
Hungarian.
Hungarian
(1) A
the
ko¨nyv-et
book-acc
az
the
asztal-ra
table-superl
tesz-em.
put-1sg
‘I put the book on the table.’
Both nouns in (1) are case marked. The suffix -(e)t on ko¨nyv ‘book’ is the
accusative case. The accusative case is a structural case that marks the
direct object of the verb. Most English speakers are probably familiar with
structural case from languages like German and Latin. The suffix -ra is a
spatial case, the superlative. It is translated with the English preposition
on(to) and expresses the final position of the book with respect to the table.
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Through the use of case marking it is clear that in (1) the book is put on
the table and not, for example, under it or, the other way around, the table
being placed on the book.
Spatial case is like structural case in that both are suffixes. At the
same time, spatial case is similar to spatial adpositions in that both express
spatial meaning. The similarity between spatial case and structural case
on the one hand, and between spatial case and spatial adpositions on the
other is not a coincidence. Spatial adpositions and structural case are the
neighbors of spatial case on a case cline (see Bybee, 1985; Lehmann, 1985;
Svorou, 1993; Hopper & Traugott, 2003):
(2) The case cline:
Noun/Verb ≺ (Spatial) adposition ≺ Spatial case ≺ Structural case
On the one hand, the cline illustrates the diachronic relation between its
different categories. The categories on the right often develop from their
neighbors to the left. From this perspective, the cline is a grammatical-
ization cline showing an increasing degree of grammaticalization. On the
other hand, it illustrates synchronic differences like a decreasing size of type
members in a category (e.g. there are more different nouns than there are
different cases), an increasing token frequency of these types in a corpus
(the mean frequency of occurrence of adpositions is higher then the mean
frequency of occurrence of verbs), and a decreasing lexical specificity (a
noun has a more specific meaning than a case). Though the case cline is
motivated by diachronic research, mostly synchronic implications will be
discussed.
A brief introduction to morphological case and the way in which it is
approached in this study will be given below. But before we start, why
a thesis on spatial case? I think case is one of the most interesting con-
structions human language has developed. It is the result of a combination
of more general cognitive principles like categorization and economy and
of purely linguistic ones like argument linking, agreement, and paradigm
pressure. Spatial meaning is one of the most important and basic concepts
in life. We need some understanding of the space around us in order to be
able to think in terms of, for example, possession. By studying spatial case,
I do not have to choose between the two phenomena.
The most frequent use of case is to express syntactic relationships. This
is called the structural use and is illustrated in (3). Syntactic relationships
are mostly relations between a verb and its arguments. The accusative case
marker -(a)t in the Hungarian sentence in (3) tells us that ha´zak ‘houses’
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is the object of e´p´ıtetek ‘they were building’ and hence the thing that is
being built. The marker is really the same as the -(e)t marker in the first
example. The binding vowel is determined by the phonological properties
of the noun the suffix attaches to, a process called vowel harmony (cf. also
the two different plural markers -(e)k and -(a)k in (3)).
Hungarian (Ackerman & Moore, 2001, 1)
(3) Az
the
u´j
new
telepes-ek
settlers-pl
ha´z-ak-at
house-pl-acc
e´p´ıt-et-tek.
build-past-3pl
‘The new settlers were building houses.’
The frequency of the structural use of case does not follow from a pre-
disposition of case but from the need to mark syntactic relationships in
virtually every clause. In fact, morphological case is only one strategy to
mark the syntactic argument organization. Many languages use structural
position, word order, agreement, and semantic properties like animacy in-
stead of or in addition to case. As de Hoop and Lamers (2006) show, these
different principles can be viewed as a set of violable and potentially con-
flicting constraints that are all active at the same time in an incremental
process of interpretation. De Hoop and Lamers (2006) reanalyze the results
of an experiment by Lamers (2001) that measures the time course of brain
activity (so-called event related brain potentials, ERPs) while interpreting
transitive sentences in Dutch like those illustrated in (4). They found evi-
dence for a preference to interpret the first constituent as the subject. Later
on in the interpretation process, however, this preference can be overruled
by (animacy) selection preferences of the verb and the case form of the sec-
ond, pronominal argument.
Dutch (de Hoop & Lamers, 2006, 280)
(4) a. De
the
oude
old
vrouw
woman
in
in
de
the
straat
street
verzorgde
took.care.of
hem.
him
‘The old woman in the street took care of him.’
b. Het
the
oude
old
park
park
in
in
de
the
straat
street
verzorgde
took.care.of
de
the
vrouw.
woman
‘The old woman in the street took care of the park.’
c. De
the
oude
old
vrouw
woman
in
in
de
the
straat
street
verzorgde
took.care.of
hij.
3sg.nom
‘He took care of the old woman.’
In (4-a) the three strategies (word order, selectional restrictions, and case)
3
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point to the same interpretation. The first constituent is preferably in-
terpreted as the subject, it refers to a human and therefore matches the
selection criteria of the verb, and the second constituent is an accusative
case form, indicating objecthood. In (4-b) het oude park ‘the old park’
is interpreted as the subject because of word order preferences. Upon en-
countering the verb, however, subjects have to switch to an object-initial
interpretation because the verb verzorgen ‘take care of’ selects for a human
subject. The switch in interpretation is measured as a significant ERP effect
at the verb (viz. as early and late positivities in comparison with the first
sentence). In (4-c) not the selectional restrictions of the verb, but the nom-
inative case form of the second argument causes a jump in interpretation.
The same ERP effect is found for (4-c) but this time at the pronoun.
Note that knowing the subject from the object does not yet tell us who
did what to whom. That is, syntactic function cannot be directly linked
to semantic functions. The question which semantic argument ends up as
which syntactic argument and, though often neglected, the question which
syntactic argument should be interpreted as which semantic argument, is
known as the linking problem (see Ackerman & Moore, 2001). Typically, the
acting argument becomes the subject and the argument that is being acted
on the object. But in principle, we can choose which of the two semantic
arguments will be expressed as the syntactic subject. For example, if we
want to topicalize the houses in the English translation in (3), we can say
The houses were built by the new settlers. In this sentence, the former
object became subject. Also, we find variation for the object position.
In ditransitive constructions in English, for example, it is possible to use
a double object construction (5-a) or a prepositional dative construction
(5-b) (see, among others, Bresnan, Cueni, Nikitina, & Baayen, 2007).
(5) a. Susan gave toys to children.
b. Susan gave the children toys.
Note that, at least in some theories, the Theme toys is a direct object in
(5-a) only, the Recipient the children being the direct object in (5-b). As
Bresnan et al. (2007) show, the choice between the two options is determined
by various interacting constraints, one of which, most offensively for the idea
of a direct link between semantics and syntax, is the difference in length
between the object candidates. The smaller a constituent is, the more likely
it is to be placed directly adjacent to the verb to become the direct object (in
English at least). Spray-load alternations are another example of variation
in object selection. For the same event, one can say both clear the table
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and clear the dishes (Sweep, 2009), or spray the paint onto the wall and
spray the wall with the paint (Dowty, 1991).
Because there is no direct mapping from semantic to syntactic relation-
ships, structural case is often said to be meaningless. Next, a fundamental
boundary is drawn between the structural and the semantic use that, as was
illustrated in the first example with spatial case, does have meaning. Struc-
tural case then becomes an abstract output criterion of language without
any extra-linguistic motivation (and semantic case often ignored).
I think the distinction between structural and semantic case is a gradual
one. As I will argue in Chapter 2, both types of case are the result of the
same grammaticalization process in which meanings become more general
and more frequently used, and their forms of expression more economical.
Case expresses the most general and most frequent meanings, viz. semantic
roles. Semantic roles are generalizations about event participants necessary
for communication. The semantics of an argument in a particular event is
much richer but cannot efficiently be communicated as such for all individ-
ual participants. By categorizing arguments into semantic roles, the speaker
can use more economical means of expression, namely the forms correspond-
ing to semantic roles. From the semantics of the predicate, the hearer can
tell the precise argument function. For example, the Agent of to hit is a
‘hitter’, the Agent of to walk is a ‘walker’. Syntactic functions like subject
and object are high-level generalizations about argument functions. They
are the most predictable semantic roles of a particular predicate. Because
they are so predictable, their argument function can be derived entirely
from the predicate semantics. These roles do not need their own form for
identification, they only need to be kept apart by structural case. Note that
in this view, construction alternations like in (5) are indeed expected for
ditransitive predicates. The Recipient and Theme role are equally pervasive
in the argument structure of these predicates.
Only if a semantic role is used frequently enough its marker can develop
into a case marker. For the spatial domain, this predicts that the most
frequent aspects of spatial meaning will be expressed by spatial case first. As
I will argue in Chapter 3, this most frequent aspect concerns directionality,
the change of relative position over time. With respect to the Hungarian
example in (1) above, before the putting, the book was not on the table, but
it was afterwards. I will show that this change of position comes in three
basic flavors only, namely Place, Goal, and Source. That is, no change, a
positive change, and a negative change. All other directionality meanings
are derived from this basic set.
In some languages, it is possible to omit case markers. Such differential
5
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case marking is relatively well-known for structural case. However, as I will
show in Chapter 4, it similarly applies to the spatial domain (thus stressing
the similarity between the two uses). I will show how this differential use
of case follows from the very same principles that I have used to explain its
development and normal use.
Being the end result of a grammaticalization process, case is an econom-
ical expression with a general meaning. This makes it a profitable and easy
candidate for other than spatial uses. In Chapter 5, I discuss the use of
spatial case to mark Agents. I argue that the choice of spatial case in the
argument domain is semantically motivated. The combination of a spatial
form with a human semantic role results in a compromise between spatial
and Agent meaning.
1.2 Basic Assumptions
The basic assumptions that form the background to my study are sum-
marized in the mottos of this thesis. Probably, they need some further
explanation.
I believe that language is a system that is adapted to our cognitive make-
up, not the other way around (cf. also, for example Christiansen & Chater,
2008). Language is part of a more general organization. That is, it is not
an independent module with its own rules, but is embedded in general cog-
nitive principles. In this broad perspective, I try to ground the principles I
use with the lowest amount of theory-internal motivations as possible. Such
a view is, among many others, expressed by Bybee (2008, 110), who reduces
the creation of language systems through categorization, semantic general-
ization, and pragmatic inferencing to “the innate neurocognitive capacities
of human beings.”
In addition to neurocognitive principles, the communicative function of
language plays a major role in its development. Language is the result of
our need to communicate (although this is the wrong way to talk about it
from an evolutionary perspective). Hence, studies of language should always
take into account both the production and interpretation of language. How
something is said exactly is not only determined by the intentions of the
speaker, it is also motivated by the way in which the hearer will probably
interpret the utterance. This point of view is formalized in a bidirectional
optimality theoretic framework (bidirectional OT; Blutner, de Hoop, &
Hendriks, 2006). However, “[t]his is not to say that every aspect of syntax
should be explainable in semantic terms” (Jackendoff, 1983, 14). There may
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be rules of syntax that cannot be explained by functional principles and have
to be postulated as belonging to the language system. Nevertheless, the goal
is to motivate syntactic structure by communicative and neurocognitive
principles as much as possible, thereby reducing the set of postulated rules
as much as possible.
Morphological case is a nice example of the compromise between speak-
ers’ and hearers’ requirements of language. According to Blake (1994, 169),
“[t]he whole point of having a case system, or any morphological system
for that matter, is to provide brief signals for broad categories that will be
sufficient for communication most of the time.” As such, it satisfies Econ-
omy, which states that speakers want utterances to be as short as possible
to waste as little energy as possible. This principle is extremely important
in languages. At the same time, case is used to satisfy an opposing desire
to mark functions and meanings that could otherwise not be derived by
the hearer. If communication is to succeed, the speaker has to take the
hearer into consideration. The speaker has to use case, thereby violating
the ultimate satisfaction of Economy, because the hearer might not get
the right interpretation otherwise.
I have chosen a typological approach to study spatial case. Given my
goal of embedding language principles in a broader cognitive frame, the
comparison of languages is necessary. A spatial case paradigm of a given
language, or any language construction for that matter, is always partly
the result of arbitrary choices and dependent on the coincidental other
existing linguistic strategies. Only by comparing different languages, the
general principles that determine the possibilities to choose from in the
first place become clear. This is called the Typological Prevalence hypoth-
esis by Gentner and Bowerman (2009, 468), which they define as follows.
“All else being equal, cross-linguistic agreement in semantic categorization
suggests relative uniformity in the way people readily conceptualize the do-
main, while disagreement suggests that the domain is more open to alterna-
tive conceptualizations, and so more in need of language-specific learning.”
Thus, by studying the use of spatial case in different languages, I try to find
out how people conceptualize space and which principles are active in the
case domain.
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About Case
I argue that case is the result of a diachronic economy process
in which frequent words develop more economical forms and
become semantically more general. Thus, case is not an ab-
stract prerequisite of the syntax of language, as most explicitly
proposed by generative grammar, but the product of a general
economy principle. Case markers express semantic roles, which
are defined as language-particular medium-level generalizations
about argument functions. Semantic roles are used to efficiently
communicate the argument structure. Structural case can be
seen as a high-level generalization. It is used to discriminate
between the semantic roles that are most predictable for a par-
ticular predicate.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is about the space of case in the linguistic system. Morpho-
logical case is the result of a grammaticalization process that leads to more
general meanings and more economical forms. Case forms compete with
each other and with other linguistic constructions for further generalization.
The title ’The space of case’ can thus be taken pretty literally, in terms of
the space a case occupies on a semantic map of argument functions.
Much work on case focused on its structural use only and hence does
not give a representative picture. In this study, I start with its semantic
use and reconcile both uses in one account. Both the structural and the
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semantic use of case can be shown to follow from a generalization principle
that is necessary for efficient communication. Also, most theories see case
as a product of syntax only. I think language crucially has a communicative
function, and case is also a service of the speaker to the hearer. My proposal
is couched in a bidirectional optimality theoretic framework (Blutner et al.,
2006) that formalizes this idea. In this framework, both the hearer’s and
the speaker’s perspective are taken into account.
In Section 2.2, it is argued that case is the ultimate result of a diachronic
economy process in which frequent words develop more economical forms.
Eventually, these forms become so short that they lose their syntactic in-
dependence and need to be suffixed to another word.
In Section 2.3, the same principles that cause the development of case
markers will be used to account for their meaning. Case expresses semantic
roles, which are language-particular generalizations about argument func-
tions. The precise semantics of the argument is retrievable from the verb
semantics. The communication of argument functions by means of seman-
tic roles is represented by a distance minimization procedure on semantic
maps.
In Section 2.4, the structural use of case will be discussed. Transitive
predicates have two prominent semantic roles that are virtually always used.
Structural case is used to discriminate between these arguments. Just like
with the more semantic use of case, the precise semantics of the arguments
can be determined by the verb.
In Section 2.5, the use of case is modeled in semi-bidirectional OT. I
will show how the functional motivations behind the development of case
straightforwardly explain its use. Also, I will show how the structural use
of case follows from the fossilization procedure of optimization processes.
Finally, I will argue in Section 2.6 that the often assumed dichotomy
between the structural and the semantic use of case is a gradual difference
only.
2.2 The Form of Case
This section will show how Economy leads to the development of case
markers in a grammaticalization process.
We try to do what we need to do with the least effort possible. If not for
everything, at least it holds for human language usage. Zipf (1965) calls this
the Principle of Least Effort and illustrates it for the lexicon (see Hogeweg,
2009, for other constraints that are active in the organization of the lexicon).
10
2.2 The Form of Case
From the perspective of the speaker, it is maximally economical to refer to
all meanings with one word only. In this way she does not have to keep
up a large vocabulary nor does she have to select the right item from this
vocabulary to refer to a specific meaning. From the perspective of the
hearer, on the other hand, it is maximally economical to have a specific
word for every meaning. In this way, he does not have to find out which of
all possible meanings of a certain form the speaker intended, as there is only
one meaning for each form. Zipf (1965) calls the first tendency the Force
of Unification, the second the Force of Diversification. In this thesis, these
forces are referred to with the OT constraints Economy and Identify.
Clearly, the two constraints work in opposite directions.
For Zipf, a (what has become known as a) zipfian curve illustrates the
compromise between the two constraints. A zipfian curve shows the inverse
proportional relation between the frequency of a word and its rank in a
numerically sorted list:
(1) freqi = C/ranki (in which C is some constant)
According to this formula, the second most frequent word has half of the
frequency C of the most frequent one, the third most frequent word has one
third of this frequency, etc. Figure 2.1 shows this relation for all words in
Melville’s Moby Dick.1 Indeed the plot of the logarithm of the frequency
of word types (log frequency) against the logarithm of their rank (log word
rank) almost follows a straight line, which is what the formula above would
predict. Zipf explains the pattern as follows:
On the one hand, [Economy] will act in the direction of de-
creasing the number of different words to 1, while increasing the
frequency of that one word to 100%. Conversely, [Identify] will
act in the opposite direction of increasing the number of differ-
ent words while decreasing their average frequency of occurrence
toward 1. (Zipf, 1965, 22-23; emphasis in original)
This means that words with a more general meaning apply to more
meanings and, because of Economy, can and will be used more often
than the specific words for the specific meanings that are covered by the
more general words. Although this idea in itself sounds very plausible,
not everybody agrees that it also explains Zipf’s law. For example, Ja¨ger
and van Rooij (2007) show that this is better viewed as a consequence of
1Data from Baayen (2008).
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Figure 2.1: Zipf’s law: rank-frequency distribution of words in Moby Dick
the fact that the probability of the usage of a word is positively correlated
to its frequency in the preceding discourse. In any event, words differ with
respect to their frequency of use and words with a more general meaning are
expected to be used more often than words with a more specific meaning.
Zipf allows for meaning extension by proposing an optional expansion of
the meanings a frequent word has. If a word is frequent, apparently it does
a good job and therefore it is more likely to be used for other meanings than
a word that is not that frequent. Thus, if a frequent word has a general
meaning its meaning will get even more general and its frequency will go
up even further.
In this process of increased usage, not only the meaning of the word
is predicted to change, but also its form. Shortening the form of words
a speaker uses very often reduces the average amount of effort she has to
put in articulating her utterances. The more frequent a word is, the more
beneficial it is to reduce its form. As a result, highly frequent items should
consist of less material (Zipf, 1965, 59). This prediction is borne out. It
is illustrated in Figure 2.2 in which the logarithm of the length (log word
length) of the words in Moby Dick is plotted against their log rank.2 The
variation in length for infrequent words is bigger than for frequent words
(not all infrequent words are long). On average, however, the mean length
of a word clearly increases as its frequency of use decreases. Thus, frequency
2All words longer than 20 characters were excluded as these were mostly hyphenated
combinations.
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Figure 2.2: Rank-length distribution of words in Moby Dick
works as a flywheel: “greater frequency makes for greater ease which makes
for greater frequency and so on.” (Zipf, 1965, 62).
Instead of frequent words becoming shorter, it could in principle also be
the case that infrequent words become longer. Nettle (2002, 23-24) gives
an interesting explanation why there is only a shortening process at work
and not one of word lengthening. He explains this in terms of variation
in language acquisition. Normally, there is random variation in language
acquisition. Language learners occasionally may learn a word wrongly. If
this variation is random it will cancel itself out. As a result, language
will not change because of random variation only. Only when variation is
directionally skewed, languages are expected to change in that direction,
and diverge over time (Nettle, 2002, 25). Variation in word forms is indeed
directionally skewed. Words can be expressed correctly or wrongly, clearly
and slowly or sloppily and quickly. Speakers do not generally invent extra
phonetic material and add it to words. However, a final consonant may
easily be omitted and unstressed vowels left out. In other words, each
word has a realization continuum from the perfect realization to, in cases
of contextual redundancy, zero. Thus, language learners are faced with a
skewed range of variation. Accidentally, language learners may think that
a phonologically reduced instance really is the target form. However, they
will never think the target form is longer than it really is. Therefore, if a
form changes, it can only become shorter.
This idea can be used to explain why mostly frequent words become
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shorter. When a word, because of the particular context it appears in, has
a high real-time predictability, the hearer will be able to identify the word
in question on the basis of less acoustic information (see Ernestus, Baayen,
& Schreuder, 2002; Givo´n, 1976, 171, on pronouns). In these cases, the
speaker does not have to, and therefore will not, articulate all of the phono-
logical details of a word. This will more often be the case for general, fre-
quent words than for specific, infrequent words, since the former are more
predictable than the latter. Whenever some specific word is predictable,
its more general cover term will be predictable too. Now, because of the
more frequent use of the phonologically reduced form of predictable, more
frequent words, language learners may more often think that this phonolog-
ically reduced form is really the target form. Thus, phonological reduction
takes place as a result of predictability. Similarly, Haspelmath (2008, 206)
argues that frequency only indirectly causes economical coding: it is pre-
dictability that directly causes phonological reduction and it is frequency
that causes predictability.
In addition, Economy can be motivated by the production bottleneck
(see Levinson, 2000a, 2000b). Pre-articulation processes run faster than
the articulation process itself (Anderson, 1982; Wheeldon & Levelt, 1995,
327) and comprehension can handle increased speech rates without any
problems (Mehler et al., 1993). Because of this bottleneck, linguistic coding
is costly: It slows down the communication process. By saving some costly
morphemes, the speaker can speed up the communication process.
In sum, frequency causes a more general meaning, which leads to higher
predictability, which allows phonological reduction (which is more profitable
for frequent forms), which causes the learning of a shorter form, which
makes it more profitable to use. It could also be the case that the causal
relation at the outset is from a more general meaning to higher frequency. In
this version too, once the process is running, it is autocatalytic, that is, high
frequency eventually causes higher frequency via a number of intermediate
steps. There is an important difference between the two options though. If
frequency causes a more general meaning, the meaning of a frequent item
is expected to become more general over time, whereas if a more general
meaning causes a higher frequency of use, the meaning is not expected
to change any further as it is outside the frequency loop. Since frequent
words seem to develop to more general functions in the course of their lives
(Blake, 1994; BarDdal, 2009; Harris & Campbell, 1995), I opt for the version
in which the meaning is part of the repeating process.
Thus, highly frequent items are (or become) shorter and more grammat-
icalized and therefore they are more economical than less frequent items (see
14
2.2 The Form of Case
Haspelmath, 2008; Heine, Claudi, & Hu¨nnemeyer, 1991; Zeevat, 2007; By-
bee, Perkins, & Pagliuca, 1994; Zipf, 1965). An expression can be said to
be economical in comparison with another expression if it is shorter (fewer
words, fewer syllables, fewer segments) or otherwise requires less articula-
tory effort (Haspelmath, 2008; Kiparsky, 2004).
Now, what does this have to do with case? Morphological case, just like
for example agreement markers, is the ultimate result of this process. Be-
cause of semantic and morphophonemic changes that result from economy
(e.g. semantic bleaching and vowel harmony), word boundaries can become
opaque (Harris & Campbell, 1995, 89). These processes are most likely to
apply to the boundaries of the most frequent words, as explained above.
Because of its frequent use, a lexical item can get worn-out to such a de-
gree that it can no longer live as an independent word. It then becomes a
case suffix that is dependent on the noun it is attached to. Eventually, the
(predecessor of a) case suffix and a noun are so closely connected that they
are analyzed as one word. Differently from Harris and Campbell (1995), I
think this state of mutualism between the case suffix and its bearer is thus
the result of the new status of the frequent item, not the cause.
This process is more likely to apply to postpositions than to prepositions,
as Hawkins and Cutler (1988) show. For computational processing reasons,
both in production and comprehension, people like to know the argument
before its function. The effect of the suffix cannot be determined without
knowing the stem it combines with (Hawkins & Cutler, 1988, 307). As a
result, cases are mostly suffixes rather than prefixes.
To demonstrate the supposed frequency of cases, I extracted the first
20,000 words of four different Finnish newspapers from the online Finnish
CSC newspaper corpus:3 Demari 2000 (D), a newspaper of the Social
Democrats; Karjalainen 1998 (K) and Aamulehti 1999 (A), two fairly high
standard, big newspapers, the latter especially for the region of Tampere,
and Helsingin Sanomat AE 1995 (H), generally considered the highest qual-
ity newspaper. By using four different newspapers, we can informally check
for dispersion (see Gries, 2009): If the findings are consistent between dif-
ferent corpora, we can be more confident about our conclusions as we can
eliminate the possibility of a quirk of a particular corpus.
The proportion of words on which case is used are given in Table 2.1.
The distinction between structural and semantic cases will only become
relevant (and be discussed) below. It should be noted that in all four
3www.csc.fi, consulted on February 26, 2009. The number of words is motivated by
a technical restriction of the web interface of the CSC.
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newspapers some case form is used on nearly 60% of the words. For technical
reasons punctuation marks have been counted as words and the use of cases
on adpositions has been neglected. The actual proportion could be shown
to be even larger had this been corrected. On the basis of these numbers,
we can safely say that case is an extremely frequently used strategy.
Corpus
A D K H
Structural case .43 (8630) .44 (8754) .42 (8395) .44 (8774)
Semantic case .15 (2996) .15 (2988) .16 (3122) .14 (2762)
No case .42 (8374) .41 (8258) .42 (8483) .42 (8464)
Table 2.1: Proportion of case used on words in Finnish
Figure 2.3 shows how frequency relates to grammaticalization. The hor-
izontal axis represents the case cline introduced in the previous chapter, a
grammaticalization cline showing an increasing degree of grammaticaliza-
tion that eventually leads to case markers. Members on the right are the
grammaticalized versions of their neighbors to the left. This cline is really a
continuum without hard boundaries between the syntactic categories. The
white bars indicate the log number of types within each class; the black
bars indicate the log ratio of tokens per type, that is, the average frequency
of use of each type. It was decided to plot the log number in order to re-
duce the plotting range that would otherwise run from a number of types
of around 3000 (for nouns and verbs) to 3 (for structural case) and from a
type/token ratio of around 3000 (for structural case) to around 3 (for nouns
and verbs; cf. Table 2.2).
The number of types within each class decreases along the cline. That
is, the classes of nouns and verbs are open, there are much fewer adpo-
sitions, only a few spatial or semantic cases, and two or three structural
cases. In contrast, the token frequency increases along the cline. Seman-
tically very specific, lexical classes (like nouns, generally) consist of many
different types with a low token frequency; semantically less specific, gram-
maticalized classes (like spatial adpositions) consist of fewer types with a
higher token frequency.
The counts on which Figure 2.3 is based are given in Table 2.2. As one
can see, the numbers between the different corpora are similar enough to
warrant the general claim about a relation between frequency and gram-
maticalization.
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Figure 2.3: Relation between log number and degree of grammaticalization
Corpus Count Nouns/ Adpositions Semantic Structural
Verbs case case
A number of types 3306 76 13 3
ratio 3.0 4.7 229.6 2844.3
D number of types 3010 69 13 3.0
ratio 3.1 4.8 229.0 2898.0
K number of types 3379 76 13 3
ratio 3.0 4.2 239.4 2776.3
H number of types 3243 66 12 3
ratio 3.1 4.5 229.7 2886.3
Table 2.2: Case cline counts (number of types and type/token ratio)
The results clearly support the hypothesis of the role of frequency in the
development of case. Case forms a closed class of extremely frequent types.
Because of this frequency, case markers are more susceptible to Economy,
as explained above.
Since case forms a closed class and since case markers generally are in
complementary distribution (exceptions to such mutual exclusion are cases
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in languages that allow case stacking, see Plank, 1995), cases can be listed
in a case paradigm. In fact, a (case) paradigm is nothing but the list of
some set of grammatical morphemes that can be affixed to content words.
In Table 2.3, the Latin case paradigm for feminine nouns ending in -a (the
first declension; Mansveld & Waleson, 1970) is given. As most people will
know, there are other declensions in Latin with other case forms for the same
case functions. This is indeed typical for paradigms. They often come in
different declensions, or distinguish between different word classes.4
Case name Singular Plural
Nominative mensa mensae
Genitive mensae mensa¯rum
Dative mensae mens¯is
Accusative mensam mensa¯s
Ablative mensa¯ mens¯is
Table 2.3: Latin case paradigm
With its five cases (six, if you count vocative as a separate case), Latin
is fairly typical for a case language. In the language sample of Iggesen
(2005), only 23 languages are reported with a two-member case system, 30
have three to five cases, 84 have six or more. These numbers are to some
extent dependent on geographical distribution. Languages in the Pacific
and Eurasia have on average significantly more cases than can be expected
by chance distribution of inventory sizes over region, languages in Africa
have less. In the Americas, the observed inventory sizes are as expected (cf.
Appendix C; see Bickel, 2008, on how to compute these expectations).
In this section we saw that frequency causes the generalization and ex-
tension of the meaning of an item, resulting in increased predictability that
causes its form to wear out. Eventually, the frequent item loses its syn-
tactic autonomy and becomes a suffix in a case paradigm. This does not
yet provide a sufficient definition of case. For one, it is unclear at which
point some linguistic element has lost enough of its syntactic autonomy or
4Carstairs (1983) shows how the number of declensions is kept to a logical minimum
given the set of inflectional morphemes. That is, Latin words do not randomly select one
of the possible nominative markers from the different declensions and then independently
select from the set of genitive markers, but rather the different case markers come in pre-
given sets. All words that have a nominative case marker from a certain declension will
have the accusative case marker from that same declension. Thus, paradigms are regular
and predictable and, therefore, usable and learnable.
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acquired enough functions to be called a case marker. Unfortunately, we
will never be able to answer this question. As mentioned above, the bound-
aries on the case cline are fuzzy. Indeed, as Haspelmath (2007) notes,
what exactly is a case may be a matter of taste of the linguist. In any
event, the constructions I analyze as spatial case in this thesis are among
the most grammaticalized constructions of language. To distinguish case
from agreement, I will follow Blake (1994) in saying that case is a marker
of dependent nouns for the type of relationships they bear to their heads.
Otherwise, agreement is similar to case as being a relational marker that is
the result of a diachronic economy process.
What is still missing in the characterization of case most significantly is
a specification of the meaning of case. So, what are these frequent functions
that need to be expressed so often that they wear down their markers? This
will be the topic of the next section.
2.3 The Meaning of Case
In the previous section I have discussed the form of case, arguing for the
importance of Economy. In this section, we will have a closer look at the
use of case and the role of semantic generalization, which was only men-
tioned in general terms previously. One could say, like Zipf, that semantic
generalization is a kind of speaker’s economy too as it reduces the size of the
lexicon (cf. also Stiebels, 2002, 27). Alternatively, the use of more general
lexical items can be thought to reduce the search time for the expression of
a given meaning. Note that these two options are perfectly compatible.
Generalization is a very general cognitive principle. To make sense of
the world, we impose categorizations on its infinite variation in objects, and
segmentations on its ongoing activity. The more general the category, the
more often it can be used, and the more often something is used, the more
likely it is to develop a case marker. It will be argued that case is used
as a marker for semantic roles, language-specific generalizations about the
functions participants have in a communicated event.
According to Rosch (1978), humans, like probably most other living be-
ings, categorize stimuli. In this way, humans can deal with the infinitely
many meanings in the world using finite cognitive resources (cf. also the sys-
temic constraints on language of Talmy, 2000, 244). The more fine-grained
the categories, the more informative the categorization system. On the
other hand, the more coarse-grained, the better the infinite differences are
reduced to usable proportions. The principle of categorization is a general
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cognitive function that plays an important role in language. For example, it
is known from phonology, where gradually changing sounds are categorized
as belonging to different phoneme categories (see, for example, Liberman,
Harris, Hoffman, & Griffith, 1957; McMurray, Aslin, Tanenhaus, Spivey, &
Subik, 2008). In the lexicon, the infinite variation in objects is reduced to
a manageable amount of (typically) nouns (see Zipf, 1965). Similarly, verbs
(mostly) are generalizations about events, imposed segmentations of ever-
changing ongoing activity (see Kurby & Zacks, 2007; Zacks et al., 2001;
Zacks & Tversky, 2001). These events necessarily differ as they concern
different points in time (under the assumptions that we only have one time
line and that we cannot step in the same river twice).
Languages differ with respect to the quality and quantity of distinctions
they make. In fact, a language is a particular ordering and categorization
of a fuzzy world that is agreed upon by the community of its speakers (plus
a set of rules of grammar and pragmatics, of course). Clearly, culture is
inextricably bound up with language in this process of categorization. But
of course, we all live in the same world and many notions (i.e., categoriza-
tions of objects or activities) are shared between languages. At a slightly
more abstract level, even more correspondences are expected (Rosch, 1978).
For example, the precise semantics and pragmatics of HIT may differ be-
tween languages dependent on, among many other things, the number of
contrastive predicates, but the semantic argument structure, i.e. the list of
events participants, will generally contain a hitter and a hittee.
Argument structure can be represented in standard predicate logic as in
(2), in which the first argument is the hitter, the second one the hittee.
(2) Hit(x, y)
Instead, however, I will use a neo-Davidsonian representation in which these
core arguments, as well as adverbials like instruments and locations, are re-
lated to the event argument e by event modifiers: two-place predicates
denoting thematic relations (Davidson, 2001; Parsons, 1994). These event
modifiers are again generalizations, as I will explain below. Like in Parsons’
work, the representation in (3) is not meant as the semantic structure of
hit. Instead, it is a logical form (see Williams, 1981). In my account, a
logical form is the representation by a speaker of a particular event (and
should not be confused with LF in generative grammar in which it is the
result of syntactic processing). A logical form consists of only those ingredi-
ents that the speaker finds worthwhile to communicate. These ingredients
are coincidental, and may differ between events, speakers, speech settings,
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and languages. Thus, a logical form, as illustrated in (3), represents an
individual construal of a particular event for communication. The thematic
relations are language-specific semantic roles into which the arguments are
categorized.
(3) Hit(e)&Agent(e, x)&Patient(e, y)&Loc(e, z)&Ins(e, w)
Event modifiers can be freely added, formally by the predicate conjunction
operation MOD (see Maienborn, 2001). This operator takes a modifier and
an expression to be modified and yields a conjunction of predicates.
(4) MOD: λQλPλx[P (x)&Q(x)]
Thus, instead of taking x and y to be special and defining ingredients of the
predicate, they are (arguments of) event modifiers in this view. This illus-
trates the principal equivalence of all arguments at this point. Arguments
at a logical form are those things in the world that are judged relevant by
a speaker for the expression of a certain event. Again, this selection may
differ between languages, among speakers of the same language, and within
the same speaker between situations. At a low level of generalization, the
relation between the participants and the event are situation and predicate
specific (‘hitter’, ‘thing used to hit with’), at a more generalized level, they
are categorized in semantic roles, a notion that I will explain now.
Fillmore (1968) proposes a generalization about the relationships be-
tween individual predicates and arguments in terms of case roles, in subse-
quent work mostly called thematic or semantic roles. These semantic roles
can be seen as medium-level generalizations about semantic predicate ar-
guments. As explained above, the meaning and argument structure of a
certain predicate are low-level generalizations about situations and events
in the world (see Rosch, 1978; Kurby & Zacks, 2007; Zacks et al., 2001). For
example, transitive verbs like break and kill generally have a ‘breaker’ and
‘killer’, and a ‘breakee’ and ‘killee’. At the medium level, we can charac-
terize these as an argument that is voluntarily instigating and performing
the action denoted by the verb, and an argument undergoing it and be-
ing changed by it. The semantic role that is often used for the former is
Agent, whereas Patient is generally used for the latter. Other semantic roles
are, for example, Instrument (a thing that is used to achieve something),
Theme (a thing that undergoes an action without being changed by it),
and Beneficiary (person for whom some action is performed). High-level
generalizations lead to notions like subject and object, and will be discussed
in Section 2.4.
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Semantic roles are generalizations about event participants necessary
for communication. The semantics of an argument in a particular event
is much richer but cannot efficiently be communicated as such for all in-
dividual participants. By categorizing arguments into semantic roles, the
speaker can use more economical means of expression, namely the forms
corresponding to semantic roles. From the semantics of the predicate, the
hearer can tell the precise argument function. For example, the Agent of
to hit is a hitter, the Agent of to walk is a walker. Such a distinction
between a rich conceptual and language-ready logical level has previously
been proposed by Levelt (1989); Bierwisch and Schreuder (1992); Wunder-
lich (1997), and Jackendoff (1983). Differently from most of these accounts
(but like Williams, 1981 and Parsons, 1994), however, in my proposal all
arguments are optional and verbs do not come with a strict argument struc-
ture. A logical form does not consist of obligatory ingredients, but only of
those that a speaker wants to convey.
Attractive as they may sound, it is notoriously difficult and a matter
of ongoing debate to determine which generalizations should be made and
how these generalizations should be defined and labeled. Because of this,
most linguists agree that semantic roles are a problematic concept (Butt,
2006, 31). The problem is the, in my view, wrong assumption that semantic
roles are universal concepts. Instead, Langacker (1991, 284) argues that a
definite list is neither necessary nor achievable. Semantic roles are gener-
alizations and languages can differ in the degree they abstract away from
the unique semantic properties each verb defines for its participants (for
a similar view, see Croft, 1991). I too think semantic roles should not be
any more problematic than the notion of words in the lexicon. There is no
universal set of semantic roles simply because semantic roles are language
specific generalizations about arguments, just like the lexicon is a set of
language specific generalizations about individual objects and events. As
said above, the higher the level of generalization, the more commonalities
we can expect between the categories of different languages. The set of
general principles that are useful and applied at this level of categorization
is restricted. As a result, which semantic roles are discerned and which ar-
gument functions they include will be comparable between languages. This
maybe explains the quest for a universal list of semantic roles. However,
the results of this categorization do vary between languages and the failure
to establish this list can be seen as evidence for the view of semantic roles
as language-particular generalizations. Such a view is well-established with
respect to the lexicon and I think it should be used for other grammatical
phenomena such as semantic roles and morphological case.
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A semantic role is nothing but a set of argument functions that share
a particular construction or exhibit similar grammatical behavior. For ex-
ample, we could discern the role of Opponent in the prepositional domain
in Dutch (see Lestrade & de Swart, to appear), as illustrated in (5).
Dutch
(5) Wij
we
spelen
play
vanavond
tonight
tegen
against
F.C.
F.C.
Bal
Bal
op
op
het
het
dak
dak
4.
4
‘Tonight, we are playing against F.C. Bal op het dak 4.’
The preposition tegen ‘against’ in Dutch expresses, among other roles, the
role of Opponent. Even though this role does not seem to play a role outside
of the prepositional domain in the grammar of Dutch, it is a generalization
about the event participants in (6) nevertheless, which could accordingly
be analyzed as Opponents.
Dutch
(6) a. F.C.
F.C.
Bal
Bal
op
op
het
het
dak
dak
4
4
verhindert
prevents
ons
us
te
to
scoren.
score
‘F.C. Bal op het dak 4 prevents us from scoring.’
b. F.C.
F.C.
Bal
Bal
op
op
het
het
dak
dak
4
4
loopt
walks
ons
us
in
in
de
the
weg.
way
‘F.C. Bal op het dak 4 is walking in our way.’
c. F.C.
F.C.
Bal
Bal
op
op
het
het
dak
dak
4
4
schopt
kicks
onze
our
spits
striker
omver.
over
‘F.C. Bal op het dak 4 knocks down our striker.’
Probably not everyone will accept the presence of the Opponent role in
Dutch. To do so, one might wish to see some additional relevant grammat-
ical consequences. However, such criteria for the status of semantic role are
debatable. If some language distinguishes a role in an interestingly enough
manner, that is, by a case marker generally, we are probably more willing
to recognize it in another language. For example, just like for the Opponent
role, the only relevant instance of the Comitative in Dutch seems to be a
prepositional construction (samen) met ‘(together) with’. But because of
the existence of Comitative case markers in many languages of the world,
the identification of this role is probably less controversial.
Now, how does the expression of a semantic role by a case marker come
about? At the low level of event segmentation, the set of all event-particular
arguments (‘hitters of inanimates’, ‘thinkers of complex thoughts’, ‘invol-
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untary helpers in table making events’, etc.) constitute a multidimensional
semantic map (see Haspelmath, 2003). The dimensions of this map con-
sist of all factors that are relevant in that language in the distinction of
semantic roles. For example, if animacy is a factor, ‘readers of books’ is
maximally distinguished from ‘books that are read’ on this dimension; if
volitionality is a factor, ‘hitters of men’ are generally maximally different
from ‘men that are hit’ here. These two dimensions differ but they are not
necessarily at right angles. It is impossible for a language to label every
specific argument function on this map (see Rosch, 1978). In principle,
semantic roles originate as nothing but (again language-particular) focus
points on this map, i.e., argument functions that are more frequently used.
A particular argument function borrows the form of its nearest focus point,
thereby increasing the frequency of use of this form and extending its mean-
ing. This choice for a focus point for a particular argument function can be
formalized as a distance minimalization procedure on an ordered field, as
proposed for the color domain by Ja¨ger and van Rooij (2007). By choosing
the nearest focus point for the expression of a particular argument function,
the speaker minimizes the distance between the intended meaning and the
resulting interpretation. All other forms would lead to an interpretation
that is more distant from the intended one.
As a result of this procedure, the map is divided into contiguous cate-
gories of semantic roles. The focus points at the centers become the proto-
typical instances of their own semantic-role category. As in the color exam-
ple of Ja¨ger and van Rooij (2007), languages differ in the number of (seman-
tic role) categories they distinguish. The distribution of labor changes in a
more or less predictable way with the addition of new categories. Differently
from the example Ja¨ger and van Rooij (2007) use, however, the underlying
field of semantic roles need not be inherently organized along a fixed set of
dimensions for all languages. The number and type of dimensions on the
argument map are themselves language-particular categorization criteria,
such as animacy, volitionality, control, instigation, abstractness, etc. The
question what exactly the different language-particular dimensions and dis-
tributions are, is uninteresting from the general perspective developed here,
viz. the view of semantic roles as a generalization about argument functions
that can be formalized using a distance minimalization procedure.
Crucially different from the procedure described in Ja¨ger and van Rooij
(2007), the eventual interpretation of the marker is not the focus point, but
the more specific interpretation of this semantic role given the predicate
with which it is used. That is, the hearer only uses the semantic role as
a starting point for interpretation. By using the predicate semantics the
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hearer can enrich the semantics proper of the semantic role to arrive at (an
interpretation close to) the original argument function. This follows from
the interaction of the constraints FaithL and AddW , as will be shown now.
The set of semantic roles to choose from and the structure of the se-
mantic map in the first place are language particular. That is, the general
principle of a distance minimization procedure to choose a specific semantic
role for an argument function leads to language specific outcomes depend-
ing on the organization of the map. The need to be faithful to this language
particular organization is expressed by the constraint FaithL. This con-
straint basically summarizes the rules of a language that should be followed.
In its application to semantic maps, FaithL dictates the speaker to choose
the form of the nearest focus point available in the language to express some
argument function. That is, it dictates to follow the distance minimization
procedure and not to cross borders on the map. Note that the very same
principle applies to the use of content words for low-level generalizations
(and therefore should not be controversial). If you want to refer to a ‘man’
you use the word man, not boy or, even worse, girl. If your language, like
English, distinguishes between ‘nephews’ and ‘cousins’ you have to use the
equivalents to nephew and cousin. If not, like Dutch, you can use (the
equivalent to) neef for both.
FaithL is a self-evident but crucial speaker’s constraint, also present in
the work of Grice, that guides the choice among semantic role expressions for
argument functions. At the same time, FaithL tells the hearer to interpret
the utterance accordingly (in this use, it is more like the original constraint
FaithInt, proposed by Zeevat, 2000, which tells the hearer to make use
of all available morphosyntactic information). The interpretation range of
a semantic role is similarly given by the distance minimization procedure.
By the combination of the information from the semantic role and the
semantics of the predicate, the hearer can determine the actual argument
function. The integration of this, and possibly other, information is called
for by AddW . This constraint requires the hearer to enrich the semantics
proper of the utterance with world knowledge. For example, as explained
above, the Agent of ‘to hit’ is a hitter. AddW ensures that the hearer will
indeed make this inference (and stay within the boundaries set by FaithL).
The way in which the semantic map of argument structure is cut up into
different semantic roles is of course dependent on the number of cases/semantic
roles (see Ja¨ger & van Rooij, 2007). Indeed, Butt (2007) argues that a case
paradigm is a complex system of semantic contrasts. Case forms jostle with
each other to occupy a particular semantic space. New case markers may
enter the system to reinforce existing semantic contrasts, introduce new
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ones, or fill vacancies that emerge by, for example, case syncretism. Inter-
estingly, the same source marker may thus end up expressing different case
functions in different languages depending on how it slots into the system of
semantic contrasts (see Zeevat, 2007, for a simulation of this process). This
jostling and system dependent function make perfect sense if case forms
compete for space on a semantic map.
The more frequently something is expressed, the more suitable its ex-
pression is for a case marker. Wunderlich and Laka¨mper (2001, 378) claim
that the potential number of semantic cases is in principle unlimited, as the
number of semantic roles in principle is too. However, I do not think that
the number of semantic roles, and therefore the number of cases, is unlim-
ited. Increasing the number of semantic roles necessarily decreases their
scope on the map and therefore decreases of their usage frequency. Only
when semantic roles are general and frequent enough, can they develop case
markers (cf. Section 2.2). The higher the level of a generalization, the more
frequently it can be used, and the more suitable it is for case. At the same
time however, the higher the level of semantic generalization, the less likely
it is that languages find it appropriate to make this generalization, because
too much information is lost. The interaction between these competing mo-
tivations results in case systems of varying size, on average 6-7 (see Iggesen,
2005, and the discussion in the previous section). Only the most frequently
used semantic roles are expected to develop case markers. Prime examples
of functions that meet these requirements are Agents and Patients, Ben-
eficiaries, Comitatives, Instruments, and spatial meaning. As I will show
in Chapter 3, we can zoom in even further on spatial meaning. Some spa-
tial meaning aspects are necessarily more frequent than others which again
leads to a difference in grammaticalization.
In short, a semantic role is a language-specific medium-level generaliza-
tion of argument functions. Because they are general, they are frequently
used and expressed by more grammatical means. If a semantic role is fre-
quent enough, its marker will develop into a case marker. Because of the
level of generalization, semantic roles are expected to be comparable be-
tween languages. Still, the exact semantics of roles may differ depending
on the case paradigm they appear in.
Although all semantic roles at a logical form are equal in being event
modifiers, their frequency of selection differs. Some event modifiers are vir-
tually always judged relevant for communication in two similar situations
to which the same event predicate applies. Notably, if there is such a thing
as a Patient in an event it will generally be part of the logical form of the
event. This importance of the Patient is understandable as transitive verbs
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are defined on the basis of the effect they have on their Patient. For ex-
ample, the verb to break denotes the transition from an undamaged to a
broken status of its Patient. Indeed, as Marantz (1984) shows, more than
any other role the Patient determines the interpretation of the verb, as il-
lustrated in (7) (cf. also Williams, 1981):
(Marantz, 1984, 25)
(7) a. throw a baseball
b. throw a party
A person throwing a baseball is performing a very different action than
a person throwing a party. According to Marantz (1984), almost every
simple transitive verb in English expresses a wide range of predicates, the
actual interpretation depending on the direct object. As will be shown in
Section 2.4, those semantic roles that are virtually always selected by a
predicate are expressed by structural case, which is an even further gram-
maticalized version of case.
First, however, note that this defining importance of Patients is not suf-
ficient for them to become obligatorily expressed. Often, also Instruments
meet this requirement. For example, it is the comb that makes a combing
event and it is a rake that makes a raking event. Still, these modifiers are
hardly ever explicitly mentioned. One could say that these are so important
for the meaning that they became lexicalized (to comb is ‘to make hair look
tidy using a comb’), but then it should not be possible to say something
like (8), in which no comb is used.
Dutch
(8) Lotte
Lotte
kamt
combs
haar
her
haar
hair
met
with
een
a
vork.
fork
‘Lotte is combing her hair with a fork.’
Also, important as they may be, Patients are not obligatory. Consider
the following example.
Dutch
(9) Mozes
Mozes
heeft
has
gegeten.
eaten
‘Mozes has eaten.’
An eating event necessarily includes food that is eaten. As (9) shows how-
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ever, it is not necessary to make it part of the expression or logical form.
Also in (10), the Patient is left out. Out of the context, this sentence
may sound odd. However in the context of a bear roaming around the
countryside killing sheep and other farm animals night after night, it is per-
fectly grammatical (see de Swart, 2007, Section 2.1.3, for more examples of
transitive verbs without object arguments).
(de Swart, 2007, 15, after Goldberg 1995)
(10) Last night the bear killed again.
Similarly to this omission of Patients, it is possible to leave out the other
most pervasive event modifier, the Agent. Passive constructions without
oblique Agents, as in (11), are well-known examples of this.
(11) The house was built.
Another example is (13), in which only the Patient modifier is expressed of
an event in which someone (the Agent) is cooking potatoes (the Patient)
(cf. also Wunderlich, 1997).
Dutch
(12) De
the
aardappels
potatoes
koken.
cook.3pl
‘The potatoes are boiling.’
The optionality of arguments is also assumed in constructionist ap-
proaches. The object of study in construction grammar are constructions,
learned pairings of form with semantic or discourse function (Goldberg,
2006, 5). In this type of approach, verbs do not come with a predeter-
mined argument structure. Instead, verbs occur in constructions. This is
illustrated in the following examples in which verbs that generally are con-
sidered intransitive combine with a direct object (see de Swart, 2007, for
further discussion).
(Goldberg, 2006, 6)
(13) a. He sneezed his tooth right across town
b. She smiled herself an upgrade
Thus, frequent as they may be, it is possible to leave out Agent and
Patient modifiers in the expression of transitive events. Better put, it is
possible to construe a transitive event without an Agent or Patient modifier.
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In fact, the very reason for Parsons (1994) to analyze core arguments as
event modifiers is that they are omissible like this. For me, representing
the argument structure in this way shows that all modifiers in principle are
equivalent in the sense that they are optional event modifiers. They do
differ, however, in two important and probably related respects. First, as
mentioned above, their frequency of occurrence differs as some modifiers are
more pervasive than others. Second, as Primus (2010) notes, semantic roles
differ in animacy which has important consequences for their structural use
because of the inherent prominence of animates (cf. Section 2.4 and the
contributions in de Swart, Lamers, & Lestrade, 2008). Animates are more
likely to become topic than inanimates and therefore animate roles are more
often used in topic position than inanimate ones.
In conclusion, the meaning of case is a semantic role, a generalization
about relations between events and event participants. The meaning of an
utterance can be represented as a logical form, a formula with only those
ingredients a speaker wishes to communicate. In the particular event at
hand, the arguments have a very specific meaning, an argument function.
For communication, however, a semantic role is used. If semantic roles are
general and frequent enough, their markers will develop into case markers.
The choice and interpretation of these case markers is guided by the con-
straints FaithL and AddW . As the term “medium-level generalizations”
already suggests, we can still go up one level of generalization. This brings
us to the realm of structural case and the next section.
2.4 The Structural Use of Case
When taking into consideration the set of predicates that have two pervasive
event modifiers like hit, see, help, and read, a final (circular) generalization
can be made. For all these transitive predicates, there are two prominent
event modifiers that are virtually always selected. Without making appeal
to any of their theoretical connotations yet, I call these prominent partici-
pants the subject and object. Subject and object are the highest semantic
generalizations, therefore the most frequently used functions, and therefore
the most eligible case candidates. Structural case is used to mark the sub-
ject and object. That is, if a language has case, it will generally use it at
least structurally. As Blake (1994) notes, this indeed seems to be the case
(for exceptions, see Iggesen, 2005).
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2.4.1 On Subject and Object
The pervasiveness of two arguments in transitive constructions could be ex-
plained by the need to know the cause and result of an event to understand
it. According to Zacks (Kurby & Zacks, 2007; Zacks et al., 2001; Zacks
& Tversky, 2001), we perceive continuous action in the dynamic world as
consisting of a string of discrete events. Segmentation simplifies an ex-
tended interval of time to a single chunk of information. This spontaneous
segmentation is related to core functions of cognitive control and memory
encoding (Kurby & Zacks, 2007, 72). Predicting and anticipating enables
one to encode structure from the continuous perceptual stream, to under-
stand what an actor will do next, and to select one’s own future actions.5
As is the case with objects (Rosch, 1978), if done well, event segmentation
saves processing resources and improves comprehension. Event boundaries
are established at points at which the prediction of the next activity be-
comes more difficult or fails. Indeed, Zacks and Tversky (2001, 8) show
that if subjects do not understand the purpose of some activity, they tend
to divide the stream of behavior into smaller units. For example, someone
who does not know that potatoes are edible will segment a cooking potatoes
event into the subevents washing potatoes, peeling potatoes, boiling potatoes,
and putting potatoes on a plate. Note that the principle of event segmen-
tation is very similar to that of word segmentation which will probably be
more familiar (Saffran, Newport, & Aslin, 1996) to linguists. For example,
in the continuous speech signal /spi:tSsIgnl/ the transition probability be-
tween /S/ and /s/ is the lowest. This helps in the recognition of the words
speech and signal. Saffran et al. (1996) show that this use of the transition
probability between two subsequent phonological elements can even be ap-
plied to word segmentation in artificial languages. Apparently, the same
cognitive principle is at work in different domains.
The principle of event segmentation could explain the frequent selection
at a logical form of Agents and Patients. As will be discussed in more
detail below, in prototypical transitive sentences, the Agent instigates an
event that ends with some change in the Patient. Similarly, for verbs of
emotion and perception, the Stimulus and the Perceiver are generally rep-
resented at a logical form since a perception event begins with a Stimulus
and ends at its Perceiver. Thus, subject and object make an event com-
plete, a saying that is used in their informal definition too. For Patient
5The segmentation of activities is corroborated with evidence from reading-time, neu-
rophysiological (fMRI) and oculomotor (pupil diameter) experiments which will not be
discussed here.
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arguments, the frequency of selection can in addition be explained by its
defining importance for the predicate, as explained in the previous section.
Moreover, for all argument functions that concern human performers, an-
imacy is an important factor. We simply like to talk about animates (see
Dahl, 2008), so if there is a human or animate participant in an event, it is
probably represented linguistically too.
In the previous section, we have seen that the exact semantics of a se-
mantic role can be filled by the predicate semantics (the Agent of ‘to hit’
being a hitter, etc.). The same holds for the subject and object in a tran-
sitive construction. Consider the German examples in (14).
German
(14) a. Der
the
Mann
man
schlug
hit
den
the
Jungen.
boy
‘The man hit the boy.’
b. Der
the
Mann
man
sah
saw
den
the
Jungen.
boy.
‘The man saw the boy.’
The semantic functions of the arguments can be described at various levels
of generalization. At a low-level in (14-a), the man is a hitter (or even
more specifically, a hitter of boys) and the boy is a hittee (by a man). In
(14-b) the man is a seeer and the boy someone who is seen. At a medium
level, the man is an Agent and a Perceiver, and the boy a Patient and
Theme/Stimulus, respectively. At the highest level, the man is a subject
and the boy is an object in both sentences. Just like we know that the
Agent of ‘to hit’ is a hitter, we know that the subject of ‘to hit’ is a hitter
and its object a hittee (and similarly for ‘to see’).
But if there are two prominent arguments, how do we know which pred-
icate argument is the subject and which is the object? In principle, the
mapping between syntactic and semantic functions in (14) could have been
the other way around, the interpretation being that the boy is the Agent
and the man the Patient. This mapping follows from the argument selection
principle in (15), proposed by Dowty (1991). Given a predicate with two
predicate arguments, the selection principle will tell which argument will
become the subject and which will become the object.
(15) The argument selection principle (Dowty, 1991, 576)
In predicates with grammatical subject and object, the argument
for which the predicate entails the greatest number of Proto-Agent
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properties will be lexicalized as the subject, the argument having
the greatest number of Proto-Patient properties will be lexicalized
as the direct object of the predicate.
This principle requires that in predicates with two syntactic arguments, the
argument that resembles a Proto-Agent the most becomes the subject and
the argument with the greatest number of Proto-Patient properties will be
lexicalized as the direct object of the predicate (Dowty, 1991). Note that,
in terms of the semantic map of argument functions that was proposed in
Section 2.3, this procedure is really a distance minimization procedure in
which there are two focus points only.
Dowty’s preliminary list of semantically independent proto-properties,
which can accordingly be understood as the dimensions of the map, are
listed in (16) and (17):
(16) Proto-Agent properties (Dowty, 1991)
a. volitional involvement in the event or state
b. sentience (and/or perception)
c. causing an event or change of state in another participant
d. movement (relative to the position of another participant)
e. (independent existence)
(17) Proto-Patient properties (Dowty, 1991)
a. undergoes change of state
b. incremental theme
c. causally affected by another participant
d. stationary relative to movement of another participant
e. (no independent existence)
The idea of a prototype definition of semantic roles is used in differ-
ent frameworks and developed further in later work. The multifactorial
definition in terms of prototypes and the argument selection principle are
mostly maintained, the difference is in the list of properties and the num-
ber of proto-roles that can be characterized with it. For example, Primus
(1999, 48) proposes more primitive predicates to define the properties with,
such as CONTROL, CAUSE, MOVE, and EXPERIENCE. She redefines
proto-properties as corresponding pairs (e.g. cause versus being caused,
control versus being controlled, etc.; Primus, 2003, 379-380) and she argues
that Proto-Agents and Proto-Patients are thematically dependent (Primus,
1999, 52). That is, to have control implies that there is something con-
trolled. Thus, Primus proposes the application of a lexical decomposition
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approach to entailed argument properties. In these approaches, the lexical
meaning of an entry consists of a complex internal structure composed of
primitive functions (see Bierwisch & Schreuder, 1992; Wunderlich, 1997;
Jackendoff, 1983; Ramchand, 2002; Kiparsky, 2001).
Just as Primus did, Grimm (2005, 20-22) defines a single set of Proto-
Agent properties and the Proto-Patient is defined by the lack of these prop-
erties. He too decomposes the properties proposed by Dowty into more
basic notions but argues that CAUSE and CONTROL are complex notions
themselves. His list of properties is given in (18).
Proto-Agent properties (Grimm, 2005)
(18) a. volition: Volition is assigned to any argument wherein the
participant intends, i.e., consciously plans, to bring about the
event designated by the predicate.
b. sentient: Sentient concerns conscious involvement in the action
or state. It is entailed by, among others, emotional, psycho-
logical and cognition predicates.
c. motion: Motion is entailed just in case the argument is required
to be in motion.
d. instigation: Any argument effecting the event designated by
the predicate is entailed in the instigation property.
e. persistence: An entity which is unchanged by the event or state
is said to persist.
The final property concerns both existential persistence, the essence re-
maining the same during the course of the event/state, and qualitative
persistence, persistence in all particulars. Furthermore, it can be divided
according to whether it is entailed at the beginning of the event or at the
end.
Very similar to the multidimensional semantic map I propose, Grimm
(2005) proposes to view these primitives as atoms that can be logically
combined to form a lattice. For example, a predicate can entail none of
the above properties for an argument ({∅}); one property only ({motion},
{sentient}), or a combination of properties ({motion, instigation, sentient}).
In these combinations, volition entails sentience. The “maximal agent”
occupies the top region in this lattice, that is, it includes all Proto-Agent
properties; the “maximal patient” occupies the bottom region.
Both Primus and Grimm allow for other proto-roles than the two Dowty
proposes by a combination of properties. Primus (1998, 1999) adds a Proto-
Recipient which is thematically in between the Proto-Agent and Proto-
33
Chapter 2. About Case
Patient as it is caused by the Agent (Proto-Patient property) to become in
possession (Proto-Agent property) of something. Similarly, Grimm (2005)
characterizes different case markers as regions on his agentivity lattice.
The original idea of proto-arguments and the elaborations discussed
above are integrated into my proposal. In my view, Dowty really describes
a generalized distance minimalization procedure for two semantic roles that
makes use of the ordering dimensions animacy, volitionality, affectedness,
and motion. In addition to the Proto-Recipient that Primus adds, and like
Grimm, I allow for additional proto-arguments. What is different from all
three proposals, however, are the proto-types of semantic roles and the di-
mensions along which they are characterized are language-particular choices
in my account, not universals. But of course, given the high level of gen-
eralization, many commonalities in the ordering dimensions are expected
between languages.
As an aside, I do not think it is necessary to assume specific seman-
tic primitives by which semantic roles are decomposed. That is, unlike
linguists, normal speakers probably do not have a notion of, for example,
volitionality by which they actively classify arguments. In my view, such
semantic primitives are the result of semantic analysis but not cognitive
or linguistic entities. I prefer an account in which semantic primitives are
emergent phenomena, like in connectionistic approaches (Smolensky & Leg-
endre, 2006). Connectionism is inspired by the view of the human brain
as a neural network that works by massive parallel distributed processing.
In connectionism, meaning is also decomposed. But instead of using se-
mantic primitives, this is done into neural activation patterns, represented
by vector representations. Higher level, abstract, symbolic structures are
the result of the reanalysis of this lower-level connectionist architecture.
Mental representations are not mapped to individual neurons but realized
as activation patterns of combinations of neurons. In this perspective, the
overlap between different neurological representations of argument func-
tions accounts for the emergence of semantic roles. Entries are expected to
overlap at the very low symbolic level at which all entries are ultimately
decomposed, because of the distributed architecture. The amount of over-
lap determines the neurological similarity and hence the semantic distance
between two argument functions on the map. In this way, the semantic map
of argument functions is translatable in neurocognitive or connectionistic
terms without making use of semantic primitives.
Before we continue, a few more words on the notions of subject and ob-
ject are in place. Even though the first term was used loosely in the above,
it is far from clear what a subject is exactly. Chafe (1976) distinguishes
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between three types of subject: the psychological subject (the discourse
topic), the grammatical or syntactic subject (the version discussed above),
and the logical subject (in terms of semantic role, the Agent basically).
They are illustrated in (19).
(Chafe, 1976)
(19) a. Betty peeled the onions. (psychological, grammatical, logical:
Betty)
b. The onions were peeled by Betty. (logical: Betty; psychologi-
cal, grammatical: onions)
c. The onions, Betty peeled. (psychological: onions; grammatical,
logical: Betty)
Li and Thompson (1976) show that syntactic subjects are less impor-
tant than often thought and that topics are at least as basic to grammar
as subjects. The details of the discussion of the characteristics that dis-
tinguish subjects from topics need not concern us here. The general idea
is that there is a close (selectional) relationship between verb and subject,
but not between verb and topic. Whereas in subject-prominent languages,
the basic structure of the sentence is best analyzed as subject–predicate;
in topic prominent-languages, the basic structure of the sentence should
be analyzed as topic–comment. Confusingly, in most languages familiar to
us the subject and topic have merged and are no longer distinguishable in
most sentence types. In fact, the grammatical or syntactic subject could be
said to be the grammaticalized topic that has become part of the argument
structure of the verb (Li & Thompson, 1976; Lehmann, 1976; Givo´n, 1976).
For example, Givo´n (1976) argues that subject agreement developed via the
grammaticalization of topic coreferential pronouns. This grammaticaliza-
tion relation explains why topics and subjects share many properties (cf.
also the contributions in van Bergen & de Hoop, 2009; especially Brunetti,
2009).
Because of the merging of topic and subject, what we think of as the
subject partly concerns the topic really. According to Dahl (2008) we prefer-
ably talk about ourselves and our fellow men. That is, humans are often
the topic of our utterances. Thus, in addition to predicate entailments that
determine which argument becomes the subject, there is an independent
desire for a human subject. At the same time, however, animacy is also
entailed by most of the proto-properties mentioned above. Indeed, Comrie
(1981, 107) proposes a multifactorial definition for the syntactic notion of
subject that says that subjects prototypically represent the intersection of
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Agent and topic. That is, a typical subject is both Agent and topic, but it
need not be either of the two. Thus, semantic function only partly deter-
mines syntactic function in which topicality is an additional factor (cf. the
discussion in Chapter 1).
At the core of the object marker, on the other hand, is probably the
Patient role. Obviously, this is what the Proto-Patient properties of Dowty
(1991) suggest. Because these properties are given up in the privative defi-
nitions of Primus (1999, 2003) and Grimm (2005), however, it is less clear
which semantic role applies as the source marker for this function. The eligi-
bility of the Patient marker follows from its close relationship with the verb,
described above. According to Marantz (1984), more than any other role,
the Patient role is necessary for the correct interpretation of the verb. From
this, the generalization to syntactic dependence for general predictability
follows relatively easily. Also, as will be discussed below, the Patient role is
considered the prototypical instance of the object by Hopper and Thompson
(1980). Because of this, the Patient marker is likely to extend its function
to other meanings.
In sum, subject and object are the prominent arguments of a predicate
that are virtually always selected and therefore expressed by the most gram-
matical means, structural case. Because of their high level of generalization,
their meaning has to be derived from the verb semantics completely. Im-
portantly, the discussion of subject and object in this section concerns the
arguments of the transitive clause. The subject of an intransitive clause is
something completely different, as will be shown now.
2.4.2 Structural Case
Structural case is used to distinguish the prominent semantic roles of a
predicate.
According to Svorou (1993, 5), the more familiar a situation is, the
less we need to elaborate on it linguistically. This observation, about the
spatial domain originally, explains the use of structural case. Each semantic
predicate has a set of one or two semantic roles that are virtually always
selected at a logical form. Because they are so predictable, they do not need
to be explicitly marked for their argument function, only to be distinguished
from each other. This is the function of structural case. It no longer has
a clear functional semantic core that explains its use, it only serves to
distinguish the most predictable roles of a predicate (which can be done in
several ways, as I will show). Importantly, this use follows from the same
principles that motivate the use of case for the expression of semantic roles.
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Case is an economical form to communicate the argument structure of a
predicate. As explained in Section 2.3, less pervasive semantic roles need
a rough identification of their function that can be further filled by the
semantics of the predicate.
According to Dixon (1979, 102), clauses come in two basic kinds: clauses
with two obligatory arguments and clauses with only one obligatory argu-
ment. Constructions with both a subject and object are called transitive
constructions, constructions with a subject only are called intransitive con-
structions. Thus, we can discern three main argument functions, viz. the
subject of an intransitive clause (S), the subject of a transitive clause (A),
and the object of a transitive clause (O). A major classification of languages
is based on the way these three relationships are aligned (cf. also Comrie,
1981, Chapter 6).6 There are various ways in which languages could cover
these argument functions with case, as illustrated in (20).
(20) Possible alignments patterns
a. A = S = O
b. A 6= S 6= O
c. A 6= S = O
d. A = S 6= O
e. A = O 6= S
Languages can treat the three functions all the same (20-a), which, depend-
ing on the case form used for non-argument functions, generally means that
a case system is absent (see Iggesen, 2005).
A second option is to have a tripartite alignment as in (20-b), that is,
to have a separate case for each of these functions. This strategy is chosen
only rarely by languages in the world, which is understandable by the gen-
eralization principles described in Section 2.3. By definition, S is the only
argument of a clause. The set of argument functions this single argument
may have is in fact the same as the total set of semantic roles. Probably
any semantic role can be used as an intransitive subject (see Malchukov &
Narrog, 2009). Therefore, there is no use developing a special case marker
for this grammatical function: it does not mean anything. Whatever the
argument function of S, the use of structural case will not be very informa-
tive, as the verb semantics needs to specify its argument functions anyway.
6According to Butt and King (2003) and Bickel and Nichols (2009) this is an over-
simplification of case patterns and more syntactic functions and case phenomena should
be taken into account for an alignment classification and a thorough understanding of
the role of case.
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Since it does not need its own marking for semantic reasons and since it
cannot be confused with some other argument, the S may as well use the
case form of either of the other two. In this way, a language only has to
maintain two structural cases, which is more economical than maintaining
three.
The same argumentation holds for the last option (20-e). Moreover,
using the same case for A and O is not very helpful in highlighting the
argument structure. Since this is the whole idea of structural case, this
option is rather useless. Indeed, this strategy is extremely rare (Bickel &
Nichols, 2009; Comrie, 2005; Stiebels, 2002).
Ergative and accusative languages choose different versions of the same
idea to disambiguate between A and P. Ergative languages choose to mark
S and O the same, marking A differently (20-c); accusative languages mark
O differently and take S and A together (20-d).7 As a result, A and O can
be identified as A and O, and therefore distinguished from one another.
Following Comrie (1981), de Hoop and Malchukov (2008, 2007) argue that
Distinguishability and Identify are in fact the two main functions of
case. The identifying strategy makes use of case morphology to encode
specific semantic/pragmatic information about the nominal argument in
question. The distinguishing strategy is a more specific strategy that is used
for distinguishing between the two core arguments of a transitive clause (de
Hoop & Malchukov, 2008). The two functions of case considerably overlap
in the structural domain: If a transitive argument is identified, it can be
distinguished from the other, and if it is distinguished, it can be identified.
Note that, differently from S, it is possible to characterize A and O, however
general this semantic characterization may be (cf. the proto-properties of
Dowty, 1991, discussed in the previous section).
An example of an ergative languages is Yalarnnga given in (21).
Yalarnnga (Mallinson & Blake, 1981, 49)
(21) a. Kupi
fish
waya
that
kunu-Nka.
water-loc
‘That fish is in the water.’
b. Kupi-Nku
fish-erg
milNa
fly
t
˙
aca-mu.
bite-past
‘The fish bit the fly.’
The intransitive subject (S) kupi ‘fish’ in (21-a) has the same zero form as
7cf. Ja¨ger (2007) for this same argumentation couched in a game-theoretic approach.
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the object of the transitive clause milNa ‘fly’ in (21-b). This is different
from the subject of a transitive clause, which is marked with ergative case.
This ergative pattern is the opposite of the accusative one illustrated
for Korean in (22). Here, the S and A share the same marker -ka which
differs from the marker for the object of the transitive clause -lul.
Korean (Sohn, 1994, 235)
(22) a. Nalssi-ka
weather-nom
coh-ta.
good-decl
‘The weather is good.’
b. Ku
the
cha-ka
car-nom
Yongho-lul
Yongho-acc
chi-ess-ta.
hit-past-decl
‘The car hit Yongho.’
The difference between the accusative and ergative languages is schemat-
ically illustrated in Figure 2.4 (which is nothing but a summary of (20)).
{ A } ergative
nominative
S
}
absolutive
accusative
{
O
Figure 2.4: Case alignment
Thus, by grouping S together with one of the transitive argument func-
tions to the exclusion of the other, Economy is elegantly obeyed. But
languages can be even more economical. For the purpose of distinguishing
between A and O, marking only one argument already suffices. The other
argument does not need its own case marking to encode it as such. What
is very often called nominative or absolutive case is in fact the absence of
case marking. This was already illustrated for the absolutive case above,
and is illustrated for the nominative case in Hindi in (23).
Hindi (de Hoop & Malchukov, 2008)
(23) Raam-∅
Ram-nom
ek
one
bakre-ko
goat-acc
bectaa
selling
hae
is
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‘Ram sells the goat.’
In (22), what is glossed as nominative is in fact a zero marker, just like
the absolutive marker previously. I follow de Hoop and Malchukov (2008)
in saying that the absence of morphological case marking is the absence of
case.
As argued above, there is no need to case mark the S by its own form,
neither from a distinguishing nor from an identifying perspective. Obvi-
ously, it will be most economical to have S share the zero form of the un-
marked transitive argument. Economy can explain the fact that languages
preferably use one case only to distinguish between three different syntactic
functions. The difference between ergative and accusative languages is that
accusative languages choose to mark the object reserving the zero form for
the intransitive subject and transitive subject, ergative languages choose to
mark the subject argument of a transitive clause, reserving the zero form
for the subject of an intransitive clause and the object.
According to Langacker (1991), however, the different case systems are
the result of completely different motivations. Ergative systems have a mo-
tivation that is independent from the marking of grammatical role. Ergative
alignment can also be found outside of the verbal argument domain for ac-
cusative languages. For example, the nominal domain in English can be
analyzed as ergative as the following examples show:
(Langacker, 1991, 380)
(24) a. the chanting of the demonstrators
b. the chanting of the slogans
c. the chanting of the slogans by the demonstrators
Similarly to the modifiers in the “intransitive” constructions (24-a,b), the
Theme modifier slogans in the “transitive” construction (24-c) is marked
with of ; the Agent modifier of this transitive construction, however, is dif-
ferently marked, with by. Thus, languages may make use of both systems
in different domains (English being an accusative language), which sug-
gests functions of other than the marking of grammatical relations only. In
fact, even within the domain of grammatical relations, some languages use
both systems, using for example the ergative system for pronouns and the
accusative system for full NPs.
According to Langacker (1991), the purpose of ergative alignment is re-
ally the marking of conceptual autonomy. The internal (Theme or Patient)
argument is said to be conceptually more autonomous than the external
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(Agent) argument because the semantic contribution of the latter is smaller.
The accusative system is argued to have a different motivation, namely the
marking of the figure-ground organization, or the profiling of the event. The
figure is the participant that is singled out and that is profiled with respect
to some ground, and can thus be seen as the topic of the event. (This
latter point seems to be compatible with the blurring of the subject-topic
distinction in many of the languages mentioned previously.) According to
Langacker, absolutive and nominative mark the unmarked members in their
respective systems (i.e. the conceptually autonomous and figure argument),
and therefore have the unmarked, often zero, form.
To explain how the different motivations lead to different case systems,
however, one needs to stipulate unmarked members in the opposition be-
tween internal and external arguments, and between figure and ground.
Moreover, I do not think it is correct to say that the internal argument
is semantically more autonomous than the external argument. I do think
the idea of a distinction between semantic roles in terms of semantic au-
tonomy is interesting. In fact, I have used it in the previous section to
motivate the generalization of the Patient role to direct object. However, I
argue for the exact opposite of Langacker’s proposal. The Agent role can
be said to be semantically more autonomous than the Patient as the first
generally instigates, causes and performs the action to which the second is
submitted. Instead, the interpretation in terms of argument function of the
Patient role is much more closely related to the semantics of the predicate
than the interpretation of the Agent (cf, Williams, 1981; Marantz, 1984;
Kratzer, 1996). In that sense, the semantics of the Patient role, but not
that of the Agent, is dependent on the semantics of the predicate. In a way
then, the Agent role is more prominent, more independent, and therefore its
semantics more difficult to override. The Patient role, on the other hand, is
more dependent on the predicate semantics for its interpretation. It can be
expected, therefore, to easily become a very general marker of dependency
only. This is indeed the main task of the accusative in accusative languages.
Accusative case often only says that the constituent it marks belongs to a
V (or P), the expected semantic relation being dependent on this syntactic
head. Note that this is not to deny the semantic core of the accusative case
or Patient role, only to motivate its final generalization. In my proposal,
the ergative case is expected to generalize beyond typical Agent meaning
less easily. The counts of alignment systems in the sample of Comrie (2005)
seem to support this view. In the pronominal domain, 61 languages have an
accusative system versus 20 ergative systems, whereas for full noun phrases,
46 languages use accusative alignment and 32 have an ergative system.
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2.4.3 The Reach of Transitivity
Semantically, transitivity can be characterized as an activity which is car-
ried over or transferred from an Agent to a Patient (Hopper & Thompson,
1980, 251). Clearly, this characterization concerns the prototypical instance
of a transitive construction only. For example, for the transitive construc-
tion John read the book, such a characterization is hard to maintain. At
the end point of semantic generalizations, the motivation for generalizations
becomes opaque. The commonality between breakers and thinkers is more
difficult to perceive than the one between breakers and killers. It is to be
expected, then, that the system of generalization eventually breaks down.
This is precisely what we find. As Malchukov (2005) shows, the transi-
tive construction is not used for all events in which two participants are
involved. In terms of a semantic map, the further away from the transitive
prototype, the more likely at least one of the arguments comes within the
domain of another construction.
Though the previous sections may have suggested otherwise, transitivity
is not a binary notion. Hopper and Thompson (1980) argue that transi-
tivity is a gradable notion, which can be decomposed into a number of
parameters (cf. Table 2.4). Clauses can be characterized as more or less
transitive. The more high-transitive properties a clause has, the more tran-
sitive it is semantically, and the more likely it is to be in the form of a
standard transitive construction. The defining properties of transitivity are
discourse determined. Transitivity has to be understood as an activity that
is transferred from an Agent to a Patient, and this can be done with vari-
ous degrees of success. Although not all transitivity properties are equally
unproblematic (Affectedness, for example, is notoriously difficult to define),
the idea of transitivity as a gradable notion that is determined by a variety
of (discourse) properties is firmly established.
According to Hopper and Thompson (1980), a highly transitive clause
has two or more participants, and denotes an action event that is brought
to an end in an instantaneous manner by a volitional Agent and that causes
a change in an individuated Patient. This idea is perfectly compatible with
the proto-properties proposal of Dowty. The higher in transitivity a clause
is, the more its arguments resemble Proto-Patients and Proto-Agents.
Prototypical transitive clauses are expressed by standard transitive con-
structions in which the arguments are marked with structural case. The
further away from the prototype, the more likely it is that a different con-
struction is used. For example, in many languages, perception verbs are
considered to be too far away from the prototype to be expressed by a stan-
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Parameter high low
A. Participants À2, A and O 1
B. Kinesis action non-action
C. Aspect telic atelic
D. Punctuality punctual non-punctual
E. Volitionality volitional non-volitional
F. Affirmation affirmative negative
G. Mode realis irrealis
H. Agency of A high low
I. Affectedness of O totally affected not affected
J. Individuation of O highly individuated non-individuated
Table 2.4: Hopper and Thompson’s transitivity parameters
dard transitive construction. In Hindi perception verbs are on the verge of
a construction change. Consider the following example.
Hindi (Ackerman & Moore, 2001, 164)
(25) a. Tus
˙
aar-ne
Tushar-erg
caand
moon.nom
dekhaa.
saw
‘Tushar saw the moon.’
b. Tus
˙
aar-ko
Tushar.dat
caand
moon.nom
dekhaa.
saw
‘Tushar saw the moon.’
The difference between the two constructions lies in volitionality. The stan-
dard transitive construction in which the subject is marked with Ergative
case has a volitional subject and can be translated as Tushar looked at the
moon; the nonstandard construction has a non-volitional subject and can
be translated as Tushar saw the moon. Being volitional is a Proto-Agent
property in the sense of Dowty and increases transitivity in the sense of
Hopper and Thompson. If the subject is volitional, it is closer to the pro-
totype and therefore more likely to share its form with it. In terms of our
semantic map of argument functions, in Hindi, the perceiver of a seeing
event is about as close to the prototypical instance of the dative as to the
prototypical instance of the ergative. Its volitionality pushes it over to one
or the other side.
Perception verbs are only one example of many different verb types (see
Levin, 1993), and Hindi is only one example of many different languages.
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In a cross-linguistic study, Tsunoda (1985) proposes a hierarchy of verb
types that predicts the distribution of transitive patterns in individual lan-
guages. Malchukov (2005) decomposes this hierarchy and recasts it in a two-
dimensional semantic map. The purpose of the semantic map of Malchukov
(2005) is to disentangle several semantic dimensions that were confused in
the original hierarchy and to better account for the cross-linguistic data.
The first dimension in this map concerns the degree of agenthood, the sec-
ond the degree of patienthood. These degrees are determined by reference
to yet another way to characterize the semantic complex of transitivity,
namely the one by Givo´n (1985), given in (26).
(Givo´n, 1985, 90, emphasis in the original)
(26) a. agent-related : The prototypical transitive clause has a visible,
salient, volitional, controlling agent-clause which initiates the
event.
b. patient-related : The prototypical transitive clause has a visi-
ble, salient, non-volitional, non-controlling patient-affect which
registers the bulk of the change associated with the event.
c. verb-related : The prototypical transitive clause has a compact,
perfective, realis verb or verbal tense-aspect-modality.
The bigger the deviation from the prototypical transitive verb type, the
less likely it is that a verb type allows a transitive pattern. More generally,
the bigger the difference between two verb types, the less likely it is that they
share the same case marking pattern. The idea of prototypical transitivity
explains the pattern in Figure 2.5, in which different verb types are ordered
with respect to their deviation from the prototypical transitive effective
action on the basis of a typological comparison. For example, whereas the
object undergoes some change in the effective action type, it does not in the
pursuit type. Similarly, the subject of emotional predicates is less in control
than the subject of a prototypical transitive event. The further away a verb
type is from the prototypical transitive type, the closer its arguments are
to other focus points and the less appropriate the transitive case frame.
The two branches of the semantic map are to some extent independent, the
upper one pertaining to object properties, the lower one to those of the
subject. At the same time, the degree of patienthood partly depends on
the degree of agenthood of the other argument. Whatever the exact degree
of the angle at the crossing, the two branches are not in line and probably
not at right angles.
The hierarchy follows the standard semantic map logic (Haspelmath,
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contact/ pursuit/ (motion)/
effective action
perception/cognition/ emotion/ (sensation)/
Table 2.5: Two-dimensional verb type hierarchy (Malchukov 2005, 81)
2003). If two verb types share a case frame, all intermediate verb types
share this same case frame. This means that if a verb type on the hierarchy
allows a transitive pattern, any verb type to its left should allow this too.
In this hierarchy, it is only necessary that there be some members of a given
class that allow a transitive pattern to predict that some members from a
higher class will. That is, it is not necessary that all members of a verb
type exhibit the same pattern.
In sum, the typological studies of Tsunoda (1985) and Malchukov (2005)
support the idea of a semantic map of argument functions. Argument func-
tions that are close to each other are expected to share the same form,
those that are further apart are expected to have different forms. Given
the characterization of Dowty (1991), the semantic cores of the object and
subject marker seem to be Patient and Agent respectively.
In conclusion to this section, structural case is used to discriminate be-
tween the roles that are most predictable for a particular predicate. Because
of their predictability, their argument function does not have to be identi-
fied by a semantic role marker, they only have to be kept apart. As such,
structural case cannot be inherently characterized. It always concerns a
semantic role in relation to its predicate. A selection principle, often in
combination with topicality, determines which of the two roles becomes
subject and which object. For economy reasons, it suffices to mark one
of the prominent arguments only. Thus, what is called nominative in an
accusative language and absolutive in an ergative language is the absence
of case.
2.5 The Bidirectional Use of Case
In the previous sections the development of case with respect to its form
and meaning and its extension to the structural use were discussed. This
section will be more explicit on how the assignment of case works. The ideas
of the previous sections will be formalized in a semi-bidirectional optimality
theoretic account.
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The fun of meaning is in sharing it. The speaker does not just want
to establish an argument structure or express her thoughts for herself, she
wants the hearer to understand what she means. An utterance is a mean-
ing wrapped in an expression from which the original meaning should be
derivable again. Together with strategies like word order, prominence and
agreement, case is used to aid the hearer in getting the right interpretation.
Note that this view of case is fundamentally different from the one in most
other approaches, most notably Government and Binding/The Minimalist
Program, in which abstract case is used as an output restriction. I think
case, and language in general, for that matter, can only be understood in
light of its communicative function. All language use is the result of the
conflict between the needs of the speaker and those of the hearer. The
optimization procedure between the speaker’s wish to be economical and
the requirement for the utterance to be intelligible can be formalized in
bidirectional Optimality Theory (bidirectional OT; Blutner et al., 2006).
In addition to the standard OT assumption that language rules are violable
constraints (Prince & Smolensky, 1993/2004), bidirectional OT evaluates
candidates on their communicative qualities. That is, both from a hearer
and speaker perspective. Case, in this view, is a bidirectionally optimal
solution for the expression of a meaning.
More specifically, I use the semi -bidirectional version of OT proposed
by de Swart (2007, in prep.). In this version, the production of a sentence
is constrained by its interpretation. The speaker checks if the optimal can-
didate from her speaker perspective will indeed lead to the right interpre-
tation. If not, she resorts to a suboptimal form that she thinks will get the
meaning across. This semi-bidirectional version in my view mostly describes
the pragmatic principles behind language. As will be shown below, by a
process of fossilization, the optimization process may become standardized
and may develop into more specific rules of grammar. Thus, the rules of
language are motivated by the way we use it, which is highly desirable for
a theory of language in my view.
The constraints I propose are inspired by the work of Grice (1989) and
Levinson (2000b). According to Grice (1989) speech participants are ex-
pected to observe a rough general principle that says that one should make
a conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the communication event.
This principle is called the cooperative principle. Grice distinguishes four
categories with certain more specific maxims that underly the cooperative
principle (Grice, 1989, 26-27). The maxims basically tell the speaker to
make true and relevant contributions that are intelligible but not too ex-
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tensive.
In spite of his interest in conversation, Grice only spells out the cooper-
ative principle for speakers. But arguably, similar maxims should hold for
hearers. If not, the following example cannot be taken care of, as Levinson
(1983, 146) argues:
(27) He turned on the switch and the motor started.
The interpretation one generally gets is that the starting of the motor is
caused by turning on the switch, which does not follow from any of the prin-
ciples above. Therefore, Levinson (1983) proposes to add an independent
principle of informativeness:
(28) The principle of informativeness (Levinson, 1983, 146)
Read as much into an utterance as is consistent with what you
know about the world
In later work, Levinson (2000b) proposes simple heuristics, so-called gen-
eralized conversational implicatures, that are more explicit on the principle
of informativeness. These heuristics can be seen as the hearer’s equivalents
to some of Grice’s speaker maxims. The first heuristic says that what is
not said, is not so; the second heuristic says that what is simply described
is stereotypically exemplified, and the third says that what is said in an
abnormal way is not normal.
The constraints I propose are heavily inspired by these ideas. They have
been discussed in the previous sections already and are summarized again
in (29).
(29) a. FaithL: interpret linguistic signs
b. AddW : use world knowledge to enrich an utterance
c. Economy: be economical in expressing what you want to say
Note that a different interpretation of FaithL is used here than in Sec-
tion 2.3, in that only the hearer’s interest is mentioned. In the remainder
of this thesis, the fact that the speaker obeys the rules of her language is
taken for granted.
Further note that similar constraints have been proposed in other work
in OT. For example, in a lexical semantic study of (a)round, Zwarts (2004)
uses Fit and Strength. The first says that the interpretations should
not conflict with the (linguistic) context, the second that stronger inter-
pretations are better than weaker interpretations. Strong and weak in-
terpretations are determined on the basis of inclusion. Strong interpre-
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tations include weaker ones (cf. also Hogeweg, 2009). Although Zeevat
(2000) proposes slightly more specific interpretation constraints, in all cases,
the general idea is very much the same. The hearer needs to conform to
some general principles for successful communication. Also the principle
of Economy is assumed in many (OT) studies, often in more specific for-
mulations to specifically deal with the variation of concern. The intuitive
motivation of it is shared by most linguists. We simply cannot express all
semantic details, so choices have to be made. By exploiting the other two
constraints, the speaker can save some costly morphemes and speed up the
communication process. Thus, the workings of the constraints are closely
intertwined. Economy tells the speaker to use as few or as general words
as possible given the other principles. AddW states that the hearer should
enrich the semantics proper of the utterance with any relevant piece of
knowledge about the world or the discourse situation. However, this should
never happen at the expense of what is being said explicitly, which is stated
by FaithL.
8 As the hearer knows, anything the speaker says is in spite of
Economy and therefore relevant.
Finally, note that Gricean principles that ask for relevant and true con-
tributions are not represented in these three constraints, nor formulated as
independent ones. They are simply assumed to be satisfied at this point.
These principles pertain to the input and therefore are of no relevance once
some meaning is selected by the speaker.
In Optimality Theory, optimization processes are illustrated in tableaux.
In Tableau 1, this is done for the Hungarian example in (30).
Hungarian
(30) a. Az
the
ember
man
az
the
asszony-t
woman-acc
la´t-ott.
see-past.3sg
‘The man saw the woman.’
b. Az
the
asszony-t
woman-acc
az
the
ember
man
la´t-ott.
see-past.3sg
‘The woman, the man saw.’
c. *Az
the
ember
man
az
the
asszony
woman
la´t-ott.
see-past.3sg
‘The man saw the woman.’
Accusative case marks the object, the subject remains unmarked. As the
8As is always the case in linguistics, “never” is too strong. If a speaker obviously is
confusing things (e.g. saying by turning on the stitch), a cooperative hearer will repair
the confusion (i.e. interpreting ‘by turning on the switch’).
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difference between (30-a) and (30-b) shows, word order in Hungarian is
determined by discourse principles and does not inform about syntactic
function. The topic of the sentence is placed sentence-initially, the (identi-
ficational) focus preverbally (see Kiss, 1998). Also, neither agreement nor
prominence tell us anything about the argument structure in this example
(both arguments refer to a third person human).
Constraints are ranked from left to right in a tableau. Optimality is
determined on the basis of violation patterns, which are marked by asterisks.
The candidate that best satisfies the ranked constraints becomes optimal.
What is important is that to become bidirectionally optimal a candidate
needs to lead back to the right interpretation again.
Prod: ‘man saw woman’ FaithL AddW Economy
+ az ember az asszony la´tott
, az ember az asszony-t la´t-ott *
Int: az ember az asszony la´tott FaithL AddW Economy
+ ‘man saw woman’
+ ‘woman saw man’
Int: az ember az asszony-t la´tott FaithL AddW Economy
+ ‘man saw woman’
‘woman saw man’ *
Tableau 1: Optimization of Accusative Alignment
As illustrated in the evaluation of the form candidates, the use of case is
a violation of Economy, at least in comparison with the unmarked candi-
date. From the perspective of the speaker then, it is optimal not to use case
at all, hence the (unidirectional) optimality of the first candidate indicated
by the pointing finger symbol (“+”) at the production level. (FaithL and
AddW do not apply at this level because they are concerned with interpre-
tation not with production.) However, as the interpretation check of this
candidate shows, it does not lead to the right interpretation again. Without
the use of case, the hearer could not decide which of the two interpretations
is meant. The case marked candidate, on the other hand, does lead back
to the right interpretation. Therefore, the speaker knows that if she uses
this form she will be understood by the hearer. Although the structural
case that the second candidate makes use of is a violation of Economy, it
is necessary to use this form for communication. Any more elaborate form
to express this meaning, either by using an additional subject marker or a
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more elaborate object marker, would lead to an even more serious violation
of Economy. Thus, the second candidate becomes bidirectionally optimal,
indicated with “,”. It is the best form candidate that will be interpreted
as intended.
Three things should be noted here. Firstly, this model covers strategies
like agreement and word order just as well, if it is used to encode argument
structure. The interpretation of John hit Bill as ‘Bill = Agent, John =
Patient’ would be a violation of FaithL, because in English word order
determines subject and object.
Secondly there is no constraint saying something like “express syntactic
function” or “express semantic role”, which is often proposed in other OT
work (e.g. de Hoop & Malchukov, 2007, 2008; Primus, 2010). The working
of such constraints is captured by the interpretation check (but cf. Tableau 2
below). More specific constraints like “mark objects with accusative case”
are absent. For me this follows from the very same principles that make
the speaker use the word woman to refer to a woman. The fact that object
markers are chosen for objects follows from the same procedures that make
that, in English, man is chosen for ‘man’. At this level of optimization, the
constraints that link meaning to form are not relevant (but see Hogeweg,
2009, for a discussion of these constraints). There is no choice between a
dative and an accusative case marker for the object role, just like there is no
choice between the use of woman and man to express ‘man’. The speaker
simply uses everything she thinks is necessary for communication and omits
anything she thinks she can do without.
Finally, note that the use of case is often redundant. In the second
Hungarian example of this chapter, repeated in (31) for convenience, world
knowledge already helps in telling the builder apart from the buildee. Still,
accusative case is used, which therefore seems to be an unnecessary viola-
tion of Economy. However, redundancy is not a bad thing. In fact, it is the
norm rather than the exception in natural language use (see Stiebels, 2002;
van Lier, 2009).
Hungarian (Ackerman & Moore, 2001, 1)
(31) Az
the
u´j
new
telepes-ek
settlers-pl
ha´z-ak-at
house-pl-acc
e´p´ıt-et-tek.
build-past-3pl
‘The new settlers were building houses.’
There are two explanations for this redundant use of accusative case.
Both are essential for the understanding of language. First, redundancy is
vital for successful communication across a noisy channel like speech. It is
50
2.5 The Bidirectional Use of Case
possible that the hearer misses the object marker and therefore has to fall
back on other cues.
Languages differ with respect to the degree they allow for, or make use
of, redundancy. In some languages, like in Hungarian, the benefits of using
case to ensure the correct reading outweigh the violation of Economy. In
others, if other cues are considered to be sufficient for this purpose, case
is omitted because of Economy. Economical as morphological case may
be, if possible, the latter type of languages does not make use of it. This
phenomenon is known as Differential Case Marking (DCM). DCM is gen-
erally only discussed for structural case. However, as will be discussed in
Chapter 4, we find the same phenomenon for spatial case. For example, in
Bukharian Uzbek, spatial case can be omitted from nouns that are inher-
ently spatial as (32) shows.
Bukharian Uzbek (Aziz Djuraev, p.c.)
(32) a. Siz
you
bozor
market
borasizmi?
go
‘Will you go to the marketplace?’
b. Siz
you
bozor-ga
market-dat
borasizmi?
go
‘Will you go to the marketplace?’
Because a marketplace prototypically has a spatial function, dative case
that marks this function is omitted in (32-a).
Secondly, redundancy can be explained by the fossilization of optimiza-
tion procedures, leading to the development of rules of grammar. Arguably,
the process of checking the interpretation costs effort and time and therefore
slows down the communication process. To speed things up the bidirec-
tional optimization procedures may develop into a less costly unidirectional
constraint that directly leads to a certain outcome. Instead of checking
whether it is necessary to use case to mark the argument structure and to
find out that this is necessary, the outcome for a given input can be put into
a constraint. This process is called fossilization by Blutner (2007; cf. also
Zwarts, Hogeweg, Lestrade, & Malchukov, 2009). The use of case marking
in Hungarian is much more likely the result of the fossilization of the opti-
mization procedure in Tableau 1 than its real-time result. This fossilization
led to a rule of grammar that says that the object of the transitive clause
should be assigned accusative case (MarkO). This does mean, of course,
that the use of the accusative marker is no longer always strictly necessary
for interpretation.
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According to Geertje van Bergen (p.c.), the evaluation of an additional
constraint also costs effort. She is more explicit about the process of fos-
silization or automatization of optimization procedures. Van Bergen pro-
poses that the assessment between performing a check and developing a
constraint depends on the likelihood of the result. If, for a certain class
of arguments, the interpretation check results in the use of a marker in a
large enough proportion of the cases, it becomes more economical to use the
marker for all members of the class. However, if the interpretation check
results in the omission of the marker in a large enough proportion of the
cases, the check is more profitable than developing a constraint.
So, how does this work? It has to be the case that the use of a case
marker costs more effort than the check of its necessity. Otherwise case
would always be used. Adding a constraint to the model also costs effort
as it has to be taken into consideration for each evaluation procedure. But
apparently, the addition of a new constraint costs less effort than the in-
terpretation check. Otherwise, fossilization would not take place. For the
sake of convenience, let’s say that using a marker costs three euro, using
a check costs two, and using a constraint costs one euro. Now, in a class
of arguments that actually need case marking in only 30% of the cases,
the semi-bidirectional version on average is (the cost for the check plus the
proportion of markers times the cost for a marker,) 2 + .3 ∗ 3 = 2,9 euro,
whereas the fossilized version on average is (the cost for an extra constraint
plus the one for the marker,) 1 + 3 = 4 euro. For this class (given these ar-
bitrary numbers of course), the interpretation check pays off. However, in a
class of arguments that actually needs case marking in 80% of the cases, the
semi-bidirectional version on average costs (2 + .8 ∗ 3 =) 4.4 euro, whereas
the fossilized version on average still costs 4 euro. Now, the development
of a new constraint becomes more profitable.
The fossilized version of the case assignment in the Hungarian example
in (31) is represented in Tableau 2. There is no longer an interpretation
check. The fossilized constraint MarkO overrules the more general con-
straints and determines the case marking of the object.
Prod: ‘settlers built houses’ MarkO FaithL AddW Economy
ha´zak *
+ ha´zak-at *
Tableau 2: Fossilized Optimization of Accusative Alignment
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In this section the use of case was modeled in semi-bidirectional OT. I
was shown how the functional motivations behind the development of case
explain its use. It was also shown how the structural use of case follows
from the fossilization procedure of optimization processes.
2.6 The Case Continuum
Most work on case makes a distinction between structural and nonstruc-
tural case (exceptions are studies working in the framework of Cognitive
Grammar, see Langacker, 1991; BarDdal, 2001). Generally, this is stated as
a fundamental dichotomy to continue studying the former only. As I have
tried to show in the previous sections, the structural use of case follows
from the very same principles as its nonstructural use and differs from it
only in being the final result of generalization. The purpose of this section
is to show that the difference between the two is in case uses, not in case
markers. This is not simple word play but an important distinction, which,
if not made, can be confusing (see Mel’cˇuk, 1986). One case form can have
different uses depending on the construction it is in. Thus, the difference
between the structural and nonstructural case is not so clear-cut as often
presented.
Chomsky (1981) sees structural case as the result of a purely syntactic
licensing requirement on noun phrases that lack inherent semantics; non-
structural case, on the contrary, comes with its own semantics. Woolford
(2007b) proposes to make a further distinction within the non-structural
cases between lexical and semantic or inherent case, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.5 (cf. also Butt & King, 2004). The difference between the two is that
lexical cases are idiosyncratic, whereas semantic cases are predictable on the
basis of their meaning.9 Maling (2009, 73) argues that really a four-way
distinction should be made, splitting structural case up into grammatical
or syntactic case and configurational or true ‘structural’ case. The former
expresses surface grammatical relations like ‘subject of’ and ‘object of’, the
latter is assigned to particular syntactic positions.
I will bring back the number of different types to distinguish between
semantic and structural use. Next, I will show that this distinction is rather
a continuum of uses, as case markers can have both uses.
Semantic case transparently expresses semantic roles, as explained above.
Lexical case can be seen as a vestige of semantic case in which all other uses
9For the sake of consistency, I have replaced Woolford’s Inherent by Semantic in
Figure 2.5.
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Case
Structural Non-structural
Lexical Semantic
Figure 2.5: Types of case (Woolford, 2007)
have accommodated to a more general pattern. Thus, the assignment of
lexical case was meaningful once, but its motivations are now opaque. The
remaining instances are idiosyncratically assigned by some lexical head and
no longer predictable in any way. Such lexical case can only survive in
highly frequent collostructions, which are pairs of lexeme and grammati-
cal construction (term by Stefanowitsch & Gries, 2003), as infrequent con-
structions cannot resist standardization (see Hopper & Traugott, 2003; Yip,
Maling, & Jackendoff, 1987; BarDdal, 2009). For example, BarDdal (2009)
shows how in Germanic languages high type frequency constructions gain
in type frequency over time, attracting new and existing verbs at the cost
of low type frequency constructions. Low type frequency constructions are
expected to gradually disappear unless they are high in token frequency, in
which case they might be preserved as idiosyncratic constructions (BarDdal,
2009, 13-14). Thus, only highly frequent constructions have the “mass” to
behave idiosyncratically; less frequent members need to behave like others,
otherwise they cannot be learned (cf. also Lestrade, 2010). Pullum and
Scholz (2007) claim that it is because of memory limits that less frequent
items have to behave regularly.
In the account of Maling (2009), structural case is tied to specific po-
sitions in a syntactic tree representation. As such, it expresses abstract
configurational meaning. As an example of structural case, Vainikka (1993)
argues that the genitive case in Finnish is the structural default case for
the specifier position, be it the specifier of DP, PP, or VP, whereas partitive
case is the structural default case for the complement position.
Maling (2009) distinguishes structural case from grammatical case that
expresses grammatical relations instead of syntactic position. Grammatical
case is assigned to grammatical roles like subject and object. Examples
are most instances of nominative, accusative, and ergative case. What the
category of grammatical case is exactly becomes most clear in theories of
grammar in which there is no one-to-one mapping between grammatical case
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and grammatical function (Yip et al., 1987; Zaenen, Maling, & Thra´insson,
1985; Maling, 2009). In these theories, grammatical cases are assigned
along a hierarchy of grammatical functions, using a case tier. Nominative
is assigned before accusative to the DP with the highest grammatical func-
tion (GF) that does not bear inherent lexical case already. Accusative case
is assigned to all remaining unmarked DPs. The exact ordering of gram-
matical functions often differs between different authors. In all approaches,
however, subject is higher than object. Grammatical case explains case
alternations from accusative case to nominative case in passivization as il-
lustrated in (33).
Icelandic (Maling, 2009).
(33) a. Jo´n
Jon.nom
gaf
gave
barninu
the.child.dat
bo´kina.
the.book.acc
‘John gave the child the book.’
b. Barninu
the.child.dat
var
was
gefin
given
bo´kin.
the.book.nom
‘The child was given the book.’
In both examples, the DP with the highest GF that is not already
marked with lexical case already is marked with nominative case. Thus,
nominative case is assigned to the subject, accusative case to the object in
(33-a). In (33-b), the DP with the GF subject already bears inherent dative
case. Therefore, nominative is assigned to the DP with the next highest
GF, the object. Accusative case remains unused (Maling, 2009).
I think Maling’s structural and grammatical case are of the same kind,
which I call the structural use. It expresses information about syntactic
dependency. In what Maling (2009) analyzes as grammatical case, the
omission of accusative case is due to the presence of other arguments of
which the grammatical function is already marked. Because all other se-
mantic roles are clear, accusative case does not have to distinguish between
the two prominent semantic roles and can be omitted. Contrary to Maling,
I think nominative case is not assigned as a grammatical case, but is the
absence of case (cf. Section 2.4). Because of economy, accusative case is
only used when necessary to distinguish between the subject and object. If
the distinction is already clear, it can be omitted.
Thus, we end up with two different uses of case only, the semantic use
and a more generalized version, the structural use. The difference between
the two is gradual, which will be shown.
Sometimes the semantic core that shows the origin of a structural case
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marker is used. Similarly, sometimes case markers that normally have a
semantic use are used structurally. This is why I posit that there is no
cutoff point between structural and semantic case. Often, these meaning
aspects will be overruled or neglected. In case alternations, however, they
may surface again. In case alternations there is no other reason to use a
different case than for semantic purposes. It is in such environments that
ergative case may show its Agent and accusative case its Patient source
meaning most clearly. Consider the alternation in (34).
Lezgian (Haspelmath, 1993, 292)
(34) a. Zamira.di
Zamira.erg
get’e
pot
xana.
break.aor
‘Zamira broke the pot.’
b. Zamira.di-waj
Zamira-abl
get’e
pot
xana.
break.aor
‘Zamira broke the pot accidentally/involuntarily.’
Ergative case is used for the true Agent in (34-a) but not for the involun-
tary one. In the same vein in (35), accusative case is only used for the true
Patient.
Icelandic (BarDdal, 2001, 146)
(35) a. Hann
he.nom
klo´raDi
scratched
mig
I.acc
‘He scratched me’ (painfully, against my will)
b. Hann
he.nom
klo´raDi
scratched
me´r
I.dat
‘He scratched me’ (because my back is itching)
Even though this is quite rare, structural case markers may still have a
functional core semantics too.
Kracht (2003) shows for Finnish that the ablative in (36-a) is a seman-
tic case, whereas it is used lexically in (36-b). In the first example, the
ablative case denotes a Source meaning. In the second however, it has
null semantics, the verb semantically selecting for a THING, not a Source.
This is illustrated by the (im)possibility to replace laivalta with the spatial
particle alas ‘down’ (in parentheses). The ablative case in (36-b) is idiosyn-
cratically assigned by the verb.
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Finnish (Kracht, 2003)
(36) a. Ha¨n
he
menee
walks
laiva-l-ta
ship-abl
(alas).
(down)
‘He is going/walking from the ship.’
b. Ta¨ma¨
this
na¨ytta¨a¨
resemble
laiva-l-ta
ship-abl
(*alas).
(down)
‘This looks like/resembles a ship.’
In this respect, my proposal is very similar to that of Kracht (2003). Kracht
(2003) uses (36) to argue for a difference between a functional and nonfunc-
tional use of case markers. According to Kracht (2003), cases are signs,
triples of an exponent (the case marker), a type (the case feature) and a
meaning (the case function). The case feature and case function of a case
sign are in competition. A case can be syntactically selected as a feature (by
a verb) and without any meaning, or be self-licensing and with a function
(cf. also Blake, 1994, 32). However, the categorical difference that Kracht
(2003) makes between case functions and case types may not always be so
clear.
Næss (2003, 269) defines structural cases as “a case category that has
been generalized beyond its core semantic specification, to the point where
its uses, or some of its uses, can be described in purely structural terms,
without reference to the semantic properties of the arguments in question.”
Such a generalization is possible because structural cases encode unmarked
combinations of the semantic features for volitionality, affectedness, and
instigation. For example, ergative case encodes only control and no affect-
edness, accusative case encodes only affectedness and no control. Because
only one of the features is specified, instances which do not exactly fit these
specifications are more easily assessed as similar to them than to cases with
more specific combinations. Languages may differ with respect to the extent
to which deviations from the prototype must be encoded differently, that
is, with a semantic case or another, more elaborate construction. Although
I do not adopt her binary take on semantic features (there may be more
and their evaluation may be gradual), I do agree with the general principle
Næss (2003) proposes. This view is compatible with the ideas outlined in
Section 2.4, where structural case is said to be a further grammaticalized
and more general version of semantic case.
More specifically, Næss (2003, 262) argues that dative case in German
(otherwise generally analyzed as a structural case) is assigned to the sub-
ject of certain experiencer verbs, and therefore in order to account for its
distribution an appeal has to be made to semantic information. Even ad-
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vocates of a fundamental distinction between the two types have to allow
intermediate options. For example, Wunderlich and Laka¨mper (2001) allow
“marked structural cases” to account for additional semantic conditions on
structural case and“structural-plus-semantic” case to account for semantic
cases that trigger agreement.10
Næss (2003, 262) uses the case alternation in (37) as another example:
Urdu (Butt & King, 2004, 34)
(37) a. Anjum-ne
Anjum-erg
xat
letter-nom
likh-naa
write-inf
hai.
is
‘Anjum wants to write a letter.’
b. Anjum-koxat
Anjum-dat
likh-naa
letter-nom
hai.
write-inf is
‘Anjum has to write a letter.’
If both ergative and dative case are analyzed as structural cases, the case
alternation in (37) should not occur in the first place, and be without a
meaning contrast if it did nevertheless. Allowing for structural cases to have
some semantic contents, however, makes the occurrence of the alternation
in (37) unproblematic and its explanation fairly easy. Ergative case has a
core meaning of control, which is precisely what it expresses in (37-a).
BarDdal (2001, 108) shows that the distinction between structural and
semantic case does not hold in Icelandic. In her corpus study, around 25%
of the objects bears dative case, which is too big a proportion if accusative
case is the structural default case. The use of dative is not only semantic, as
the semantic roles it expresses are not always Experiencers and Perceivers.
Moreover, an analysis of learning mistakes shows that it is not only alleged
structural cases that are substituted for alleged semantic case, but also
the other way around, which is unexpected if children only overgeneralize
the use of structural case. Similarly, Forker (2010) notices the increase of
grammatical functions for local cases in Tsezic languages and the absence
of a clear-cut distinction between grammatical and semantic cases.
I distinguish two different uses of case that really are extremes on a
cline, the semantic use and its generalized version, the structural use. The
latter is claimed to be more frequent and general than the semantic use.
The difference in frequency was already empirically validated in Section 2.2,
although by approximation via the case markers that typically have these
functions only. One way to test the meaning part of the claim is to look at
10Note that Wunderlich and Laka¨mper (2001, 378) also view structural case as more
economic than semantic case.
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the number of characterizing case bearers of both uses in corpora. Again,
this will only be done by looking at their typical case markers as a proxy.
If a large amount of the token occurrences of a case is due to only a small
set of noun types, these noun types can be said to characterize this case.
If, however, there are many different types with similar frequencies that
account for most of the token occurrences of a case, this case cannot so
easily be characterized by its bearers.
Karlsson (1986) notes that from the point of view of the language sys-
tem, paradigms are by definition full. However, from the point of view
of individual words, paradigms can be defective (cf. also Kiparsky, 2004).
Karlsson (1986) shows how the distribution of case token frequencies of a
given noun is dependent on its semantics. For example, a proper name for
a human being like Martti in Finnish appears 94% of the times in a nom-
inative case, a personal pronoun like ha¨n ‘he/she’ 59%. The second major
case of proper names and personal pronouns is the genitive (respectively,
6% and 24%). However, instances of spatial case are virtually nonattested
for Martti (one occurrence), and make up less than 10% of the occurrences
of ha¨n. These low numbers are in spite of the fact that spatial cases can
be used for possession. In contrast, more than half of the token frequency
of alue ‘the region’ is accounted for by spatial cases. Karlsson (1986, 23)
concludes that the meaning components of a word largely predispose what
forms of the words are likely to be used. Very similarly, Aristar (1996,
1997) argues for what he calls case typing. As is the case with verbs, cases
have selectional restrictions for their arguments (see Lieber, 2006, for a sim-
ilar claim on derivational morphology). For example, spatial cases prefer
things, dative case prefers humans. Some languages prohibit a mismatch
between the type requirements of the case and the semantic features of the
argument.
If structural case really is less specific than spatial case, we expect struc-
tural case to have fewer characterizing nouns. Its total number of occur-
rences should be distributed more evenly over a larger set of nouns. Thus,
the variation in the type of nouns a case combines with can be used as
an approximation for the specificity of its meaning. The lower the amount
of different types, the more specific; the bigger the amount, the less spe-
cific. I took a slightly different approach in answering this question than
previously in the frequency counts of cases to circumvent the problem of
data sparseness. Instead of selecting the first 20,000 words and looking
at the relative proportion of the different cases within this set, I selected
the first 20,000 instances of the different structural and spatial cases in
the four Finnish newspaper corpora mentioned in Section 2.2 (Demari2000
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(D), Karjalainen 1998 (K), Aamulehti 1999 (A), and Helsingin Sanomat AE
1995 (H)). Cases that did not reach a token frequency of 20,000 instances
are marked with an asterisk.11 Then, I counted the number of noun types
that occurred in .5% or more of these instances. This threshold was arbi-
trarily chosen as a criterion for a case characterizing noun. The numbers in
Table 2.6 show the number of noun types per 20,000 case tokens (type) and
the number of types that individually make up for at least .5% of a given
case’ instances (proto).
corpus
A D H K
Case type proto type proto type proto type proto
Nom 7026 9 7030 8 7169 4 7511 5
Gen 6477 7 5931 14 6665 4 6487 7
Part 6562 10 6396 11 6271 10 6598 10
Abl 5083 18 849* (27) 670* (32) 4693* 19
Ade 5175 22 2691* (22) 2469* (19) 5201 20
All 5487 19 1952* (23) 1411* (18) 5588 17
Ela 7050 6 4563* (9) 3701* (7) 7182 6
Ine 5078 16 3912* (21) 2966* (18) 5117 18
Ill 6404 13 4547* (16) 3420* (15) 6481 14
Table 2.6: Number of types and characterizing nouns per 20,000 case tokens
in Finnish
Because it is easier to reach the .5% threshold if there are fewer tokens
(which is the case for the less frequent cases in the smaller corpora), I put
the number of characterizing types for these cases between parentheses. In
the following discussion, only the combined Karjalainen 1998 (K) and Aa-
mulehti 1999 (A) corpora will be considered, neglecting the relatively small
deviation of the norm of Ablative case in the K corpus (see footnote 11).
The differences between the two uses of case are illustrated in Figure 2.6.
The bold-faced horizontal lines represent the median, plus signs represent
the means. The upper and lower boundary of the boxes represent the upper
and lower quartile, the whiskers mark the most extreme observation that is
still within a 1.5 interquartile range away from the box. The constrictions,
11The actual token frequencies of these cases were D: Abl 1754, Ade 8779, All 4725,
Ela 11699, Il 12730, In 14879; H: Abl 1379, Ad 6450, All 3258, El 7955, Ill 8614, In 8981;
K: Abl 17873.
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Figure 2.6: Selection behavior of structural and semantic case
finally, mark a confidence interval (±1.58 times the interquartile range di-
vided by the square root of the number of observations). If the mean or
median of one box plot is outside the range of this interval of the other, the
difference between the two is probably significant (see Gries, 2008, 125).
As the figure suggests, the difference in selection behavior between struc-
tural and semantic case is indeed significant and structural case can be
shown to be less selective than semantic case. The more different types per
20,000 tokens, the less selective they are. This ratio is higher for structural
than for semantic case. The mean number of types for structural case (for
these two corpora) is 6777, the mean number for semantic cases is 5712.
This difference is significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test: W = 61, p-value
= 0.01821). Alternatively, the bigger the proportion of token occurrences
of a case that can be explained by a subset of types, the more this case
is characterized by this subset. The mean number of characterizing types
for structural cases is 8, the mean number for semantic cases is 15. This
difference is also significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test: W = 13, p-value =
0.03471).
Now, consider again Table 2.6 and note the low number of characterizing
types for elative case. For a semantic case this number is unexpected.
However, Vainikka (1993) argues that elative case also has a structural
use in Finnish. It is used with quantifiers, superlative adjectives, as the
complement of adjectives and nouns and with some particles. Having a
structural use too, elative case is expected to have fewer characterizing
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nouns than the other spatial cases and this is precisely what we find in
Table 2.6.
In this section, I have argued that the difference between structural
and semantic case should be discussed in terms of case uses. One case
marker may have both structural and semantic uses. Typical structural
case markers were shown to be less selective than markers that have a
semantic use only.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I explained the development and use of case by very general
principles. In my view, case is the natural result of cognitive and linguistic
motivations, not an abstract primitive.
The primary function of case is the expression of semantic roles. In my
proposal, semantic roles are language specific generalizations of argument
functions. Argument functions constitute a multidimensional, language spe-
cific semantic map on which cases cover contiguous areas. Their domains
are defined by a distance minimization procedure. The idea of proto-roles,
as originally proposed by Dowty (1991), is integrated in this definition of se-
mantic roles. It also solves the problem of a lack of a universal well-defined
set of semantic roles.
Because of the frequent use of semantic roles, their (case) forms got
shortened and their meanings more general. Both results led to a further
increase of use, leading to a further shortening and generalization process.
As a result, cases are among the most frequently used constructions of
language, with the shortest form and most general meaning possible. This
simultaneously describes the development of case and its real-time use by
the same principles, capturing the intuition that language change is due to
language use.
By using semantic roles, the speaker can economically encode the func-
tion of an argument (in a zipf file, so to speak). By enriching the interpreta-
tion of the semantic role with the semantics of the predicate, the hearer can
unpack this information again. Structural case discriminates between the
semantic roles that are most prominent for a particular predicate. Because
their argument function is so predictable, it does not have to be guided by a
semantic role marker, they only have to be kept apart. As such, structural
case cannot be inherently characterized, it always concerns a semantic role
in relation to its predicate. For economy reasons, it suffices to mark one of
the prominent arguments only. What is called nominative in an accusative
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language and absolutive in an ergative language is the absence of case. A
selection principle, often in combination with topicality, determines which
of the two roles becomes subject and which object.
Using corpus counts, I have shown that morphological case is as expected
among the most frequent constructions of language and that structural case
markers are more frequent and more general than semantic ones.
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Chapter 3
The Case of Space
In this chapter the importance of frequency for spatial case is
discussed. It will be argued that the directionality dimension
of spatial meaning necessarily consists of three basic distinc-
tions, which follows from the analysis of directionality in terms
of a change of configuration over time. Place directionality is
the absence of a change in configuration; Goal directionality
is a change into some configuration, and Source directionality
is a change out of some configuration. All other directionality
meanings are shown to be derived from this basic set. Contrast-
ingly, the configuration domain is much more complex, consist-
ing of different ordering principles that lead to a larger set of
language particular configuration contrasts. As a result, the
distinctions of directionality are more frequently used than the
contrasts of configuration. Because frequent use leads to gram-
maticalization, spatial case is expected to express directionality
mainly. This prediction is shown to be correct in a study on
the growth of spatial case inventories, in a comparison between
spatial case and spatial adpositions, in a semantic analysis of
the morphosyntactic parts of spatial adpositional constructions,
and, finally, in a study of the case forms of spatial adpositions
in Finnish and Hungarian.
Chapter 3. The Case of Space
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is about the way morphological case expresses spatial meaning.
In the previous chapter, the importance of frequency was shown for case in
general. In this chapter the importance of frequency for spatial case will be
discussed.
De Hoop and Zwarts (2009, 178) argue that one of the interesting char-
acteristics of spatial case for the study of spatial meaning is that it tends to
encode spatial distinctions more systematically than lexical constructions
because of its paradigmatic nature. As a result, they think, the study of
spatial case might reveal something about fundamental distinctions and
patterns in spatial meaning. Hopefully, this chapter lives up to their ex-
pectations. Following the line of argumentation of the previous chapter,
what is most important for spatial meaning will be expressed most often
and therefore is predominantly expected to develop a case marker. Thus,
the study of spatial case is expected to show us the most important aspects
of spatial meaning.
Consider the following examples from Hungarian:
Hungarian (Hegedu˝s, 2008)
(1) a. a
the
ha´z
house
mellett
next.to
‘next to the house’
b. a
the
ha´z
house
alatt
under
‘below the house’
(2) a. A
the
ha´z-ban
house-ine
a´llok.
stand.1sg
‘I’m standing in the house.’
b. A
the
ha´z-on
house-super
a´llok.
stand.1sg
‘I’m standing on the house.’
In (1), the position of the speaker next to and below the house are expressed
with the postpositions mellett and alatt. In (2), the position of the speaker
inside of and on the house are expressed with the case suffixes -ban and
-on. Apparently, the configurations IN and ON are more case worthy than
NEXT TO and BELOW. The primary use of spatial case however, as I will
argue below, is illustrated by the contrasts between (2) and (3). Spatial case
first and foremost expresses directionality, the change of relative position
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over time. Only if a directionality distinction is made, a further distinction
among the more basic meanings of configuration is expected.
(3) a. A
the
ha´z-ba
house-ill
megyek.
go.1sg
‘I’m going into the house.’
b. A
the
ha´z-ra
house-superl
felma´szok.
climb.1sg
‘I’m climbing up the house.’
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 first some important
concepts of spatial meaning will be discussed. Configuration and direction-
ality will be the most important for present purposes.
In Section 3.3 a modified version of Jackendoff’s analysis of directionality
will be proposed. In this version basic directionality distinctions do not
have to be stipulated but their number is necessarily restricted to three.
In contrast, the set of distinctions that can be made on the configuration
dimension is less restricted and therefore in general much bigger. Because
the members of the smaller set of directionality functions are more often
used than the members of the bigger set of configuration functions, the
former are predominantly expected to develop case forms. This prediction
is shown to be borne out in different ways in Section 3.4.
In Section 3.4.1 I will show that my analysis explains the semantic map
of directionality that results from cross-linguistic comparison of syncretism
patterns. On this map, Place is placed between Goal and Source. In Sec-
tion 3.4.2 I will show that it correctly predicts the growth of spatial case
inventories in the two dimensions of space. In Section 3.4.3 the division of
labor between spatial constructions that differ with respect to their degree
of grammaticalization will be discussed. In Section 3.4.4 the division of
labor within the set of more lexical spatial constructions will be discussed.
That is, spatial constructions in which more lexical elements, like adpo-
sitions, and more grammatical elements, like case, are used at the same
time. Finally, in Section 3.4.5 a prediction concerning the case paradigms
of spatial adpositions that follows from this distribution of labor will be
tested.
3.2 About Space
The importance of a spatial conceptual system for any species with the abil-
ity to move around is obvious. According to Landau and Lakusta (2009),
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humans do not differ from other species by having such a system, but only in
having language as an additional, powerful representational system that al-
lows us to share this representation of space with others. Language provides
tools to strongly represent and combine aspects of spatial organization that
are otherwise fragile. Therefore, the way we talk about spatial relations
in the physical world should not be taken as a direct derivative of a single
basic cognitive representation of space. Rather, it shows how different sys-
tems can be integrated into a linguistic representation. Similarly, Svorou
(1993) argues that there is no direct mapping from spatial language to a
state of affairs in the physical world. There is always a language-specific
conception of space in between, comparable to the logical form of argument
structure introduced in the previous chapter. Thus, contrary to what has
been thought for long (see Levinson & Wilkins, 2006b), the combination of
ordering principles behind spatial language and their relative importance
may differ between languages. As is the case with pretty much any other
domain of language, spatial language is arbitrary to some degree. As will be
shown in this section, the organization of some domains of spatial meaning
may vary greatly between languages. However, as will be argued in the next
section, directionality is organized in a similar fashion for all languages.
In studying spatial language, I am only interested in more grammatical-
ized items (“spatial grams”, in the terminology of Svorou, 1993). According
to Talmy (2000, 178), these closed-class grammatical forms and syntactic
structures (together constituting the so-called fine structure of language in
contrast to its macroscopic expository level) provide a fundamental concep-
tual framework. Furthermore, I confine myself to the use of spatial language
that describes location in space, disregarding predication of spatial proper-
ties. That is, utterances like the house is big or the road is long will not be
discussed. Note however that these properties are important for descrip-
tions of locations. For instance something can only be along some object if
this object is long in some sense.
The location in space of objects is relational, that is, it involves other ob-
jects. Talmy (2000) proposes the notions figure and ground for disambigua-
tion (similar to the notions trajector and landmark of Langacker, 1991). To
communicate the location of a figure, we make use of grounds, reference
objects whose position is evident. Spatial case relates figures to grounds by
marking the latter. The definitions of the two notions are given in (4).
(Talmy, 2000, 312):
(4) a. The figure is a moving or conceptually movable entity whose
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path, site, or orientation is conceived as a variable, the partic-
ular value of which is the relevant issue.
b. The ground is a reference entity, one that has a stationary set-
ting relative to a reference frame, with respect to which the
figure’s path, site, or orientation is characterized.
In addition to concrete objects, also events are allowed to be taken as figures.
For instance in (5), both Lenny is singing a song and Lenny can be the
figure.
(5) Lenny is singing a song in the shower.
The precise relative position between the two objects in space, e.g. AT,
IN, ON, UNDER, etc., is the domain of the configuration function. Di-
rectionality is about the way this configuration changes over time. For
example, if a figure is AT a ground at some point in time, but was not
previously, we speak of Goal directionality. I will only discuss configuration
here, as directionality will be the topic of the next section.
According to Levinson and Wilkins (2006a), the configuration func-
tion is a complex, multidimensional semantic space for which there are no
simple surface universals. Their claim really concerns the topological do-
main, which, as we will see below, is a subset of the configuration domain.
Bowerman and Choi (2003) show that children even at very early stages of
spatial language acquisition already show language particular preferences,
suggesting a lack of general ordering principles, or at least a lack of a univer-
sal hierarchy of these principles. In spite of this variation, the distinctions
of the configuration function do not seem to vary unrestrictedly. For exam-
ple, some distinctions seem to be easier to acquire than others (Casasola
& Cohen, 2002; Gentner & Bowerman, 2009). Also, through studying the
difference between languages in inventory size of topological expressions,
Levinson, Meira, and the Language and Cognition Group (2003) establish
an implicational scale of topological relations expressed by adpositions that
at least holds statistically. They show that there are tendencies that de-
scribe the growth of the set of configuration options between languages.
Their findings are summarized in (6).
Implicational scale of topological distinctions (Levinson et al., 2003)
(6) AT Â IN Â ON/UNDER Â OVER/NEAR Â ON-TOP Â AT-
TACHED Â INSIDE Â . . .
This scale should be read as follows. With the addition of every new term,
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INAT AT
AT
AT
INAT AT
ON
UNDER
Figure 3.1: A two-way and a four-way configuration distinction
the meaning range of the already existing terms will be narrowed down.
Whereas the semantic domain that is covered stays the same, the way it is
cut up changes. If languages make a two-way topological distinction in their
adpositional system only, it will probably be on the basis of an inclusion
relation, distinguishing between IN and not-IN; if languages make a three-
way distinction, it will either be between AT, IN, and ON, or between AT,
IN, and UNDER, etc. The range of the markers for AT and IN in the latter
cases is more limited than in a two-way distinction. As some languages
make a very fine-grained distinction within their adpositional system, the
scale may grow even up to 30 adpositions. In Figure 3.1, the distinction
between a two-member and a four-member system is illustrated.
Levinson et al. (2003) show that there seem to be general underlying
ordering principles like containment, vertical positioning, contact, support,
and adhesion from which spatial concepts are compositionality constructed
(see Talmy, 2000, 241, for a list of 20 such constraints). The ordering of
the scale can be explained by inclusion relations between these notions. For
example, Zwarts (2008b) shows how the interaction of such principles can
account for the use of prepositions in situations in which in principle more
than one preposition applies. Support is typically part of a situation of
containment, as, because of gravity, a figure that is inside a ground will
typically be supported by the surface of that ground. As a result, there is
a default inference from containment to support. Similarly, support often
implies a certain vertical positioning. The principles can be ranked accord-
ing to such entailments. In choosing the applicable preposition for a certain
situation, a speaker is faithful to a principle of maximal informativity (see
Grice, 1989). That is, an adposition expressing containment is more infor-
mative than one expressing support only and therefore will be used in a
situation of containment.
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In spite of such implicational relations for the more basic notions, the
implicational hierarchy in (6) only holds statistically and has an open end.
This does not mean that the number of topological distinctions that can
be made with adpositions is uncountable. Following Ja¨ger and van Rooij
(2007), the choices of the configuration function, or the underlying prin-
ciples that motivate these choices, are functionally constrained, yielding
practical upper limits (cf. also the criteria for semantic roles in Section 2.3).
Only spatial functions that are sufficiently useful will be used and learned.
What exactly counts as sufficiently useful differs between cultures. How-
ever, as discussed above, some basic distinctions recur in most languages.
The open end only means that the particular set of meanings a language
adopts is not a priori determined. Languages can add very specific topo-
logical notions to a more or less predictable starting set.
Configuration contrasts can be divided into projective and non-projective
meanings (Herskovits, 1986; Zwarts & Winter, 2000). The truth conditions
of the latter only depend on the region of space occupied by the two objects
and generally also includes relations of propinquity, contact, and contain-
ment. When figure and ground are separated in space, further information
about “projections” from the ground are required. These projections can
be dependent on the intrinsic spatial or functional properties of the ground
or on that of the speaker (cf. the notions angular and non-angular mean-
ing in Levinson & Wilkins, 2006b and AxParts in Svenonius, 2006, 2008).
The way in which projective meaning is described is dependent on the per-
spective point, or, in the terminology of Levinson that is adopted here, the
frame of reference (Levinson, 2003; Levinson & Wilkins, 2006b). There are
different frames of reference that languages can apply. For example, speak-
ers can choose to place the origin of the spatial coordinate system that
organizes space at the ground, using properties of the ground (applying an
“intrinsic” frame of reference, in front of the church). Secondly, they can
choose to place the origin at themselves, using their own bodily coordinates
(“relative”, to the left of the tree). Finally, speakers can use fixed bearings
(“absolute”, to the south). Often, languages use more than one frame of
reference, having context dependent preferences. For example, in English,
one would say that Brighton is south of London whereas the car is in front
of the house.
Most studies of spatial languages look at spatial expressions in isola-
tion, for example comparing the adpositional inventory of languages. Sinha
and Kuteva (1995) argue against such an application of lexical semantics to
spatial expressions (cf. also Levinson, 2003, 63). They propose to analyze
spatial meaning as being syntagmatically distributed over both closed- and
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open-class items. In principle, this idea was already established by Talmy
(1975, 1985) in his typological study of the constituents that encode direc-
tionality in a clause. Talmy distinguishes satellite-framed from verb-framed
languages. Directionality is encoded by the verb in verb-framed languages,
whereas in satellite-framed languages, directionality is expressed by satel-
lites. Manner of motion, on the other hand, is encoded by satellites in
verb-framed languages, whereas it is encoded by the verb in satellite-framed
languages. This is illustrated in the following example:
Spanish (Talmy, 1975, 224)
(7) La
the
botella
bottle
salio´
exited
flotando
floating
de
from
la
the
cueva.
cave
‘The bottle floated out of the cave.’
In Spanish, a verb-framed language, directionality is encoded by the verb
(sal´ıo ‘exited’), manner of motion is expressed by a coverb (flotando ‘float-
ing’). In the English translation however, manner of motion is encoded by
the verb, whereas directionality is expressed by the prepositional phrase.
However, languages do not neatly fall into either of these two categories.
At best, they can be characterized as having a preference for one or the
other strategy. For example, like Spanish, English has the verb to exit,
which expresses directionality but not manner of motion. In any event,
such examples show that spatial meaning is indeed distributed over the
sentence rather than being concentrated in a single item.
As another example of such distributed spatial semantics, Herskovits
(1986, 41) notes the importance of the figure for the interpretation of a
spatial construction, as illustrated by the difference between the spatial re-
lationships denoted by the water in the vase and the cracking in the vase.
Similarly, Lemmens (2002) shows how Dutch posture verbs may encode the
posture of the figure and information about the duration of the configura-
tion, which itself is encoded by a prepositional phrase, cf. (8).
Dutch
(8) a. De
the
vaas
vase
staat
stands
op
on
tafel.
table
‘The vase is standing on the table (vertically).’
b. Het
the
boek
book
ligt
lies
onder
under
de
the
tafel.
table
‘The book is lying under the table (horizontally).’
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In (8-a), the vertical orientation of the vase is expressed by the posture verb
staan ‘to stand’; the horizontal orientation of the book in (8-b) is expressed
by the posture verb liggen ‘to lie’.
As a final example, van Riemsdijk and Huijbrechts (2007) argue that
there are syntactically and morphologically identifiable positions in gram-
matical structure that specifically express location and directionality. They
argue for the hierarchically ordered sequence of directionality and configu-
ration between the verb and the ground illustrated in (9).
(9) V – DIRECTIONALITY – CONFIGURATION – GROUND
Van Riemsdijk and Huijbrechts (2007) use the notion of locality to test
the predictions of this hierarchically ordered sequence. According to this
notion, only adjacent heads can enter into morphological or syntactic rela-
tionships. More specifically, contiguous functions/members in the hierarchy
may be covered by a single expression and two noncontiguous elements can
only be expressed by the same marker if all intervening elements are also
expressed by the same marker. Note that this analysis is not concerned
with surface structure but has to assume movement and/or neglect case
marking to account for the following examples:
German
(10) a. Dirk
Dirk
geht
goes
in
in
dem
the.dat
Laden
shop
herum.
around
‘Dirk is walking around the shop.’
b. Dirk
Dirk
geht
goes
in
in
den
the.acc
Laden.
shop
‘Dirk is going into the shop.’
The difference between (10-a) and (10-b) is in the case marking of the
prepositional complement. As in many Indo-European languages, this ad-
positional case determines directionality (see Lestrade, 2008). In these con-
structions however, this marker of directionality is in between the ground
and the marker of configuration, i.e. the preposition, thereby violating the
sequence in (9) proposed by van Riemsdijk and Huijbrechts (2007). The
same holds for the English translation in (10-b). The directionality marker
-to is in between the ground the shop and the configuration marker in.
Nevertheless, I believe van Riemsdijk and Huijbrechts (2007) are right
in the sense that languages preferably have the configuration marker in
between the ground and the directionality marker, which has also been ob-
served by Kracht (2002) and Zwarts (2005b). Zwarts (2005b) explains this
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observation by a preference to have syntactic surface structure follow se-
mantics, which is referred to in this thesis as the principle of isomorphism.
Below, it will be argued that the German and English examples above are
exceptions to this general principle. The semantic structure of spatial con-
structions will be discussed in the next section, the principle of isomorphism
will be discussed in Section 3.4.4.
Of course, there is much more to say about spatial meaning. Other
studies of spatial language (concerning adpositions, mainly) concern for
example deixis (see Senft, 2004), degree (see Koopman, 2000; den Dikken,
2006), and axial parts (see Svenonius, 2006). At a more abstract level,
Zwarts and Winter (2000) propose a vector space semantics for spatial
meaning, creating the possibility to look at algebraic properties of spatial
PPs. This short introduction cannot do justice to all studies and spatial
meaning aspects. I have only introduced those notions that I think are most
important for spatial case.
As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, spatial case primarily
expresses directionality, configuration being next in line. Sometimes other
meaning aspects are expressed by spatial case too. For example, there are
languages that use spatial case to express the difference between proximate
and distal (e.g. Tsez) or between general and more specific location (e.g.
Tabasaran; Comrie & Polinsky, 1998). However, such distinctions are sec-
ondary to the expression of configuration and directionality. Only when
configuration and directionality are expressed, additional meaning differ-
ences are made by means of case.
3.3 Directionality
As we saw in the previous section, spatial constructions can be ordered ac-
cording to two dimensions of spatial meaning: a dimension of configuration,
denoting the relative position of the figure with respect to the ground (AT,
IN, ON, UNDER, . . . ), and one of directionality, describing the change
of this relative position over time. In this section it will be argued that
the directionality dimension necessarily consists of three basic distinctions,
which, as a result, can be seen as cognitive universals. This contrasts with
the previous section, which illustrated that there is no comparable uniform
set of configurational concepts (Levinson et al., 2003; Bowerman & Choi,
2003; Gentner & Bowerman, 2009). The configuration domain is much more
complex, consisting of different ordering principles that lead to a larger set
of language particular configuration contrasts. As will be shown, this dif-
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ference has consequences for the degree of grammaticalization of the forms
of the two functions. The distinctions of directionality are much more fre-
quently used than the distinctions of configuration. And because of its
frequent use, directionality is the prime candidate for spatial case.
The discussion of directionality will start with with the analysis of
Jackendoff (1983, 1990). Next, using the formal semantics machinery de-
veloped by Krifka (1998), it will be argued that the analysis of Jackendoff
should be revised.
3.3.1 From Jackendoff
Jackendoff (1983, 1990) proposes that conceptualization can be decomposed
into function-argument organizations. The two abstract formation-rules
that are relevant for my spatial purposes are cited in (11). The existence
of a hierarchical distinction between these two dimensions is standardly as-
sumed (and often elaborated upon as in the functional structure developed
in generative approaches for spatial adpositions by Koopman, 2000, den
Dikken, 2006, Svenonius, 2006).
(11) a. [Place] → [Place Place-FUNCTION ([THING])]
b. [Path]→ [Path {TO, FROM, TOWARD, AWAY-FROM, VIA}
([{THING, Place}])]
(11-a) says that a conceptual constituent belonging to the category Place is
the result of the application of a Place function to an argument that belongs
to the category THING. The argument serves as a spatial reference point
in terms of which the Place function defines the region. The Place function
could be any spatial relation, e.g. IN, ON, AT, etc. (11-b) says that a Path
is the result of the application of a Path function to a reference THING or
Place.
The interaction of the two functions is illustrated for into the house in
(12):
(12) Spatial meaning of into the house according to Jackendoff:
[Path TO [Place IN [THING the house] ] ]
In (12), the Path function TO selects the Place function IN, which selects
the THING the house in its turn.
According to Jackendoff (1983, 165) there are five categories of direc-
tionality, divided into three broad types. The first class of bounded paths
includes source paths and goal paths, FROM and TO. In bounded paths,
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the reference object or Place is the beginning or endpoint of the path. The
paths in the second class of directions do not include the reference object
or Place, but would do so if the path were extended by some unspecified
distance. The members of this class are AWAY FROM and TOWARD.
The third and final class of routes consists of one member only, VIA. The
reference object or Place is related to some point in the interior of the path
and nothing is specified about the endpoint of the motion.
Before proposing my reanalysis of directionality, I would like to adapt
the terminology. Following Talmy, the reference object is called a ground.
What is called a Place function by Jackendoff will be called a configura-
tion function; the Path function will be called a directionality function.
Thus, I free up the notions Place and Path for their use in my account as
a directionality distinction and semantic prime respectively. (12) is now
reformulated as follows:
(13) Spatial meaning of into the house, new terminology:
[directionality TO [configuration IN [ground the house] ] ]
The configuration function describes the position of the figure with respect
to the ground. The directionality function describes the way in which this
configuration changes. This change can be described in spatial terms only,
as a sequence of positions in space (e.g. Zwarts, 2008a), with reference to
event time (e.g. Kracht, 2002), or by the spatial application of an abstract
change feature (Fong, 1997). In the explanation of my proposal below I will
assume a temporal analysis as I think it is closest to our intuitive spatial
thinking.
Now for the more fundamental part of my revision. According to Jack-
endoff, the directionality function is either TO, FROM, VIA, TOWARD
or AWAY-FROM. I propose that there are only three basic distinctions,
namely Place, Source, and Goal. All the others are derivations. In the next
section, I will first show how VIA, TOWARD, and AWAY-FROM can be
derived from Source and Goal. This argument will be grounded in formal
semantics. An important criterion for my semantic analysis is its intuitive
plausibility. I will try to stay as close as possible to the intuitive reasoning
or human conception that I think is at the basis of these concepts.1 Spatial
language does not follow the physical logic of the external world, but rather
describes the human conception of spatial relations, which is partly chan-
neled by language specific conventions in addition (see Svorou, 1993, 32).
The intuition about directionality is that it concerns a change of relative
1Note that this is the point of view of Krifka (1998) too.
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position. By decomposing a directionality path into subpaths, this change
can be made explicit. In our perception of the world, a change of place
necessarily involves development in time. Therefore, the spatial subpaths
are linked to a temporal path.
My analysis will predict the implicational hierarchy of directionality dis-
tinctions given in (14).
Implicational scale of directionality distinctions
(14) Place Â Goal, Source Â VIA, TOWARD, UP.TO, . . .
Goal and Source entail Place directionality. Spatial language is only ex-
pected to express the first two if there also is a semantic feature for Place.
All other directionality distinctions are derived from Goal and Source.
Therefore, special spatial markers for these meanings are only expected
if Goal and Source are expressed first.
3.3.2 Via Krifka
In this section the basic meanings of directionality will be defined. It will be
shown that TOWARD and AWAY-FROM are atelic variants of Goal and
Source. The problem to be tackled (and the reason that formal semantics is
needed) is that TOWARD and AWAY-FROM do not involve a transition,
which is the defining property of Goal and Source in my proposal. I think
the fact that meaning a can be derived from meaning b without having the
defining property of b is best explained in formal terminology. It will also
be shown that VIA is a derived notion. All definitions and examples in the
first part of this section are from Krifka (1998).
The basic structures that we need for the study of directionality are part
structures. Eventually, we want to say that different parts of a path have
certain properties because of which we analyze the path as belonging to a
specific directionality distinction. Krifka (1998) defines a part structure as
follows:
(15) P = 〈UP ,⊕P ,≤P , <P ,⊗P 〉 is a part structure iff
a. UP is a set of entities;
b. ⊕P , the sum operation, is a function from UP × UP to UP
that is idempotent, commutative, and associative, that is:
∀x, y, z ∈ UP [x⊕P x = x∧ x⊕P y = y⊕P x∧ x⊕P (y⊕P z) =
(x⊕P y)⊕P z];
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c. ≤P the part relation, defined as: ∀x, y ∈ UP [x ≤P y ↔ x ⊕P
y = y];
d. <P the proper part relation, defined as: ∀x, y ∈ UP [x <P y ↔
x ≤P y ∧ x 6= y];
e. ⊗P the overlap relation, defined as: ∀x, y ∈ UP [x⊗P y ↔ ∃z ∈
UP [z ≤P x ∧ z ≤P y]];
f. remainder principle: ∀x, y ∈ UP [x <P y → ∃!z[¬[z ⊗P x] ∧
x⊕P z = y]
(15-b) says that the sum of a part and itself is identical to itself, and that
it does not matter in which order you add two or more parts. The part
relation says that the addition of any subpart of a part to this part leads
to this same part. The proper part relation says that if some subpart is
a proper part of a part, it cannot be identical to this part. The overlap
relation says that two parts overlap if they share a common subpart. The
remainder principle says that if some subpart is a proper part of a part,
there should be exactly one other subpart of this part that does not overlap
with the first.
Given a part structure P, we can define two types of predicates: cumu-
lative and quantized predicates, defined in (16) and (17) respectively.
(16) ∀X ⊆ UP [CUMP (X)↔ ∃x, y[X(x)∧X(y)∧ x 6= y]∧ ∀x, y[X(x)∧
X(y)→ X(x⊕P y)]]
(17) ∀X ⊆ UP [QUAP (X)↔ ∀x, y[X(x) ∧X(y)→ ¬y <P x]]
A cumulative predicate applies to at least two distinct elements, quantized
predicates do not apply to their proper parts. For example, apples is cumu-
lative: if x and y are (sets of) apples, then their sum is too. Three apples
is quantized: it has no proper part that is also three apples. These two
notions will be important in distinguishing between atelic TOWARD and
telic Goal, and between atelic AWAY-FROM and telic Source. Eventually,
the atelic variants will be shown to be cumulative, the telic basic meanings
to be quantized.
A second relation that we need for our definition of directionality is
being externally connected or adjacent.
(18) A = 〈UA,⊕A,≤A, <A,⊗A,∞A, CA〉 is an adjacency structure iff
a. 〈UA,⊕A,≤A, <A,⊗A〉 is a part structure,
b. ∞A, adjacency, is a two-place relation in UA such that
(i) ∀x, y ∈ UA[x∞Ay → ¬x⊗A y]
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(ii) ∀x, y, z ∈ UA[x∞Ay ∧ y ≤A z → x∞Az ∨ x⊗A z]
c. CA ⊆ UA, the set of convex elements, is the maximal set such
that ∀x, y, z ∈ CA[y, z ≤A x ∧ ¬y ⊗A z ∧ ¬y∞Az → ∃u ∈
CA[u ≤A x ∧ u∞Ay ∧ u∞Az]]
Adjacent elements do not overlap and if an element x is adjacent to
an element y that is part of an element z, either x is also adjacent to z
or x overlaps with z (18-b). The condition for convex elements says that
all convex subparts y and z of a part x that do not overlap and are not
adjacent are connected by a subpart u that is adjacent to both y and z.
Adjacency can be used to characterize the notion of paths, which is of
great importance for our understanding of directionality. Paths are elements
that are convex and linear, a notion that can be enforced by adjacency.
(19) Path structures: H = 〈UH ,⊕H ,≤H , <H ,⊗H ,∞H , CH , PH〉, such
that
a. 〈UH ,⊕H ,≤H , <H ,⊗H , CH〉 is an adjacency structure,
b. PH ⊆ CH is the maximal set such that
∀x, y, z ∈ PH [y, z ≤H x∧¬y⊗H z∧¬y∞Hz → ∃!u ∈ PH [u ≤H
x ∧ y∞Hu∞Hz]]
c. ∀x, y ∈ UH [¬x⊗H y ∧ ¬x∞Hy → ∃z ∈ PH [x∞Az∞Ay]]
(19-b) says that two disjoint, non-adjacent parts of a path are always con-
nected by exactly one subpath. (19-c) says that each two disjoint, non-
adjacent elements are connected by a path. Thus, there is a path between
any two locations.
Some paths are illustrated in Figure 3.2. For example, a ⊕ b ⊕ c is a
path, but a⊕ c⊕ d is not, as a and c are not connected by a subpath. Also,
a⊕ b⊕ c⊕ h is not a path as it violates uniqueness (cf. (19-b)): both b and
b⊕ h connect between a and c.
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Figure 3.2: Path illustrations
Some paths are directed, meaning that their parts are not only adjacent
but that there is a precedence relation in addition.
(20) D = 〈UD,⊕D,≤D, <D,⊗D,∞D, PD, CD,¿D,DD〉 is a directed path
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structure iff
a. 〈UD,⊕D,≤D, <D,⊗D, PD〉 is a path structure;
b. DD ⊆ PD, the set of direct paths, is the maximal set, and¿D,
precedence, is a two-place relation in DD with the properties:
(i) ∀x, y ∈ DD[[¬x¿D x] ∧ [x¿D y → ¬y ¿D x] ∧ [x¿D
y ∧ y ¿D z → x¿D z]]
(ii) ∀x, y ∈ DD[x¿D y → ¬x⊗D y]
(iii) ∀x, y, z ∈ DD[x, y ≤D z ∧ ¬x⊗D y → x¿D y ∨ y ¿D x]
(iv) ∀x, y ∈ DD[x¿D y → ∃z ∈ DD[x, y ≤D z]]
The first property says that precedence is irreflexive, asymmetric, and tran-
sitive; the second says that precedence holds only for non-overlapping ele-
ments; the third says that whenever two subpaths of a directed path do not
overlap, one must precede the other, and the fourth says that only parts of
a directed path can stand in a precedence relation to each other.
A one-dimensional path structure is a structure for which any two paths
are part of a path:
(21) A path structure H is one-dimensional iff ∀x, y ∈ PH∃z ∈ PH [x ≤H
z ∧ y ≤H z]
Many directed path structures are one-dimensional. In such structures, for
each two convex, non-overlapping direct paths x, y it holds that either x
precedes y, or y precedes x.
(22) A directed path structure V is one-dimensional iff ∀x, y ∈ DD[¬x⊗D
y → x¿D y ∨ y ¿D x]
Krifka further defines the domain of times and events, in which he derives
the latter from the former (although in principle, this could just as well
be done the other way around). Time can be seen as a one-dimensional
directed path structure as illustrated in (23), in which “¿” is interpreted
as temporal precedence.
(23) A time structure T is a one-dimensional directed path structure
〈UT ,⊕T ,≤T , <T ,⊗T ,∞T , PT , CT ,¿T ,DT 〉
Events form a part structure and are subject to a temporal precedence
relation.
(24) E = 〈UE ,⊕E ,≤E , <E ,⊗E , TE , τE ,∞E ,¿E , CE〉 is an event struc-
ture iff
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a. 〈UE ,⊕E ,≤E , <E ,⊗E〉 is a part structure,
b. TE is a time structure 〈UT ,⊕T ,≤T , <T ,⊗T ,∞T , PT , CT ,DT ,
¿T 〉
c. τE , the temporal trace function, is a function from UE to UT ,
∞E , temporal adjacency, is a two-place relation in UE ,
¿E , temporal precedence, is a two-place relation in UE ,
CE , the set of temporally contiguous events, is a subset of UE
with the properties
(i) ∀e, e′ ∈ UE [τE(e⊕E e
′) = τE(e)⊕T τE(e
′)]
(ii) ∀e, e′ ∈ UE [e∞Ee
′ ↔ τE(e)∞T τE(e
′)]
(iii) ∀e, e′ ∈ UE [e¿E e
′ ↔ τE(e)¿T τE(e
′)]
(iv) ∀e ∈ CE [τE(e) ∈ PT ]
(v) UE is the smallest set such that CE ⊆ UE and for every
e, e′ ∈ UE , e⊕E e
′ ∈ UE
The temporal trace function τE maps events to their run time. The first
property says that the run time of the sum of two events is the sum of
the run time of each event; the second and third property define temporal
adjacency and precedence for events in relation to the corresponding run
times; the fourth property says that temporally contiguous events are events
with a contiguous run time, and the final property says that the set of all
events is the closure of the contiguous events under sum formation.
Krifka defines the notion of a telic predicate by referring to the initial
and final parts of an event. An event e′ is an initial part of e if it is not
preceded by any part of e, and is a final part if it is not followed by any
part of e.
(25) a. ∀e, e′ ∈ UE [INIE(e
′, e) ↔ e′ ≤E e ∧ ¬∃e
′′ ∈ UE [e
′′ ≤E e ∧
e′′ ¿E e
′]]
b. ∀e, e′ ∈ UE [FINE(e
′, e) ↔ e′ ≤E e ∧ ¬∃e
′′ ∈ UE [e
′′ ≤E e ∧
e′ ¿E e
′′]]
If a telic predicate applies to an event e, then it does not apply to a part
of e that begins or ends at a different time. Alternatively, we can say that
telicity is the property of an event predicate X that applies to events e such
that all parts of e that fall under X are initial and final parts of e.
(26) ∀X ⊆ UE [TELE(X) ↔ ∀e, e
′ ∈ UE [X(e) ∧ X(e
′) ∧ e′ ≤E e →
INIE(e
′, e) ∧ FINE(e
′, e)]]
At this point my account diverges from Krifka. Krifka uses event struc-
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tures to describe directionality, whereas I will directly relate time to paths
instead. Also, Krifka’s characterization of telicity is too restrictive for my
spatial purposes, as in this domain either the starting point or the endpoint
is relevant, but not both. I propose a directed path structure for direction-
ality, very similar to the event domain just described, only the subscripts
differ.
(27) dir = 〈Udir,⊕dir,≤dir, <dir,⊗dir, Tdir, τdir,∞dir,¿dir, Cdir,Ddir〉
is a directionality structure iff
a. 〈Udir,⊕dir,≤dir, <dir,⊗dir, Cdir〉 is a directed path structure,
b. Tdir is a time structure 〈UT ,⊕T ,≤T , <T ,⊗T ,∞T , PT , CT ,DT ,
¿T 〉
c. τdir, the temporal trace function, is a function from Ddir to
UT ,
∞dir, temporal adjacency, is a two-place relation in Ddir,
¿dir, temporal precedence, is a two-place relation in Ddir,
Cdir, the set of temporally contiguous paths, is a subset of Ddir
with the properties
(i) ∀x, y ∈ Ddir[τdir(x⊕dir y) = τdir(x)⊕T τdir(y)]
(ii) ∀x, y ∈ Ddir[x∞diry ↔ τdir(x)∞T τdir(y)]
(iii) ∀x, y ∈ Ddir[x¿dir y ↔ τdir(x)¿T τdir(y)]
(iv) ∀x ∈ Cdir[τdir(x) ∈ PT ]
(v) Udir is the smallest set such that Cdir ⊆ Udir and for
every x, y ∈ Udir, x⊕dir y ∈ UE
The temporal trace function τdir maps directed paths to a temporal dimen-
sion. Thus, in the directionality domain, a path is no longer an atemporal
notion. The first property says that the time corresponding to the sum of
two paths is the sum of the times corresponding to each path; the second
and third property define temporal adjacency and precedence for paths in
relation to the corresponding run times. If two paths are adjacent, their
run times are too, and if one path precedes the other, the run time of this
first path precedes the run time of the second. The fourth property says
that contiguous directed paths are paths with a contiguous run time. That
is, the movement from one place to another necessarily involves develop-
ment in time. The fifth property, finally, says that the set of all paths in
a directionality structure is the closure of the contiguous paths under sum
formation.
Maybe in this way the relation between the temporal and directed do-
main is put too strong , as I only wish to capture the intuition that a change
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in place necessarily involves a change in time. For example, if Joost and
Tineke make a walk of 80 km from Hoek van Holland to Leerdam, spread
over several weekends, they could choose to first walk from Hoek van Hol-
land to Rotterdam, then from Ablasserdam to Leerdam, and only in the
last weekend from Rotterdam to Ablasserdam. The sum of the different di-
rected paths makes a contiguous from Hoek van Holland to Leerdam path,
but the sum of their corresponding time paths does not.
Before I define the different directionality distinctions, consider Fig-
ure 3.3 in which different directionality meanings are schematically illus-
trated. The development in time is (redundantly, as directionality paths
themselves already have a temporal component) represented with the dashed
vector at the top. The circles in the middle represent a region at which a
configuration with respect to some ground holds. This can be any config-
uration with respect to any ground (‘under the table’, ‘above my head’,
‘between the two houses’, etc.) but for the sake of concreteness, let us say
that one is ‘inside the house’ here. The first path a does not enter or leave
this configuration. Path a may be a minimal element in the absence of
motion or a path that stays within some configuration. In our example, the
difference between the two options would be between sitting in the house
and walking around in the house. In both cases, all subpaths of Path a are
within the specified configuration. Path b has its endpoint in the house,
Path d has its starting point in there. The other paths could be seen as
variants of these two. Path f is the sum of Path b and d; Path c would
be like Path b if we were to lengthen it, and Path e would be like Path d
if we were to extrapolate its starting point. With respect to the specified
configuration, we say that Path a is a Place; Path b is a Goal; Path d is a
Source; Path f is VIA; Path c is TOWARD, and Path e is AWAY FROM.
We can use almost the same definitions for initial and final subpaths as
the ones Krifka used for events, changing only the subscripts and type of
arguments:
(28) a. ∀x, y ∈ Ddir[INIdir(y, x) ↔ y ≤dir x ∧ ¬∃z ∈ Ddir[z ≤dir
x ∧ z ¿dir y]]
b. ∀x, y ∈ Ddir[FINdir(y, x) ↔ y ≤dir x ∧ ¬∃z ∈ Ddir[z ≤dir
x ∧ y ¿dir z]]
(28-a) says that a subpath y is the initial subpath of x if there is no other
subpath z of x that precedes y. Similarly, (28-b) says that a subpath y is
the final subpath of x if there is no other subpath z of x that y precedes.
Now, we can define the different directionality distinctions with respect
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Figure 3.3: Directionality distinctions
to some subpath for which a given configuration holds. I simply assume
a set of spatial relationships Uconfig. The exact structure of this domain
need not concern us here, since I am trying to abstract away from specific
configuration contrasts (but see Zwarts, 1997; Zwarts & Winter, 2000, for
such an analysis). In this set, there is a configuration c that denotes a region
with respect to ground x : config(x, c) (cf. the place function of Jackendoff,
1983, discussed in Section 3.3.1). In the definitions below, config(x, c) could
denote any region with respect to ground x, for example IN, ON, UNDER,
etc. To stick to our example, let us say that c refers to the region that is
described by English in and our ground is the house.
As the discussion of Figure 3.3 above already meant to illustrate, in my
analysis only Place, Source, and Goal are basic distinctions of directionality,
the others are derived. The basic meanings of directionality can be defined
formally as follows:
(29) Basic distinctions of directionality
a. Placec: ∀x ∈ Ddir[Placec(x) ↔ ∃c ∈ Uconfig∀y ∈ Ddir[y ≤dir
x→ config(y, c)]]
b. Sourcec: ∀x ∈ Ddir[Sourcec(x)↔ ∃c ∈ Uconfig∃y, z ∈ Ddir[y⊕dir
z = x ∧ INIdir(y, x) ∧ Placec(y) ∧ ¬Placec(z)]]
c. Goalc: ∀x ∈ Ddir[Goalc(x) ↔ ∃c ∈ Uconfig∃y, z ∈ Ddir[y ⊕dir
z = x ∧ FINdir(y, x) ∧ Placec(y) ∧ ¬Placec(z)]]
First note the subscript at the different meanings. A directionality distinc-
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tion is always relative to a configuration. If we imagine a bird flying from
a tree into a house, the same path could be described as a Source path for
config(tree, AT) and as a Goal path with respect to config(house, IN).
According to the definition in (29-a), a path is a Place with respect to
configuration c if this configuration holds for all of its subpaths. As before,
this may be true in the absence of motion, if the path has no proper parts;
in the absence of development in time, or when all subpaths of a path are
within a given configuration.
A Source consists of two subpaths, of which only the initial path is in
the specified configuration; a Goal is the opposite of a Source, cf. (29-b,c).
Note that the definitions of Goal and Source both include the notion of
Place. That is, Goal and Source imply Place. Without a Place to go to,
you do not have a Goal.
In our example, sitting in the house and walking around in the house
both are Places with respect to config(house, in). Walking out of the house
necessarily involves a path with an initial subpath inside of the house and
an endpoint in the complementary configuration outside of it, walking into
the house is the opposite.
Let us now turn to the derived meanings. Crucially, derived meanings
of directionality include the basic distinctions with some additional require-
ments:
(30) Derived distinctions of directionality
a. AWAY FROMc: ∀x ∈ Ddir[away fromc(x)↔ ∃c ∈ Uconfig ∧
∃y ∈ Ddir[y ¿dir x ∧ Sourcec(y) ∧ Sourcec(x⊕dir y)]]
b. TOWARDc: ∀x ∈ Ddir[towardc(x)↔ ∃c ∈ Uconfig∧∃y[x¿dir
y ∧Goalc(y) ∧ x⊕dir y ∈ Ddir ∧Goalc(x⊕dir y)]]
c. VIAc: ∀x ∈ Ddir[viac(x)↔ ∃c ∈ Uconfig∧∀y, z ∈ Ddir[y, z ≤dir
x ∧ y ¿dir z ∧Goalc(y) ∧ Sourcec(z)]]
AWAY FROM is a path that can combine with a Source to become a Source
and the same applies to TOWARD. VIA is the combination of Goal and
Source. Further note that AWAY FROM and TOWARD are cumulative,
Source and Goal are quantized (cf. (16) and (17)). The combination of two
AWAY FROM paths makes another AWAY FROM path but a Goal nec-
essarily includes an endpoint at some configuration. Thus, AWAY FROM
and TOWARD are the atelic variants of Source and Goal.
The fact that Source and Goal imply Place and that all other direc-
tionality distinctions are derived from these three basic meanings creates a
number of predictions, which will be tested in Section 3.4. For example,
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it predicts an implicational hierarchy of directionality distinctions that are
cross-linguistically made with spatial cases. An AWAY-FROM case is only
expected if a Source distinction is made first and the same goes for TO-
WARD and Goal. As will be shown below, this and other predictions are
borne out.
My analysis differs from the one proposed by Zwarts (2008a). Zwarts
formally defines a path as a continuous function p from the real interval
[0,1] to a domain S of places. A path has a starting point p(0) and an
endpoint p(1) and for every i ∈ [0,1], p(i) is an intermediary point of the
path. In contrast to what I propose, directionality is an atemporal notion
in this account. As a result, Zwarts (2008a) distinguishes four fundamental
directionality types: Transitions, Cycles, Progressions, and Continuations.
Transitions involve paths that go from one spatial domain to a different,
complementary domain. The difference between Transitions (Jackendoff’s
bounded paths) and Progressions (Jackendoff’s directions) is that only the
latter are adjacent and cumulative. In Zwarts’ analysis, two paths are
adjacent (“connect”) if one starts where the other ends, i.e. p(1)=q(0). A
set of paths X is connected iff there are p ∈ X with a connecting q ∈ X. A
set of paths X is non-connected iff there are no p ∈ X with a connecting
q ∈ X. A connected set of paths X is cumulative iff for all p, q ∈ X, if
p+q exists, then p+q ∈ X. Since Transitions are defined as having either a
starting or end point in a different spatial region, they are necessarily non-
connected. Progressions like toward, on the contrary, are connected and
cumulative. You can add another four steps toward the house to four steps
toward the house and still go toward the house (cumulativity) and therefore
divide eight steps toward the house in two times four steps toward the house
(connectivity).
Cycles and Continuations are different from Transitions and Progres-
sions in that they are reversible. The path operation of reversal is defined
as follows: the reversal of p is the path which assigns to every i ∈ [0,1] the
position that p assigns to 1 – i. A set of paths X is reversible if and only if
for every p, if p ∈ X then the reversal of p ∈ X. For example, Jackendoff’s
VIA is reversible (both ‘jumping over the fence from left to right’ and ‘from
right to left’ are VIA), but the reversal of TO is FROM. Since my analysis
of directionality is temporal and therefore directed, reversal is simply im-
possible. What Zwarts (2008a) analyzes as Cycles and Continuations are
Places or combinations of Sources and Goals in my account. In the first
case, the change of place does not result in a change of configuration, in the
second they are not basic types.
In this section, I have defined directionality in formal semantics. By
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defining directionality in terms of the development of paths in time, I ar-
rive at three basic distinctions of directionality: Place, Source, and Goal.
These basic meanings are defined on the basis of a subpath at which some
configuration holds. If some configuration c is true for all subpaths of a path,
we are dealing with Place directionality. If it is true for a final subpath but
not for all earlier subpaths, we are dealing with Goal directionality. Finally,
if a configuration is true for a first subpath but not for all later ones, we are
dealing with Source directionality. I have shown that all other directionality
options are derived from these three basic distinctions.
The advantage of my analysis is that it reduces the number of basic
directionality distinctions. As I will show below, it correctly predicts an
implicational scale of directionality distinctions made by spatial case. This
is in direct opposition to the analyses of Jackendoff (1983, 1990) and Zwarts
(2008a), which actually wrongly attribute an equal status to directionality
distinctions that differ in markedness.
3.3.3 To a New Analysis of Directionality
With the help of formal semantics the previous section showed that the dif-
ference between Jackendoff’s TO and TOWARD and between his FROM
and AWAY-FROM is aspectual. In my analysis TOWARD and AWAY-
FROM are atelic modifications of the TO and FROM function. In this
section, I will reformulate my proposal in more accessible terminology,
adapting the path analysis of Zwarts (2008a, which was discussed more
elaborately in the previous section).
Whereas directionality is an atemporal notion for Zwarts, I add a tem-
poral dimension to it. Motion is a change of location over time of a figure
with respect to some ground. The figure follows a path, defined as a con-
tinuous function p from the real interval [0,1] to a domain S of places and
to a corresponding domain T of time. Each place is linked to one or more
points in time, but different places are always related to different points
in time. Just like in Zwarts (2008a), a path has a starting point p(0) and
an endpoint p(1) and for every i ∈ [0,1], p(i) is an intermediary point of
the path. Also following Zwarts, two paths are adjacent (“connect”) if one
starts where the other ends, i.e. p(1)=q(0). A set of paths X is connected iff
there are p ∈ X with a connecting q ∈ X. A set of paths X is non-connected
iff there are no p ∈ X with a connecting q ∈ X. A connected set of paths
X is cumulative iff for all p, q ∈ X, if p+q exists, then p+q ∈ X. At some
point, the path is in the region that is described by a configuration c of
our interest. There are really only two things that can happen now. Either
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the path stays within the region specified by some relevant configuration
(Placec) at all times or it does not. Within the latter option, the path can
be in the region at p(0) and leave it at a later point in time (Sourcec), or
it can start outside of the region and end up in it (Goalc).
Other directionality meanings can be shown to be variants of this basic
set. First, a VIAc path is a combination of Goal and Source (and hence
derived). For example, if you walk through the forest in an hour you first
enter the forest and then leave it. It can also refer to motion within some
configuration, which I analyze as Place. If you walk through the forest for
an hour you were in the forest all the time. An AWAY-FROMc path is a
path that would be a Sourcec path if we extrapolated its starting point to
our region of interest. That is, if we connect it with a Sourcec path. The
same goes for TOWARDc. A TOWARDc path is a path that would be a
Goalc path if we lengthened it to the region described by configuration c,
i.e. connect it with a Goalc path. As is the case with AWAY-FROMc, the
combination of two TOWARDc paths makes another TOWARDc path, as
illustrated for TOWARDc paths a and b in Figure 3.4. Thus, TOWARDc
and AWAY-FROMc are cumulative, making them atelic. Goalc and Sourcec
on the other hand are non-cumulative and telic, they necessarily include a
transition.
If we allow only basic notions as directionality distinctions, only two of
Jackendoff’s original directionality classes remain, viz. TO and FROM, or,
in my terminology: Goal and Source. To this set we need to add Place, that
is, the absence of a change in configuration. In the previous section, I have
argued that Place is the logical third (first, actually, as it is the most ba-
sic one) option if we consider directionality as the development of paths in
time. In this analysis, I defined directionality distinctions in terms of con-
figuration, thereby simply assuming that spatial meaning always consists
of both a directionality and a configuration dimension. However, this as-
sumption can be founded with evidence from spatial case inventories. First,
however, I should mention that I am not the only one and certainly not the
first to posit that all spatial meaning is decomposed into a directionality
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and a configuration function. Kracht (2002, 2003, 2008) proposes that the
absence of motion is really a directionality distinction, and not evidence for
the absence of such a function. Note that the view of spatial meaning as
necessarily consisting of these two dimensions is another crucial difference
between Jackendoff’s account and my proposal.
Consider the following examples of spatial case in Hungarian:
Hungarian
(31) a. A
the
ko¨nyv-et
book-acc
az
the
asztal-ra
table-superl
tesz-em.
put-1sg.def
‘I put the book on the table.’
b. A
the
ko¨nyv
book-acc
az
the
asztal-on
table-super
van.
is-3sg
‘The book is on the table.’
c. A
the
ko¨nyv
book-acc
elhagy
fell-3sg
az
the
asztal-ro´l.
table-superel
‘The book fell from the table.’
d. Az
the
asztal-ig
table-term
megy-ek.
go-1sg.indef
‘I walk up to the table.’
In (31-a), there is a change of configuration from the book not being on
the table to it being on it; in (31-b) there is no change of configuration; in
(31-c) there is a change from the book being on the table to it not being on
the table anymore, and in (31-d) finally, there is motion toward the table.
The spatial cases in (31) constitute the first row of the Hungarian spa-
tial case paradigm given in Table 3.1. There are a few things to note in
this spatial case paradigm. First, the different variants for each case are
driven by vowel assimilation and therefore phonologically predictable. Next,
there is no configuration distinction for TOWARD. The same marker -ig is
used for each configuration distinction. The motivation for this absence is
probably that the exact configuration does not matter for this meaning of
directionality since the figure does not end up there any way. But most im-
portantly, the different case markers are decomposable to some extent into
their configuration and directionality dimension. The IN cases start with
-b, the ON cases start with -r, the Place cases end with -n, and the Source
cases end with -l. Thus, the morphological makeup of the spatial case sys-
tem seems to reflect the semantic analysis of spatial meaning in (34). More
specifically, the case paradigm supports the idea of analyzing Place as an in-
dependent directionality distinction. The configuration is expressed by the
89
Chapter 3. The Case of Space
first part of a complex morpheme that results from the combination with
the part expressing directionality. In this decomposition, Place is added as
a directionality distinction instead of being an underspecified configuration
meaning. The same holds for the spatial case inventory of Finnish, which
will be discussed in Section 3.4.5.
Directionality
Configuration Place Source Goal TOWARD
ON superessive delative sublative terminative
-on/-en/-o¨n/-n -ro´l/-ro˝l -ra/-re -ig
AT adessive ablative allative terminative
-na´l/-ne´l -to´l/-to˝l -hoz/-hez/-ho¨z -ig
IN inessive elative illative terminative
-ban/-ben -bo´l/-bo˝l -ba/-be -ig
Table 3.1: Hungarian spatial case paradigm
Also, as Creissels (2009a, 5) shows, Northern Akhvakh has an indepen-
dent Place marker on top of the configuration markers. As is the case with
Hungarian, the spatial markers can be decomposed into a configuration and
directionality marker. As illustrated in Table 3.2, the marker for Place -
e/i is put on top of the set of configuration markers. For example, the Place
marker -i is added to the configuration -¯Ï’ ‘under’ to express ‘under’; if the
Source marker -a(je) is added to this configuration instead, we get ‘from
under’.
Thus these spatial case paradigms support the analysis of spatial mean-
ing as consisting of two dimensions in which the absence of a change of
configuration is a directionality distinction proper.
Using yet another, more informal way of putting it, if spatial mean-
ing is decomposed into a directionality and a configuration function, the
three basic distinctions of directionality logically follow from the presence
or absence of a change in configuration. If nothing changes, we are dealing
with Place directionality. If there is a change, the directionality depends
on its type. There can be a positive change in which some figure goes from
‘not being in the configuration specified by a spatial construction’ to ‘being
there’ (∼P|P); or there can be a negative one, from ‘being in a configuration
specified by a spatial construction’ to ‘not being there’ (P|∼P). Note that,
just like in the formal definitions in the previous section, Goal and Source
include the notion of Place.
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Directionality
Configuration Place Source Goal
default (OR1) -g-e -g-a(je) -g-u(ne)
in the vicinity of (OR2) -Xar-i -¯Ïir-a(je) -Xar-u(ne)
(OR3) -q¯-e -q¯-a(je) -q¯-u(ne)
a. in a relatively narrow space
b. distributed or diffuzed localization
under (OR4) -¯Ï’-i -¯Ï’-a(je) -¯Ï’-u(ne)
(OR5) -¯Ï-i -¯Ï-a(je) -¯Ï-u(ne)
a. in a filled, dense space
b. on a non-horizontal surface
Table 3.2: Northern Akhvakh spatial case paradigm
Fong (1997) uses the same transition features in her analysis of Finnish
directional expressions. She analyzes directional expressions as ordered
structures that are interpretable in any domain that is diphasic. Only in
spatial domains, directional expressions denote a change in place. In other
words, the spatial interpretation follows from co-compositionality (Pustejovsky,
1995): An underspecified semantic form becomes contextually enriched by
its composition. Following Lo¨bner (1989, cited in Fong, 1997, 29), the no-
tion of admissible phase-interval is formulated as an interval that starts
with a phase that is not-p and is followed by a phase that is (and stays)
p. More formally, it starts with times t for which p(t) = 0, it extends to
later times t′ with p(t′) = 1, and there is no later time t′′ with p(t′′) = 0
again. The strict development from ∼ p to p is given up in Fong (1997),
also allowing for changes from p to non-p. The crucial point remains the
monotonicity of a change (cf. also Zwarts, 2005a, for a similar analysis of
directional aspect).
Thus, Fong (1997) can account for the use of directional expressions in
examples like (32) and (33), in which there is no change of place.
Finnish (Fong, 1997, 17, 12)
(32) a. Tuovi
Tuovi
unoht-i
forget-3.past
kirja-n
book-acc
auto-on.
car-ill
‘Tuovi forgot a/the book in (lit.‘into’) a/the car.’
b. Tuovi
Tuovi
lo¨ys-i
found-3.past
kirja-n
book-acc
laatiko-sta.
box-ela
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‘Tuovi found a/the book in (lit.‘from’) a/the box.’
(33) a. silta
bridge
San
San
Francisco-on
Francisco-ill
‘a/the bridge into San Francisco’
b. silta
bridge
San
San
Francisco-sta
Francisco-ela
‘a/the bridge out of San Francisco’
In (32), the position of the book does not change, instead, the verbs entail
a posterior or anterior state. In (33), only the orientation of the bridge is
specified, not a real change of place.
The overall semantic analysis of the various uses of directional expres-
sions may be best captured in terms of abstract admissible phase intervals,
as Fong (1997) proposes. For me, however, directionality is spatial and con-
cerns a change in place over time. Uses like the above are metaphorically
or metonymically derived in my view, i.e., the results of type coercion (see
Pustejovsky, 1995). In other words, the unified account of the basic and
derived uses of spatial language is necessarily abstract, but I focus on the
spatial use only.
In sum, the assumption that spatial meaning consists of a directionality
and configuration dimension and the view of directionality in terms of a
change of configuration over time gives us three basic distinctions of direc-
tionality. Other meanings can be shown to be derived from these three.
Place directionality is the absence of a change in configuration; Goal direc-
tionality is a change into some configuration, and Source directionality is a
change out of some configuration. Thus, Goal and Source imply Place (cf.
also the formal definitions in the previous section), which will be important
for their morphological decomposition in the next section. The different
meanings are characterized in Table 3.3.
Directionality distinction Characterization
Place P
Source P|∼P
Goal ∼P|P
Table 3.3: The basic distinctions of directionality
Spatial meaning in my analysis always consists of a directionality func-
tion of one of these three basic types that is applied to a language particular
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configuration function from a much bigger set that is again applied to a
ground, as illustrated in (34).
(34) [directionality {Place, Goal, Source} [configuration {. . . } [ground Thing]]]
In principle, analyzing Place as a directionality distinction is only a
minor modification that is still in the spirit of the analysis of Jackendoff.
However, it has far-reaching consequences. It entails that the meanings
of directionality no longer have to be stipulated but follow from a general
phenomenon, namely a change of state. As a result, it predicts a certain
ordering of the directionality domain as will be shown in the next section.
Place and Goal are similar in that they do not express a negative change,
Place and Source are the same in that they do not express a positive change.
Goal and Source are only the same if we completely neglect a change in
configuration. That is, they can only be encoded by the same marker if
Place is encoded by the same marker too.
Also, my analysis predicts an implicational hierarchy of directionality
meanings, repeated in (35).
Implicational scale of directionality distinctions
(35) Place Â Goal, Source Â VIA, TOWARD, UP.TO, . . .
According to this hierarchy, spatial case inventories of languages are only
expected to express directionality distinctions higher on this scale if they
also have forms for more basic meanings.
Moreover, the small set of basic distinctions of directionality is com-
pletely different from what we find in the configuration domain. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, there is no such basic set for the configuration
function, as evidenced by the enormous variation among configurational
systems of languages. This is an extremely important semantic difference
between the two domains, on the basis of which a number of differences can
be predicted. These predictions will be discussed in the following sections.
3.4 Testing Some Hypotheses
3.4.1 The Semantic Map of Directionality
This section is concerned with syncretisms between directionality distinc-
tions.
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Languages may choose whether they specify directionality locally, that
is, in the spatial construction proper, or have it determined by the context.
For example, Nikitina (2008) shows that in English in can be used instead
of into when Goal meaning can be inferred from the context. This inference
is facilitated by transition verbs (e.g. get, bring, put), directional modifiers
(e.g. up, back, out), and “container” grounds (i.e., grounds that have a clear
boundary, as for example rooms, but not forests). In the next example it
is not necessary to encode directionality in the preposition as it becomes
sufficiently clear from the context:
(36) Put the bunny back into/in the box.
Since other cues help determine the exact directionality function already,
it is possible to use the more economical form in instead of into to express
Goal directionality. This is not possible for Source directionality:
(37) Take the bunny out of/*in the box again.
Apparently, English allows the use of the same form for Place and Goal
meaning, but not for Source.
Syncretisms between directionality distinctions are not uncommon cross-
linguistically. For economy reasons, languages may choose to cover two
or more directionality functions with the same form, having them disam-
biguated by context (see Sinha & Kuteva, 1995). My analysis of direction-
ality in terms of a change of configuration over time restricts the number
of possibilities for such syncretisms. As can be seen in Table 3.3, Source
and Place are the same if we neglect the state of affairs after the change,
whereas Goal and Place are the same if we neglect the previous state of
affairs. It is important to see that, Goal and Source are only the same if we
completely neglect change altogether. That is, they are only expected to be
expressed by the same marker if it also expresses Place. Note that there is
one way in which the two can be the same to the exclusion of Place. This
option involves neglecting the directionality of change. Unexpected as this
option may be given the inherent directionality of time (in my analysis),
there are a few languages that actually do this, as I will show below.
On the basis of cross-linguistic data on syncretisms in the directionality
domain, Nikitina (2009) establishes the following semantic map for the three
basic directionality functions.
(38) Semantic map of directionality (Nikitina, 2009)
Goal – Place – Source
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The most common syncretism is between Goal and Place directionality, and
is illustrated for Alamblak in (39).
Alamblak (Bruce, 1984, 198, 201)
(39) a. Fin˜ji
neg
te¨hrme¨m
they.did.not.stand.
bus-kor-t.
forest-ad-3sg.fem
‘They did not live in the forest.’
b. Womr
another
brhiha-kor
outside-ad
fakrmeme¨r.
ran.in.fear.he
‘The other ran away in fear outside.’
c. 1nd-e¨mbha-r-pne¨
dem-place-3sg.masc-ref
mithonalgetane¨m.
floated.down.all.the.way.we
‘From there we floated down all the way.’
In (39-a) and (39-b), the adessive case marker -kor is used for Goal and
Place meaning. For source meaning in (39-c), the referent case -pne¨ is used.
An example of a language that exhibits a syncretism between Source
and Place is the East Sakhalin dialect of Nivkh in (40).
East Sakhalin Nivkh (Gruzdeva, 1998, 20-21)
(40) a. T’ivlan¸
cold
cˇaγ-ux
water-abl
n¸at’x-∅
foot-nom
vezla-d.
cramp-fin
‘I have cramp in my foot in the cold water.’
b. Umgu-∅
woman-nom
n’o-x
barn-abl
p’u-d’.
come.out-fin
‘A woman came out from the barn.’
c. Ty
this
t’ulf-∅
winter-nom
Muzgun-χan
Muzgun-nonevid
mirˇn-∅
we-nom
wo-roχ
village-dat
laγ-iny-vur
visit-mod-conv:rep
it-nt.
say-fin
‘They say that, this winter, Muzgun is going to visit our vil-
lage.’
In (40-a) and (40-b), the same ablative case marker is used for Source and
Place meaning, whereas the dative case is used for Goal meaning in (40-c).
An example of a language that does not make a directionality distinction
whatsoever is Wan, illustrated in (41). The actual directionality meaning
is inferred from pragmatics or context:
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Wan (Nikitina, 2009)
(41) a. `¯A
3pl
yi¯
sleep
ka¯l´E
forest
go´.
IN
‘They fell asleep in the forest.’
b. `¯A
3pl
ga¯
go
ka¯l´E
forest
go´.
IN
‘They went to the forest.’
c. `¯A
3pl
go¯
left
ka¯l´E
forest
go´.
IN
‘They left the forest.’
Depending on the context, the preposition go´ IN can mean ‘in’ (41-a), ‘into’
(41-b), and ‘out of’ (41-c) without any explicit local coding.
According to Nikitina (2009), if a language covers two functions with
the same form to the exclusion of the third function, this form will always
cover a contiguous region on this map, i.e. taking together Goal and Place,
or Place and Source, but never Goal and Source without Place (cf. also
Creissels, 2006a). My analysis of directionality correctly predicts the map
that follows from these observations. Source and Place are the same if we
only consider the previous state of affairs. Something may or may not be
in some configuration at some point in time, if it was previously, it can
either be a Place or a Source but not a Goal. Similarly for the syncretism
between Goal and Place: If we only consider the subsequent state of affairs,
something may or may not have been in some configuration at some point
in time. If it is at a later point, it can either be a Place or a Goal but
not a Source. If we neglect the temporal development all together, all
directionality distinctions are the same. At some point, something is in a
region described by some configuration.
Unfortunately, the semantic map of directionality in (38) gives too sim-
ple a picture of the actual syncretism patterns in the directionality domain
as it neglects the frequency with which the different syncretisms occur (a
general shortcoming of standard semantic maps). Logically, there are five
possibilities of syncretism given the three directionality distinctions (42),
of which only one pattern is excluded and all others are treated equally
in the semantic map of Nikitina. But in fact, the three different types of
syncretism Nikitina describes are by no means equally often attested.
(42) a. No syncretism: Place 6= Goal 6= Source
b. Syncretism of Place and Goal: Place = Goal 6= Source
c. Syncretism of Place and Source: Place = Source 6= Goal
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d. Syncretism of Source and Goal: Source = Goal 6= Place
e. Syncretism of Place, Source, and Goal: Place = Goal = Source
There are a number of studies that look at the cross-linguistic occurrence
of these syncretism patterns. Blake (1977, Appendix A3) studies spatial
case syncretisms in a sample of Australian languages. Of the 83 languages
that use case to express all basic directionality distinctions, 9 exhibit a syn-
cretism between Goal and Place, other options are not attested. Noonan
(2008) looks at syncretism patterns in 76 Tibeto-Burman languages. He
finds 46 instances of syncretism between Goal and Place. Source and Place
occur together only five times, Goal and Source four times. Most of these
instances are part of a larger syncretism pattern also subsuming for exam-
ple dative case functions. If we consider combinations of spatial functions
only, the number of syncretisms of Goal and Place is 20. For each of the
syncretisms between Source, Place, and Goal, between Source and Place,
and between Goal and Source the number is one. Pantcheva (2010) stud-
ies the grammars of 53 languages from 22 genera (representing 14 language
families) and two language isolates. She finds 18 syncretisms between Place
and Goal and 7 between Place, Goal, and Source. In my typological sample
of 23 unrelated languages, to be discussed in the next section, there are
three instances of Goal-Place syncretism, two overall syncretisms, and one
instance of a syncretism between Place and Source (the aforementioned
Nivkh). Overall then, the syncretism between Goal and Place seems to
be much more common than the one between Source and Place. Whereas
such frequency differences are not represented in standard semantic maps,
it is possible to do so by multidimensional scaling analyses (MDS). In MDS
plots, syncretism frequencies are translated into plotting distances. Thus,
in the MDS version of Nikitina’s map, Goal and Place would be plotted
close to each other whereas the distance between Source and Place would
be much larger.
The difference in frequency between the different syncretism options,
most notably the infrequence of the syncretism between Source and Place
is hard to explain if directionality is just the application of a path function,
i.e. Goal or Source, to a place function, as proposed by Jackendoff (1983,
cf. Section 3.3.1). Pantcheva (2010) explains the absence of the syncretism
between Source and Place in her sample by proposing a different decompo-
sition of spatial meaning. She argues that a Source function is built on top
of a Goal function that takes a Place function on its turn, as illustrated in
(43).
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(43) The decomposition of directionality according to Pantcheva (2010):
[ Source [ Goal [ Place ]]]
The function of Source in this proposal is to reverse the orientation
of the phase transition that Goal expresses. As explained in the previous
two sections, Goal directionality concerns a change from not being in some
configuration to being in this configuration. Source, according to Pantcheva,
is like a negation function. Applying Source to Goal says that the change is
from (not not) being in some configuration to not being in this configuration.
Pantcheva uses evidence from morphological decomposition for her pro-
posal. This is a method that was also used in the discussion of the Hungar-
ian and Northern Akhvakh case paradigms above. Consider the following
example:
Estonian (Pantcheva, 2010)
(44) a. jala-l-t
foot-ON-Source
‘off the foot’
b. jala-l-le
foot-ON-Goal
‘onto the foot’
In (44) the directionality distinctions Source and Goal are morphologically
built on top of a configuration function ON. Thus, in Estonian, the syntactic
and semantic function application of directionality to configuration is mor-
phologically transparent. By the same argumentation, in some languages,
Source can be shown to be built upon Goal. Consider the following example:
Quechua (Pantcheva, 2010)
(45) a. Kay
this
nvan-ga
road-top
ayakucˇo-man
Ayacucho-all
rin-n.
go-3sg
‘This road goes to Ayacucho.’
b. May-manta-s
Where-abl-rep
chay
this
runa
man
ka-n-man?
be-3sg-cond
‘Where could this man be from?’
In this Quechua example, the Goal marker lexicalizes both the Goal and
Place function. The Goal marker is the simple morpheme -man. The Source
marker is morphologically complex, adding the morpheme -ta to the Goal
morpheme. In her sample of 55 languages there are five in which the Source
98
3.4 Testing Some Hypotheses
marker morphologically contains the Goal marker in such a way. Unfortu-
nately, the only example Pantcheva gives of a language that spells out all
directionality ingredients separately does not seem to be correct. According
to Pantcheva (2010), the expression of directionality in Hua can be decom-
posed as follows:
Hua (Pantcheva, 2010)
(46) a. Source: [Source ri’ [Goal ga [Place ro’]]]
b. Goal: [Goal ga [Place ro’]]
c. Place: [Place ro’]
However, according to Haiman (1980) the combinations with -ga are really
only alternative long forms of the Place and Source markers, as illustrated
in (47). That is, -(ro)ga is underspecified for Place and Goal; -ri’ always
marks Source.
Hua (Haiman, 1980, 232-234)
(47) Zu-roga/ro’-ri’
work-roga/ro’-Source
oe.
came
‘I have come from work.’
(48) a. zu’-ro’
house-ro’
‘at/to the house’
b. Mni’
water
Zati
Zati
roga
roga
‘by/to the Zati water’
Note that spatial case systems like that of Hungarian are problematic
for the account of Pantcheva (2010) as the morphological inclusion relation
between Place and Goal goes the wrong way. The marker for Place -ban
includes the one of Goal -ba. Another example is the Alamblak Goal marker
-ko that is included in the Place marker -kor.
Joint lexicalizations of directionality functions as in Quechua are subject
to a number of pragmatic and wellformedness principles, the details of which
need not concern us here. Most importantly it is impossible to lexicalize
two noncontiguous functions in the representation in (43). Since Goal is in
between Source and Place in the account of Pantcheva (2010), a syncretism
between Source and Place is not possible to the exclusion of Goal. Thus,
Pantcheva’s analysis of directionality predicts the absence of a syncretism
between Source and Goal, as evidenced in her sample.
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According to Pantcheva (2010) the function of the Goal head is really
only to encode a transition from one spatial domain to a complementary
one. In principle, it could both describe a positive change (Goal) and a
negative one (Source). The fact that this transition is positive follows from
an apparent general cognitive bias for goals. Such a bias has been described
in studies of English language acquisition by Lakusta and Landau (2005).
Lakusta and Landau (2005) show that learners of English often omit Source
but not Goal meaning, which is explained by a general cognitive preference
for Goal over Source directionality. The same bias seems active in the
interpretation of small clauses in English. Consider the following example
of Hoekstra (1988):
(49) They painted the door green.
In (49) the activity of painting leads to the result of the door being green
and is never interpreted as an activity starting out with or caused by the
door being green. In addition, Stolz (1992) argues that in Finno-Ugric
and Caucasian languages the development of a special Goal case marker
precedes the development of a Source marker.
The transition function is interpreted as Goal directionality because of
this general Goal bias and therefore its negation or reverse operation denotes
Source meaning. Thus the “real” analysis of directionality of Pantcheva
(2010) is in fact as follows:
(50) The “real” decomposition of directionality according to Pantcheva
(2010):
[ Negation [ Transition [ Place ]]]
In spite of the evidence in favor of a Goal bias, I think a word of caution
about the default Goal interpretation of the transition function is in order.
Some (spatial) meanings may indeed be easier to learn than others (cf.
Casasola and Cohen 2002, Gentner and Bowerman 2009). Yet as Bowerman
and Choi (2003) show, languages may differ in what they consider to be most
important. As is shown in eye tracking research, the importance of Goals
in motion events may differ between languages (Carroll, Lambert, Natale,
Starren, & van Stutterheim, in press). Thus the presumably universal Goal
bias may in fact be language dependent, albeit strongly preferred by as yet
unclear cognitive motivations (cf. also Stefanowitsch & Rohde, 2004).
More specifically, my word of caution is inspired by the fact that (rare
as they may be) there are languages that do join up Source and Place to the
exclusion of Goal. (It would be interesting to see what the interpretation of
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small clauses is in these languages.) As mentioned previously, both Noonan
(2008) and Nikitina (2009) identify such a language in their samples. Un-
fortunately, Noonan does not mention the name of the language; Nikitina
mentions Nivkh. In addition, according to Creissels (2006a, 2009b) Dinka,
Iraqw, Kanuri, and Old Georgian are of this type. For example, in Iraqw,
directive case -i is used for a Goal, ablative case -wa is used for Source and
Place (Mous, 1992).
Iraqw (Mous, 1992, 104-106)
(51) a. I
S.3
bara´
in:con
xats-ta-ka-r-wa
valley-F-indef-F-abl
qa-qe´er.
hab-graze.3sg.F
‘It usually grazes in a certain valley.’
b. Tlakway
bag
i-na
S.3-past
hu´u’
fall.3sg.m.past
gawa´
top.con
hhar-ta-wa
stick.F.abl
ale´.
respro
‘The bag fell from the stick.’
c. Ta-na
imps.S-past
wa‘angw-i
pit-dir
da´h.
enter.past
‘They entered the pit.’
In (51-a) and (51-b), the same ablative case marker is used for Source and
Place meaning, whereas the directive case is used for Goal meaning in (51-c).
Similarly, in Old Georgian, the adverbial case -(a)d expresses Goal (e.g.
‘They came to Bethphage and Bethania.’). The instrumental -it may ex-
press both Source (e.g. ‘Jesus turned away from the Jordan.’) and Place
(e.g. ‘she saw two angels sitting, one at the head and one at the feet.’;
Schanidse, 1982, 178; no glossed examples).
Also in many Saami languages (Ida Toivonen, p.c.; Hansson, 2007),
Place and Source share the same marker whereas Goal has its own marker.
This is illustrated for a number of adpositions in Table 3.4.
Place/Source Goal
IN siste sisa
ON alde ala
AT luhtte lusa
BEHIND duohkin duohka´i
Table 3.4: Adpositions in Northern Saami
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In a similar fashion MacKenzie (1978) describes Source-Place trans-
fers and syncretisms for spatial adverbs in a number of Indo-European
languages, illustrating the possibility to combine these two directionality
distinctions in contrast to Goal.
Another example is Latin (Leo Conolly, p.c.), illustrated in (52).
Latin (Mansveld & Waleson, 1970)
(52) a. Roma-m
Rome-acc
venit.
go.3sg
‘He goes to Rome.’ (p. 213)
b. Roma¯
Rome.abl
venio.
go.1sg
‘I come from Rome.’ (p. 224)
c. Athenis
Athens.abl
habitat.
live.3sg
‘He lives in Athens.’ (p. 232)
Goal meaning is expressed by accusative case, ablative case may express
both Source (52-b) and Place (52-c). Note that this pattern is restricted
to place names; generally, prepositional constructions are used. In the first
and second case paradigm, an old locative case form is still used.
In proto-Polynesian, finally, *-i was used for Source and Place, *-ki is
used for goal (Ross Clark, p.c.). An example is given from Nukuoro:
Nukuoro (Ross Clark, p.c.)
(53) a. Kai
and
kilaateu
they
ka
past
teletele
sail.sail
ai
prt
i
on
te
the
moana
sea
‘And they kept sailing on the open sea.’
b. Ka
past
hulo
go.pl
kee
away
i
from
Kapingamaalangi.
K.
‘[They] left Kapingamarangi.’
c. Ka
past
lava
finish
ka
past
hulo
go.pl
ki
to
Luuku
L.
ma
and
Motolako.
M.
‘Then they went to Truk and the Mortlocks.’
In conclusion there may very well be a cognitive bias toward Goals, but
in light of the counterexamples just mentioned, I am hesitant to understand
this bias as an inviolable cognitive or linguistic universal. Although most
syncretisms are between Goal and Place, the languages that use the same
marker for Source and Place should not be ignored.
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Note that the more abstract decomposition of directionality of Pantcheva
(2010) into a negation and transition function in fact equally applies to lan-
guages that choose to interpret the transition function as Source directional-
ity. That is, languages that exhibit a syncretism between Place and Source
to the exclusion of Goal. Thus, the languages just discussed in principle do
not pose any problem for her account. However, the languages discussed
above are problematic for both the claim that a transition necessarily in-
volves Goal directionality and the one that Source is always built on top of
Goal. In these languages, an unmarked transition is understood as Source
directionality and Goal is differently marked from Source and Place.
What is not expected in either Pantcheva’s or my account is a syncretism
between Source and Goal to the exclusion of Place. For Pantcheva, this
would render the negation of the transition function meaningless as the
transition function itself in principle already distinguishes Place from the
other directionalities. For me, this would mean that for these languages
directionality is an atemporal notion. A change into some configuration
is only the same as a change out of this configuration if we ignore time
and just focus on the presence of a transition (cf. Section 3.3.2) at. Only
in that situation it does not make a difference whether we analyze the
change from the start to the end or the other way around. The absence
of such a syncretism between Source and Goal is understandable from a
functional perspective. It is not very informative just to say that there
is a change of configuration without specifying the type of change. Often
other elements in the discourse, such as motion verbs, already hint at a
change in configuration. Whereas this information can be used perfectly
to specify the distinction between Place and Goal or Source directionality
in the corresponding syncretisms, it does not help much to use it to decide
between the latter two. The question in a context of change is about the
quality of this change. That is, whether the specified configuration is left
or entered. If the verb needs to specify the type of change anyway, it could
have marked the change of configuration in the first place already, making a
syncretism between Place and Goal, between Place and Source, or between
all three of them more likely. In a sense, a directionality system marking
unspecified change is comparable to a structural case system that marks the
A and O argument differently from the S, as was discussed in Section 2.3.
In transitive constructions the ambiguity is between A and O, not between
either of them and S. Such languages are extremely rare (Stiebels, 2002;
Bickel & Nichols, 2009; Comrie, 2005).
Nevertheless, just like there are languages that case mark the distinction
between A and O on the one hand and S on the other, there are also lan-
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guages that do not specify the kind of spatial change locally, taking Source
and Goal together to the exclusion of Place. Consider the following example
from Ardes¸en Laz (Kutscher, 2010).2
Ardes¸en Laz (Kutscher, 2010)
(54) a. S¸is¸e
bottle
masa
table
goo-dgun.
on-stand.3A.sg.pres
‘The bottle is on the table.’
b. Bere
child
oxori-s¸a
house-mot
am-ulun.
into-go3A.sg.pres
‘The child goes inside the house.’
c. Bere
child
oxori-s¸a
house-mot
gam-ulun.
out-go.3A.sg.pres
‘The child goes out of the house.’
The same marker s¸a expresses Source and Goal directionality in (54-b,c)
whereas a zero marker is used for Place in (54-a). Although the local
ambiguity between (54-b) and (54-c) is dissolved by the use of verbal prefixes
(in this example, am and gam), this solution still unnecessarily violates
Economy. The presence of a transition could have been told from the
verb already as the verb is explicitly marked for Goal (54-b) or Source
(54-c) meaning. There is no need to additionally mark a transition as such.
Another example of such a language is Hindi/Urdu. According to Butt
and King (2004, 13, no example given) the spatial use of the oblique case
in Hindi/Urdu can only mean Goal or Source, not Place.
Whatever the (diachronic) explanation for these systems is, they are
exceptions to the analysis of directionality. In the case of Ardes¸en Laz
this seems to be an unnecessary violation of the principle of Economy. A
possible way out of this situation is to say that these languages do think
of directionality along the lines proposed above, but that the syncretism
pattern between Goal and Source is a semantically unmotivated diachronic
accident. Indeed, Kutscher (2010) notices that in related varieties of Laz,
the distinct markers for Goal (-s¸a) and Source (-s¸en) are close in phonolog-
ical form. The typological rarity of the syncretism makes such a solution
plausible.
The very fact that it is possible to draw an informative semantic map
means that the syncretism between directionality distinctions is motivated.
Apparently, there are some principles motivating particular syncretism pat-
2Thanks to Denis Creissels for pointing this out to me.
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terns and making others unexpected. My analysis of directionality, as sum-
marized in Table 3.3, correctly predicts the semantic map of directionality.
Goal and Place are the same if we neglect the previous state of affairs,
whereas Source and Place are the same if we neglect the subsequent state
of affairs. Moreover, Goal and Source are only the same if we completely
neglect change altogether. That is, they are only expected to be expressed
by the same marker if it also expresses Place.
By the assumption of a general but non-obligatory Goal bias, my analy-
sis can also account for the difference in frequency between the syncretisms
of Place with Goal and Source. Even though the syncretism between Place
and Source is possible, languages prefer to make this distinction explicit.
3.4.2 Spatial Case Systems
The previous section was concerned with syncretisms between directional-
ity distinctions. This section deals with the kind of distinctions a spatial
case paradigm creates. Two predictions follow from my analysis. Firstly, it
predicts an implicational scale of directionality distinctions. Derived mean-
ings of directionality are only expected to have their own case marker if the
more basic distinctions are expressed first.
Secondly my analysis assumes that spatial meaning always consists of
both a directionality and a configuration dimension. Therefore all spatial
meaning consists of a choice from only three directionality distinctions and
from a much bigger set of configuration options. This means that the three
distinctions of directionality are used much more often than those of the con-
figuration function, which has important consequences for the way in which
they are expressed. If frequent use leads to grammaticalization (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2), the more often used directional part of spatial meaning should be
expressed with more grammaticalized means than the less frequent configu-
rational part. If spatial meaning always consists of a directionality function
and a configuration function, and if directionality has significantly fewer
meanings than configuration, the mean token frequency of the distinctions
of the directionality function is necessarily higher than the mean frequency
of those of the configuration function, viz. 1/3 vs. 1/many. From this fol-
lows that the way in which the two spatial dimensions are expressed should
differ. Because of Economy, the often used distinctions of directionality
will be expressed by shorter, more grammaticalized means than the less
often used distinctions of configuration.3
3In fact, directionality is not necessarily encoded by cases. In many languages direc-
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More concretely this means that if directionality is expressed with more
grammatical means than configuration because of its higher frequency of
use, we can expect spatial case, the most grammatical of spatial means,
to express directional meaning primarily. If a spatial meaning distinction
is made it should be between directionality meanings. A configuration
distinction is only expected as a secondary aspect once directionality is
established.
In order to test these hypotheses I looked into the spatial case inventories
of 23 languages from different language families (cf. Appendix B2).4 In
Table 3.5 the directionality and configuration distinctions that are made
by the spatial case inventories of these languages are given. For reasons
of space, directionality distinctions are abbreviated: S Source, P Place, G
Goal. More details about the different forms are given in Appendix A1.
If a cell is empty this does not mean that this meaning is not ex-
pressed. It only says that the corresponding meaning distinctions that can
be made at this dimension are not expressed by spatial case. For exam-
ple Passamaquoddy-Maliseet only has a general spatial marker that does
not distinguish between directionality or configuration meanings (Leavitt,
1996) and spatial cases in Nivkh do distinguish Goal from Source and Place
but do not specify the configuration (Gruzdeva, 1998).
Usually the directionality and configuration dimension make up a carte-
sian product of spatial cases. That is, for every language each directionality
distinction mentioned is made for each configuration contrast. However, as
mentioned previously, Hungarian has a terminative case meaning UP.TO
that does not make any configuration distinction. Alamblak also only
makes configuration distinctions for Place (Bruce, 1984). A few additional
explanatory notes should be made here. In Mangarayi the special Goal
case is only used for emphasis as the locative can also be used to express
Goal meaning (Merlan, 1982). Standard Lithuanian only has a locative
case marker; Eastern High Lithuanian distinguishes a Goal and Place case
marker. The further distinction between interior and exterior is only made
in Lithuanian in Belorus (Ambrazas, 1997). The paradigm of Burushaski
exhibits a number of redundant forms and syncretisms (Lorimer, 1935).
Mundari and Ika have spatial cases for meanings other than directionality
and configuration. Mundari has different spatial case series for concrete
and approximate meaning (Hoffmann, 1903). Ika has different spatial case
series for general and far away (Frank, 1985). Finally, versions of the AT
tional meaning is covered by verb semantics.
4Many thanks to Wessel Stoop for collecting the data for this section.
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Language Directionality Configuration
Alamblak S, P, G, VIA IN, ON, AT
Basque S, P, G, VIA
Burushaski S, P, G IN, ON, AT
Dyirbal S, P, G
Evenki S, P, G
Greenlandic (West) S, P, G
Harar Oromo S, P, G
Hungarian S, P, G, UP.TO IN, ON, AT
Hua S, P/G IN, ON/AT
Hunzib S, P, G, VIA IN, ON, AT1, AT2, UNDER
Ika S, P, G
Imonda S, P, G
Lithuanian P, G IN, ON/AT
Kanuri P, G IN, ON/AT
Koasati P, G IN, ON/AT
Malayalam P, G
Mangarayi S, P/G, G, (VIA)
Meithei S, P
Mundari S, P, G
Nez Perce S, P, G
Nivkh S/P, G
Passamaquoddy-Maliseet
Table 3.5: Distinctions made by spatial case inventories
configuration in Hunzib distinguish between plus and minus contact (van
den Berg, 1995).
In line with my first hypothesis, a hierarchy within directionality can
indeed be established. Derived meanings of directionality, like VIA and
UP.TO, only occur once the basic distinctions are expressed. On the basis
of the spatial case inventories of Finno-Ugric and Caucasian languages, Stolz
(1992, 103) argues for such an implicational hierarchy of spatial meaning
expressed by case. According to Stolz spatial case systems start out with
a general locative case that is underspecified with respect to both direc-
tionality and configuration. In the development of the system the basic
distinctions of directionality are developed first (cf. Appendix A1 and A2).
The motivations for this first type are unclear to Stolz (1992, 31; but cf.
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Section 3.3). Next, there are two possible paths to be followed. Either
additional distinctions of directionality, like VIA and TOWARD, can be
developed or different layers of configuration can be distinguished for which
the directionality distinctions hold. Both options confirm the hypothe-
sis that was formulated at the beginning of this section: first, the basic
directionality meanings Goal, Source, and Place are discerned. Moreover,
according to Creissels (2009b, 614), cross-linguistically, spatial case systems
are ordered according to the two dimensions of directionality and configura-
tion. If languages distinguish only one of these, they always seem to express
directionality, mostly distinguishing between Place, Goal, and Source.
As Table 3.5 shows further, there is always a directionality distinction in
place if a configurational one is made. Less than half of the languages make
a configuration distinction. In contrast, spatial case systems consisting of
more than one case always make a directionality distinction.
Spatial case primarily makes a directionality distinction. A very rough
configuration distinction covering the more basic meanings is only made
incidentally once a directionality distinction is established. The basic con-
figuration distinctions that are discerned by spatial case seem to follow the
implicational scale of topological distinctions in (6) discussed above (see
Levinson et al., 2003; Zwarts, 2010). Firstly, a distinction is made on the
basis of inclusion (e.g. Lithuanian, Kauri, Koasati). Next, support is distin-
guished from non-support (e.g. Alamblak, Burushaski, Hungarian). Other
configuration distinctions are only made later (cf. Hunzib). The number of
configuration distinctions that are made by spatial case may run up to five
in my language sample.
In conclusion, the first predictions are borne out. In my typological
sample the implicational scale of directionality distinctions is followed and
spatial case first and foremost expresses directionality. Although some con-
figuration contrast may be used frequently enough to grammaticalize into a
case marker, the markers of directionality have a higher frequency of use and
therefore have grammaticalized first. Other distinctions, like those between
proximate and distal or general and concrete configuration, come third.
3.4.3 The Division of Labor between Spatial Construc-
tions
In this section the meaning distinctions made by spatial constructions that
differ with respect to their degree of grammaticalization will be compared.
Languages may have more than one system to express spatial mean-
ing. The difference between two such systems can often be characterized
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in terms of their degree of grammaticalization. Grammaticalized elements
are syntactically less autonomous, morphologically less complex, and/or
phonologically less heavy than their more lexical counterparts. Although
this basically boils down to the difference between adpositions and case, this
is not necessarily the case. For example in Marathi, the grammatical spatial
marker in (55-a) is directly suffixed to the word it belongs to, whereas the
more lexical one in (55-b) assigns a possessive suffix to its complement first.
Marathi (Pandharipande, 1997, 340)
(55) a. Tsor
thief
ghara¯-t
house-loc
s’irla¯.
entered
‘The thief entered the house.’
b. Tsor
thief
ghara¯-tSya¯-a¯t
house-px-in
s’irla¯.
entered
‘The thief entered the house.’
The difference between the two strategies really concerns their relative
position on the grammaticalization cline in (56) (see Hopper & Traugott,
2003) and not so much the actual syntactic category they are assigned to.
Grammaticalization cline
(56) Noun/Verb ≺ Adposition ≺ Case
Cutoff points on this cline are rather arbitrary as the categories are not
discrete. For example, since adpositions may still share grammatical prop-
erties with their source marker, they are often still referred to as nouns and
verbs in grammars. Their grammaticalization, according to Dryer (2005),
can be identified if they no longer take tense, aspect and mood inflection.
Cases subsequently develop from adpositions when the adposition and its
attribute are reinterpreted as one word; semantic and morphophonemic
changes (e.g. semantic bleaching and vowel harmony) can take place con-
cealing the word boundary and changing the syntactic category the element
belongs to, resulting in new case suffixes (Harris & Campbell, 1995; Kulikov,
2006; Hopper & Traugott, 2003).
Often, linguists do not agree on the exact position on the cline of partic-
ular forms but they generally do on the relative position of the categories
(Hopper & Traugott, 2003, 6). Since their precise syntactic category is
of no importance here I simply assume that the more grammatical spatial
construction in the examples below is spatial case. The hypothesis below
concerns their relative position only.
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Blake (1994) notes that when two spatial strategies are present in a lan-
guage the more lexical one makes more fine-grained distinctions. Levinson
(2000a, 9) also observes that spatial case expresses stereotypical, expected
situations whereas more lexical constructions are used for unexpected spa-
tial relations that do not follow from general world knowledge. I think this
observation is correct, yet more can be said on the division of labor between
the two systems. In this section I will show that the difference can be mo-
tivated in a principled way. I argue that although both the grammatical
and lexical spatial constructions express spatial meaning, the two differ-
ent spatial constructions do not have the same function. I will show that
the more grammaticalized construction particularly expresses directional-
ity, whereas the more lexical ones are used to specify the configurational
part of spatial meaning. That is, although the spatial constructions can
express both dimensions to some extent as illustrated by the Hungarian
spatial case paradigm in Section 3.3, they are specialized in one dimension
only. If directionality is expressed with more grammatical means than con-
figuration because of its higher frequency of use we can expect the more
grammatical spatial case to express directional meaning reserving the more
lexical spatial means for the larger set of configuration distinctions.
In sum, if a language has two different spatial constructions that differ in
their degree of grammaticalization, the more grammatical one is expected to
express directionality mainly, the more lexical one to express configuration.
Note that in addition to the diachronic effect that causes the existence of
a difference in grammaticalization between the two constructions in the first
place, the principle of Economy (waste as little energy as possible) becomes
relevant in a different, real-time way. The fact that sometimes a spatial case
construction can be used that omits configurational distinctions means that
the speaker sometimes thinks that it is unnecessary to explicitly mention
this distinction. That is, spatial meaning aspects can be omitted if they are
predictable from context, which is relevant in light of Economy. If it is
possible, the speaker will use the more economical spatial case construction.
In Marathi (Indo-European; Indic), two constructions that differ in econ-
omy can express the same meaning, as illustrated in (57):
Marathi (Pandharipande, 1997, 340)
(57) a. Tsor
thief
ghara¯-t
house-loc
s’irla¯.
entered
‘The thief entered the house.’
b. Tsor
thief
ghara¯-tSya¯-a¯t
house-px-in
s’irla¯.
entered
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‘The thief entered the house.’
According to Pandharipande (1997, 335) the general difference between the
two constructions is that spatial cases in Marathi (i.e., locative, ablative,
and allative) are used to express general location; postpositions express a
more specific meaning. But the distinction between general location and
more specific meaning cannot explain the optionality in (57) nor the follow-
ing example:
Marathi (Pandharipande, 1997, 373; 336)
(58) a. Khol¯ı-t
room-loc
khurtS¯ı
chair
a¯he.
is
‘There is a chair in the room.’
b. S´a¯l
˙
e-tSya¯
school-px
a¯t
inside
ek
one
mot
˙
h¯ı
big
la¯yabrar¯ı
library
a¯he.
is
‘There is a big library inside the school.’
Both (58-a) and (58-b) concern inclusive meaning, the first one not being
more general than the second. The difference is rather in the predictability
of the spatial relation. A chair will more often be inside than for example
outside or above a room. On the other hand, the spatial relation between a
library and a school is less predictable as it probably is just as often next to
as inside. Therefore the spatial relation in (58-b) needs specification, the
one in (58-a) can do without.
In Finnish (Uralic; Finnic) both constructions also are sometimes equally
possible. If there were a preference for one over the other at all in (59),
it would be the spatial case version because of its shortness. Unless noted
otherwise, all Finnish (a) examples in this section are taken from the online
CSC newspaper corpus,5 the (b) versions are made up by a Finnish infor-
mant.
Finnish
(59) a. Keita¨
cook
mausteliemi,
marinade,
tarkista
check
maku
taste
ja
and
kaada
pour
kuumana
while.hot
sien-ten
mushroom-pl.gen
pa¨a¨-lle
on-all
b. Keita¨
cook
mausteliemi,
marinade,
tarkista
check
maku
taste
ja
and
kaada
pour
kuumana
while.hot
5https://hotpage.csc.fi, consulted in the summer of 2006.
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sieni-lle
mushroom-all
‘Prepare the marinade, check the taste and pour while still hot
on the mushrooms’
(59-b) is the made-up spatial case version of the more lexical construction
in (59-a). Both sentences seem to have the very same meaning.
But this is not always the case, as is illustrated in (60):
Finnish
(60) a. kulta-a
gold-part
lo¨ytynyt
found
Suome-n
Finland-gen
ja
and
Norja-n
Norway-gen
raja-lta
border-abl
b. *kulta-a
gold-part
lo¨ytynyt
found
Suome-n
Finland-gen
ja
and
Norja-n
Norway-gen
raja-n
border-gen
pa¨a¨-lta¨
on-abl
‘gold found on the border between Finland and Norway’
As is shown in (60) it is not possible to express the meaning ‘on the border’
with a lexical construction. This is because the lexical version is a specifi-
cation of the configuration dimension. For example, in (61-a) the daredevil
really drives on top of the line, whereas he also could be driving close to it
in (61-b).
(61) a. Hurjimus
daredevil
ajoi
drove
usein
often
keskiviiva-n
middle.line-GEN
pa¨a¨-lla¨
top-ADE
‘The daredevil drove often on the midline [of the road]’
b. Hurjimus
daredevil
ajoi
drove
usein
often
keskiviiva-lla
middle.line-ADE
‘The daredevil drove often close to/on the midline [of the road]’
For some grounds, however, the configuration is necessarily kept under-
specified: As there is no such thing as the precise ‘top of a border’, the
adpositional construction with pa¨a¨- ‘on top of’ specifying this meaning is
simply not allowed in (60).
In Basque (isolate), the grammatical construction is used when the con-
figuration of the meaning can be derived from context, the lexical construc-
tion is used otherwise.
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Basque (Saltarelli, 1988, 178; 186)
(62) a. Oporket-etan
holiday-pl.loc
iru
three
mendi-tara
mountain-all
igo-tze-ko
climb-nom-rel
asmo-a
intention-sg.abs
d-u-gu.
3abs-pres.aux-1pl.erg
‘We have the intention of climbing to (the tops of) three moun-
tains during the holidays’.
b. Etxe
house
bi-ren
two-gen
arte-tik
between-sg.abl
egi-n
make-perf
z-u-te-n
3erg-past.3abs.aux2-pl.erg-past
laster.
run.abs
‘They dashed out from between two houses.’
In the grammatical construction of (62) the top of the mountain is pragmati-
cally retrievable from the combination of the verb to climb and the mountain
and does not need further specification; the configuration BETWEEN with
respect to the two houses in the lexical construction, however, cannot be
derived from the verb dash or the context. Without explicitly mentioning
it the configuration could just as likely have been, for example, BEHIND,
UNDER, or INSIDE.
In Japanese (Japanese; Japanese) the locative marker -ni can be at-
tached directly to the ground as in (63). This marker is used when the
spatial relation between figure and ground needs no further specification.
Japanese (Iwasaki, 2002)
(63) Yamada-san-wa
Yamada-Mr.-top
Tokyo-ni
Tokyo-dat
i-ru.
be-prs
‘Mr. Yamada is in Tokyo.’
The fact that Mr. Yamada is in Tokyo is not very surprising. It is even hard
to think of situations in which a different spatial (configuration) relation
would hold. To express a more specific meaning, i.e., to denote a specific
region with respect to the ground, spatial adpositions are used that assign
genitive case to the ground. Had these adpositions been absent, the hearer
would not be able to tell which spatial relation is meant.
Japanese (Iwasaki, 2002)
(64) Ringo-wa
apple-top
booru-no
bowl-gen
naka-ni
in-dat
/
/
shita-ni
under-dat
/
/
ushiro-ni
behind-dat
a-ru.
be-prs
‘The apple is in/under/behind the bowl.’
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In (64) the specification of the different configuration options is realized
through adpositions. If it is not specified, the hearer will not be able to
retrieve the intended configuration distinction. With IN probably being
the default relation between an apple and a bowl, any deviation from this
relation needs to be marked.
In Tamil (Dravidian; Southern Dravidian) the most common way of
indicating a spatial relationship is by using locative case. According to
Pederson (2006) by using this locative case does not specify or deny a more
exact nature of the relationship between figure and ground, and is mostly
used for canonical relationships. For example, a typical spatial relation like
‘boat on the water’ is expressed with spatial case. A postposition would be
overly emphatic in this case (Pederson, 2006). However, a sunk boat in the
water is expressed by means of a postpositional construction:
Tamil (Pederson, 2006, 405)
(65) a. Paaymarakkapil
sailboat
kaTTal-il
ocean-loc
ninRukkoNTirukkiRatu.
stand.ConV.Prog.Pr.3sn
‘The sailboat is on the water.’
b. Paaymarakkapil
sailboat
kaTTal-ku-uL-Lee
ocean-dat-interior-emph
mungkiyirukkiRatu.
sink.ConV.Perf.Pr.3sn
‘The sailboat has sunk.’
Thus the more precise nature of the locative relationship need not be spec-
ified by a postposition when it is adequately recoverable. In the same way,
when the location is ambiguous a specific postposition is preferred. For
example since the IN and ON configuration are equally likely for a piece of
paper with respect to a desk (i.e. contained in the drawer or on the upper
surface), the choice between the two needs to be specified Pederson (2006):
Tamil (Pederson, 2006)
(66) a. ??Peepar
paper
meecaiyil
table.loc
keTaikkiRatu.
be.availablepr.3sn
‘The paper is on the table.’
b. Peepar
paper
meecaimeelee
table.top
keTaikkiRatu.
be.availablepr.3sn
‘The paper is on the table.’
As a final example take Evenki (Altaic; Tungusic). Here too an alter-
114
3.4 Testing Some Hypotheses
nation can be found between two spatial constructions:
Evenki (Nedjalkov, 1997, 175)
(67) a. Asatkan
girl
d’olo
stone
ojo-du-n
upper.part-dat-3sg.poss
tege-re-n.
sit.down-nfut-3sg
‘The girl sat down on the stone’
b. Asatkan
girl
amkin-du
bed-dat
hukle-d’ere-n.
lieprs-3sg
‘The girl is lying on the bed.’
The girl in (67-a) could just as well sit next to as on top of the stone; lying
on a bed, however, is more likely than lying under or next to it. Therefore,
the more economical form can be chosen for the latter example whereas the
more elaborate form has to be used for the first one.
In conclusion, in all the examples above the adpositional case construc-
tion specifies a configuration dimension that is left underspecified in the
spatial case construction.
As was predicted spatial cases mostly express directionality; spatial ad-
positions can be used to express the configurational dimension that is oth-
erwise left underspecified. This underspecification in the spatial case con-
struction is possible because much of spatial meaning is retrievable from
context and world knowledge (cf. Chapter 2). Just like we saw for direc-
tional meaning in the previous sections, configurational meaning can be
underspecified. Consider again the implicational scale of topological dis-
tinctions made with adpositions in (6) (Levinson et al., 2003), repeated in
(68).
(68) AT Â IN Â ON/UNDER Â OVER/NEAR Â ON-TOP Â AT-
TACHED Â INSIDE Â . . .
The implicational scale emerges by the very fact that some languages make
more specific configurational distinctions than others. Distinctions higher
up in the hierarchy are neglected by some languages. They can be rec-
ognized in principle of course, but these distinctions apparently were not
frequent enough grammaticalized into spatial adpositions. For example in
Tzeltal specification of configuration takes place outside the PP via figure
properties, dispositional predicates, and/or relational nouns. Whatever the
categorization of topological meaning, a category in one language will com-
bine instances that are fundamentally different in another. For example,
Bowerman and Choi (2003) show how English in and on distinguish be-
tween putting Lego on Lego stacks from putting a cassette in a case and
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putting an apple in a bowl whereas the first two for Korean are both ex-
pressed by kkita ‘interlock, fit tightly’, the latter being an instance of nehta
‘put loosely in or around’. This means that some of the spatial features
that English uses to characterize an on or in situation are neglected by the
topological expressions of Korean. Similarly, some of the spatial features
that Korean uses to characterize a kkita or nehta situation are neglected in
the spatial language of English.
Because of their less frequent use, spatial adpositions have a less gram-
maticalized form than spatial cases. Moreover, most adpositions in lan-
guages that have both spatial case and spatial adpositions are marked for
directionality themselves. For reasons of economy the spatial case construc-
tion is the preferred option, as it consists of less (costly) morphemes. If the
configurational part of spatial meaning is predictable, a speaker will use
the spatial case construction leaving the configuration dimension under-
specified.
The way in which this division of labor between spatial constructions
comes about in languages is a difficult question. It could either be a real-
time choice speakers make, a diachronic result, or a combination of both.
Indeed, the exact relation between linguistic universals and language change
is notoriously difficult. In a special volume on this topic Haspelmath (2008,
213) considers (69) as the basic question:
(69) Do synchronic universals arise from universals of change, or do
universals of change arise from synchronic constraints?
Haspelmath does not really choose between the two options, saying that
implicational universals arise from universal tendencies of change to more
economical patterns. These universal diachronic tendencies themselves are
motivated by the (synchronic) constraints that speech behavior should be
rational and take both speakers’ and hearers’ needs into account. There is a
pressure on languages to change to more normal, economical patterns. Ac-
cording to Haspelmath (2008, 214) changes are motivated by the speakers’
desire to speak economically, which is not a synchronic grammatical con-
straint or even a more general cognitive constraint, but “simply a constraint
on any rational behavior.”
I am also of the opinion that the two options in (69) cannot be disentan-
gled. The diachronic development of more economical forms and hence the
synchronic possibility to choose is the result of a universal of change. As
explained in Section 2.2, because of a directional skewing in the acquisition
of word forms, forms can only become shorter. The fact that this direc-
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tional skewing exists in the first place, however, is again due to synchronic
principles. Note that Economy is not the only principle that is active here,
as its use is only made possible by AddW . Without this second constraint
that asks for a cooperative hearer, the application of Economy would lead
to communication failure.
Consider again the example from Marathi repeated in (70).
Marathi (Pandharipande, 1997, 373; 336)
(70) a. khol¯ı-t
room-loc
khurtS¯ı
chair
a¯he.
is
‘There is a chair in the room.’
b. s´a¯l
˙
e-tSya¯
school-px
a¯t
inside
ek
one
mot
˙
h¯ı
big
la¯yabrar¯ı
library
a¯he.
is
‘There is a big library inside the school.’
The optimization process for (70-b) is illustrated in Tableau 3 (cf. Sec-
tion 2.5 for a more elaborate discussion of Optimality Theoretic analyses).
The spatial construction is more economical than the lexical construction
and therefore preferred from a speaker’s perspective. However, as there is
no preferred spatial relation between libraries and schools, the underspeci-
fication of this relation will not lead to the desired outcome. To make sure
the hearer understands her correctly, the speaker has to use the lexical con-
struction. Any other interpretation than ‘inside’ for a¯t leads to a violation
of FaithL. This explicit marking is not necessary for the relation between
a chair and a room in (70-a), as there is a default interpretation for this
pair. In this case the speaker can rely on the world knowledge (AddW ) of
the hearer.
In conclusion we end up with a situation in which the bigger class with
more precise lexical semantics is used for a dimension in which most mean-
ing differences are to be made, and the smaller class with cheaper mor-
phemes is used for a dimension with highly frequent members with more
general semantics. The cheap grammaticalized construction is used for the
expression of the frequent directional meaning, the more costly lexical con-
struction is used for the less frequent configurational meaning. Again, both
the real-time choice and the diachronic development that leads to the set
of candidates to choose from are motivated by the same principles.
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Prod: ‘library inside school’ FaithL AddW Economy
+ school.Place
, school.px inside *
Int: school.Place FaithL AddW Economy
+ ‘library inside school’
+ ‘library next to school’
+ ‘. . . ’
Int: school.px inside FaithL AddW Economy
+ ‘library inside school’
‘library next to school’ *
‘. . . ’ *
Tableau 3: The choice between spatial constructions
3.4.4 The Division of Labor within Spatial Construc-
tions
The hypothesis in this section is very similar to the previous one. This
time round, however, instead of comparing grammatical and lexical spatial
constructions, focus will be on lexical constructions only. Lexical spatial
constructions consist of lexical and grammatical elements. The question is
now which formal elements express which part of the meaning.
In the expression of spatial meaning adpositions and case are sometimes
used to the exclusion of each other as was shown in the previous section.
Often, however, the two are simultaneously used in lexical spatial construc-
tions. Consider the following example from Finnish:
Finnish (Lestrade, 2010)
(71) Auto
car.nom
on
is
talo-n
house-gen
la¨he-lla¨.
near-ade
‘The car is near the house.’
In (71) the adposition la¨he- ‘near’ itself bears adessive case and combines
with a genitive case marked object. In Lestrade, de Schepper, and Zwarts
(2009), we study the mapping of the semantic parts of spatial meaning onto
the morphosyntactic parts of spatial adpositional constructions. We call the
case that is “assigned” by the adposition to its complement internal case
(Kint) and the case that the adposition itself bears external case (Kext).
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Thus in (71) genitive is the internal case, adessive is the external case.
The full syntactic structure of a (spatial) PP as we analyze it is given in
Figure 3.5.
KextP
PP Kext
KintP P
DP Kint
Figure 3.5: The syntactic structure of spatial PP
In this representation we analyze case as a functional head of its own
(cf. also Zwarts, 2005a; Asbury, 2008). According to Asbury (2008, 23)
the only real difference between cases and syntactically independent items
like adpositions and nouns is in their phonological load. The former are
phonologically dependent and therefore spelled out as suffixes, the latter
are independent. For me this difference will be of crucial importance. It is
caused by a difference in grammaticalization and therefore semantic speci-
ficity (cf. Section 2.2).
Note that we use a left branching analysis. This is the easiest way to
describe the surface structure, since most languages in our sample using
postpositions and case is almost always placed at the right of its noun or P
argument. However, the important point really is the relative order of the
different morphosyntactic parts with respect to the complement. That is,
internal case is on the ground and external case is on the P.
In the semantic representation of spatial meaning proposed in Sec-
tion 3.2 there are three meaning ingredients: a ground, a configuration
function, and a directionality function. In Figure 3.5 we have identified
four morphosyntactic parts of complex spatial expressions: a DP comple-
ment, an internal and external case, and an adposition. It is reasonable to
assume that the ground obligatorily maps onto the complement. Although
somewhat restricted by pragmatic principles that for example say that the
ground should be bigger and less movable than the object it locates, it is
semantically an open category. Clearly such a category should map onto
a lexical form. Thus we are left with six plus three logical possibilities to
combine the two remaining spatial meaning ingredients with the three re-
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maining formal parts listed in Table 3.6. The additional three options are
to combine both configuration and directionality in one element.
DP Kint P Kext
1. Ground Config Dir
2. Ground Dir Config
3. Ground Config Dir
4. Ground Dir Config
5. Ground Config Dir
6. Ground Dir Config
7. Ground Dir+Config
8. Ground Dir+Config
9. Ground Dir+Config
Table 3.6: Logically possible distributions of labor within the PP
In Lestrade et al. (2009), it is hypothesized that there are three principles
at work constraining the possibilities, namely Isomorphism, Grammati-
calization and Economy. The first says that syntactic structure should
mirror semantic structure (Zwarts, 2005b) and will be discussed below. The
latter two really are the diachronic and synchronic variants of the same
Economy principle and are distinguished for explanatory purposes only.
Following the ideas of Chapter 2 and Section 3.4.3, Grammaticalization
says that more frequent elements are expressed by more grammatical forms.
Economy prohibits the use of meaningless lexical elements. In a bidirec-
tional perspective it does not make much sense to use costly words without
any meaning.
The principle of Isomorphism is proposed by Zwarts (2005b). In lan-
guages that map the different parts of spatial meaning to different parts of
a spatial expression we expect the order of function application to be pre-
sented in the syntactic expression. This principle can be seen as a stronger
version of the principle of compositionality given in (72) as it specifies
the order of the syntactic and semantic function application to each other.
(72) Compositionality: the interpretation of a phrase is a function of
the meaning of its parts and the way they are syntactically com-
bined.
According to compositionality, the semantic interpretation process takes
a syntactic structure and maps it to a representation of the meaning. In
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its strongest form this principle interprets every syntactic combination as
a semantic function application. Syntactic heads are thus interpreted as
functions that apply to their complement.
Recall from Section 3.3 that directionality is a function that takes a
configuration function that takes a Thing on its turn. Although Jackendoff
(1983, 1990) explicitly allows the directionality function to bypass the con-
figuration function and take a ground directly, it is not possible in his or
any other account that I am aware of, to apply the configuration function to
the directionality function. With the principle of Isomorphism we expect
the marker for configuration to be in between the marker for directionality
and the ground.
Zwarts (2005b) observes that in German prepositions and cases do not
compose in the way elements of a combinatorial system are expected to
compose. Compare the following constructions:
German
(73) a. in
in
das
the.acc
Haus
house
‘into the house’
b. in
in
dem
the.dat
Haus
house
‘in(side) the house’
As the contrast between (73-a) and (73-b) shows, the preposition determines
the configuration and the case it assigns determines directionality. In other
words, German violates the principle of Isomorphism as the syntactic order
of functions does not reflect the semantic order.
The division of labor of spatial meaning within the German PP is un-
expected given the principle of Isomorphism and therefore is one of the
distributions we in fact predict not to occur. More specifically, in com-
bination with the principle of Grammaticalization we only expect to
find distributions one and eight in Table 3.6. Distributions in which the
marker of directionality is in between those for configuration and the ground
are prohibited by Iso(morphism); distributions in which configuration but
not directionality is expressed by a grammatical marker are prohibited by
Gram(maticalization). Distributions that do not assign meaning to lex-
ical elements are prohibited by Eco(nomy), as speakers are unlikely to use
costly lexical elements if this does not contribute to the meaning.
Our predictions for each logical distribution are summarized in Ta-
ble 3.7. Again, only the first and eighth strategy are expected to occur.
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DP Kint P Kext I
so G
r
a
m
E
c
o
1. Ground Config Dir OK OK OK
2. Ground Dir Config X X OK
3. Ground Config Dir OK X OK
4. Ground Dir Config X OK OK
5. Ground Config Dir OK OK X
6. Ground Dir Config X OK X
7. Ground Dir+Config NA X X
8. Ground Dir+Config NA OK OK
9. Ground Dir+Config NA X X
Table 3.7: Predicted distributions of labor within the PP
For our typological survey of spatial expressions we make use of the
PCaseBase (Lestrade et al., 2009). The PCaseBase is a typological database
of languages with both case and adpositions, consisting of 32 languages from
25 different language families and has been established on the basis of refer-
ence grammars (cf. Appendix B1). Big language families, that is, languages
with many subfamilies, are represented by two languages from different sub-
families. Thus we hope to capture the variation that may exist within bigger
families. The database contains 1355 entries on adpositions and their case-
marked objects plus an additional 548 entries for the functions of the cases
when not governed by an adposition. The goal of the database is to com-
pare the case and adposition inventories of different languages and to study
the interaction and differences between the two systems. For our present
purposes, we only consider its 403 spatial adposition types that make up
for 981 different construction tokens (differentiated on the basis of their
internal and external case). For example the Alamblak adposition bi ‘front’
makes up one type, its combinations with three different internal cases that
can each assign two external cases make up six tokens.
In the following I will go through the various possibilities spelled out in
Table 3.6. But first it should be noted that there is one important draw-
back to our method of consulting reference grammars only. Although many
grammars mention the option for adpositions to combine with different in-
ternal cases, they hardly ever mention a corresponding meaning difference.
Similarly, grammars sometimes gloss over meaning contributions that may
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be made by external cases. For example in Finnish the adposition pa¨a¨-
marked with the IN case series means ‘at the end of’, whereas it means ‘on
top of’ when marked with a case from the ON/AT series (cf. Section 3.4.5).
But this meaning distinction is not mentioned in Sulkala and Karjalainen
(1992). In other words, not all correspondences between meaning and form
will become manifest in our study.
Strategy 1. P/configuration, Kext/directionality The first
logical possibility is to map directionality onto the external case and con-
figuration onto the adposition. This option is very frequently attested and
accounts for more than 50% of the tokens (568) in which 121 types from
13 languages are involved. As an example, consider the Evenki adposition
xergi- ‘under’. It can bear different cases that determine its directionality.
It does not assign case to its complement. This is illustrated in Table 3.8.
form P Kext directionality configuration
xergiduk xergi- ablative Source under
xergile xergi- allative Goal under
xergidu xergi- dative Place under
xergili xergi- prolative Path under
Table 3.8: Evenki xergi- ‘under’
In (74) some examples are given of do:- ‘in’.
Evenki (Nedjalkov, 1997, 172)
(74) a. D’u
house
do:-du-n
interior-dat-3sg.poss
teget-chere-n.
sit-pres-3sg
‘He is sitting in(side) the house.’
b. D’u
house
do:-la-n
interior-all-3sg.poss
ngene-re-n.
go-nonfut-3sg
‘He went into the house.’
c. D’u
house
do:-duk-n
interior-abl-3sg.poss
ju-re-n.
go.out-pres-3sg
‘He went out of the house.’
Depending on its external case, do: means ‘inside’, ‘into’, or ‘out of’.
Other languages that make use of this strategy are Alamblak, Basque,
Burushaski, Finnish, Gamo, Ket, Kolyma Yukaghir, Lezgian, Malayalam,
Marathi, Turkish, and Warao.
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Strategy 4. Kint/directionality, P/configuration There is
only one language, viz. Polish, in which 9 adpositions use the fourth pos-
sibility, combining directionality with the internal case and configuration
with the adposition. An example is given in (75).
Polish (Bielec, 1999, 224)
(75) a. Pracuje˛
work.1sg
na
at
poczcie.
postoffice.loc
‘I work at the post office.’
b. Pracuje˛
go.1sg
na
at
poczce.
postoffice.acc
‘I am going to the post office.’
Although this strategy is fairly typical for Indo-European languages (see
Lestrade, 2006), it is unexpected from a functional perspective as it violates
the principle of isomorphism. As it turns out, the strategy is indeed not
found for other languages in our sample.
Strategy 5. Kext/directionality, Kint/configuration There is
only one adposition in Lezgian that seems to use the fifth possible strat-
egy to combine configuration with internal and directionality with external
case, viz. the adposition win- ‘above, top’. This is illustrated in Table 3.9
and the examples in (76) (following the order of presentation in the table).
Kint P Kext directionality configuration
genitive win- superessive Place ‘above’
inelative win- superessive VIA ‘up (along)’
genitive win- superelative Source ‘above’
inelative win- dative VIA ‘up (along)’
Table 3.9: Lezgian win- ‘above’
Lezgian (Haspelmath, 1993, 214-215)
(76) a. Cˇ’ulaw
black
cif-er.i
cloud-pl.(erg)
xu¨r.u¨-n
village-gen
winel
above.superes
micˇ’i
dark
qhen
shadow
wehe-nwa-j.
throw-perf-past
‘Black clouds had cast a dark shadow over the village.’
b. Sa
one
dagˇwi
mountaineer
zˇigˇir.d-aj
path-inel
winel
above.superes
jajlax.di-z
pasture-dat
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fi-zwa-j.
go-imperf-past
‘A mountaineer was going to a pasture up a path.’
c. I
this
aslan
lion
cˇna
we.erg
cˇi
we.gen
winelaj
above.superel
alud-in.
take.away-hort
‘Let’s take this lion from above us.’ (i.e. ‘Let’s overthrow
him.’)
d. Zun
I.abs
taxta.di-n
plank-gen
gurar-aj
stairs-inel
winiz
up.dat
xkazˇ
raise
xˆa-na.
antic-aor
‘I walked up the plank stairs.’
The pattern may not be directly clear, but internal inelative case seems to
correspond to ‘above’ configuration, internal genitive case to ‘up (along)’.
External superessive can have Place or VIA directionality; external superel-
ative expresses Source, and external dative expresses VIA.
However, we could say that ‘above’ and ‘ top’ refer to the same config-
uration and that the difference in interpretation (or, at least, in glossing)
is due to the difference in directionality. If this is the case then Strategy 5
does not occur in our sample.
Strategy 8. P/directionality+configuration The eighth strat-
egy to have both the directionality and configuration expressed by the P
was the second-most frequent option in our sample. It was chosen by 271
tokens (234 types) in 29 of our 32 languages. The difference between the
number of tokens and types is due to token variants that cannot be analyzed
as case forms. These adpositions did not make use of internal or external
case to create meaning differences although the language does have mor-
phological case. As the language counts show, languages use this strategy
for some adpositions whereas they use different internal and external cases
for others. The only three languages that did not make use of this strategy
at all are Alamblak, Brahui, and Harar Oromo.
None of the other possibilities are attested in our sample.
In conclusion, out of all the logical possibilities, there are only two that
are used abundantly. The strategy to express configuration with the ad-
position and to have the internal case specified directionality seems to be
restricted to Indo-European. Its rare occurrence can be explained by its vi-
olation of the principle of Isomorphism (cf. Table 3.7). None of the other
strategies is attested in our sample. A summary is given in Table 3.10. A
comparison with Table 3.7 shows that only the predicted languages occur
significantly.
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N Kint P Kext Attested
1. Ground Config Dir ++
2. Ground Dir Config –
3. Ground Config Dir –
4. Ground Dir Config +
5. Ground Config Dir –
6. Ground Dir Config –
7. Ground Dir+Config –
8. Ground Dir+Config ++
9. Ground Dir+Config –
Table 3.10: Attested distributions of labor within the PP
3.4.5 The Case Paradigm of Adpositions
In the previous section we saw that the spatial adposition can itself be
marked with spatial case, as illustrated by the lexical spatial construction
in Evenki, repeated in (77).
Evenki (Nedjalkov, 1997, 172)
(77) a. D’u
house
do:-duk-n
interior-abl-3sg.poss
ju-re-n.
go.out-pres-3sg
‘He went out of the house.’
In (77), the adposition do: ‘in’ is marked with the ablative case denoting
Source.
The third prediction following from my analysis concerns these case
forms. If the spatial case paradigm makes a rough configuration distinc-
tion, while adpositions, as the more lexical spatial construction, specify the
configurational part of spatial meaning much more explicitly, it is not to
be expected that spatial adpositions inflect for the complete spatial case
paradigm. That is, if adpositions themselves specify configuration already,
then the configuration distinction that spatial case makes is redundant.
Therefore spatial case is not expected to make a configuration distinction
on adpositions. This prediction is tested for Finnish and Hungarian.
As discussed above the Hungarian case paradigm distinguishes three
configuration contrasts and three directionality distinctions (again illus-
trated in Table 3.11).
But as illustrated in Table 3.12, the case paradigm of Hungarian post-
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Directionality
Configuration Place Source Goal
ON superessive delative sublative
-on/-en/-o¨n/-n -ro´l/-ro˝l -ra/-re
AT adessive ablative allative
-na´l/-ne´l -to´l/-to˝l -hoz/-hez/-ho¨z
IN inessive elative illative
-ban/-ben -bo´l/-bo˝l -ba/-be
Table 3.11: Hungarian spatial case paradigm
positions only makes a three-way distinction that goes back to the Old
Hungarian spatial case system (Creissels, 2006b; Stolz, 1992, 61).
directionality
configuration Place Goal Source
OVER fo¨lo¨tt fo¨le´ fo¨lu¨l
UNDER alatt ala´ alo´l
IN FRONT elo¨tt ele´ elo˝l
BEHIND mo¨go¨tt mo¨ge´ mo¨gu¨l
IN BETWEEN ko¨zo¨tt ko¨ze´ ko¨zu¨l
Table 3.12: The case paradigm of Hungarian postpositions
As Table 3.12 shows, the different case forms of Hungarian postpositions
only make a directionality distinction. As argued above, spatial adpositions
specifically express configurational meaning. The configuration distinctions
that are made in the spatial case paradigm are redundant on adpositions
and therefore omitted; only the directional part is used.
Now consider the inventory of Finnish spatial case in Table 3.13. Just
like in Hungarian, spatial cases in Finnish can morphologically be decom-
posed into a configurational and a directional part. The configurational
dimension is taken care of by the first part of the spatial cases: -l- for
ON/AT and -s- for IN. The directional function is expressed by the second
part: -lV for Place, -tV for Source, and a no longer recognizable morpheme
for Goal. The full spatial meaning of the ablative, for example, consists of
the directionality function Source and the configuration part ON. Note that
the Finnish spatial case system thus makes a two-way configuration distinc-
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Directionality
Place Source Goal
Configuration -lV -tV -xx
ON/AT -l- adessive ablative allative
(external cases) (-llV ) (-ltV ) (-lle)
IN -s- inessive elative illative
(internal cases) (-ssV ) (-stV ) (-(h)VVn)
Table 3.13: Finnish spatial case paradigm
tion, distinguishing external (ON/AT) from internal (IN) cases.6
So I assume that the Finnish spatial case construction talossa ‘in the
house’ is as follows:
Finnish spatial case construction
(78) a. talo-s-sa
house-in-stat
‘in the house’
b. [dir [config [ground talo- ]-s ]-sa ]
The -s morpheme adds the configurational part of the meaning (IN), the
-sV morpheme expresses the directionality Place.
In addition to spatial cases, Finnish has a number of adpositions to ex-
press spatial meaning. Unlike postpositions in Hungarian, these adpositions
are themselves marked for directionality with a “complete” spatial case, as
illustrated in (79-a):
Finnish spatial adposition construction
(79) a. talo-n
house-gen
sisa¨-lla¨
in-ade
‘in the house’
b. [dir [?? [config [ground talon ] sisa¨ ]-l ]-la¨ ]
The problem is that the configurational part of the spatial case (-l) is re-
dundant and therefore should not occur. That is, in (78) the -s morpheme
expresses the configurational part of the meaning (IN) and directionality is
6Note that this use of the terms external and internal differs from the one in the
previous section where it described structural position. In this section the terms refer to
configuration distinctions.
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only expressed by the second part, the -sV morpheme. If the adposition in
(79) expresses the configuration, then we would only need -la (and not -l-
la) to make the spatial expression complete (79-b). Because spatial case on
adpositions marks directionality only, its configuration part becomes mean-
ingless. But unlike in Hungarian, this does not mean that it can be left out.
In other words the Finnish PP talon sisa¨lla¨ ‘in the house’ in fact is as follows:
Finnish spatial adposition construction (revised)
(80) a. talo-n
house-gen
sisa¨-lla¨
in-ade
‘in the house’
b. [dir [config [ground talon ] sisa¨ ]-lla¨ ]
The adessive marked postposition combines with a genitive case marked
DP. The postposition denotes the configuration, the adessive case on the
P only adds stative directionality. The configurational part of the adessive
case does not add configurational meaning, as this is already done by the P.
But how can this be? How can this part remain meaningless when it does
add meaning in the spatial case variant in (78)? If the configuration part
is already specified by the postposition, then what does the configuration
of the spatial case in (80) do? In principle we would expect to have a
directionality marker only. According to Kracht (2003) this is indeed what
we get.
Kracht (2003) argues that a case marker can be used to express a case
feature or a case function. A case feature is a syntactic requirement with-
out any meaning; a case function is a semantic function that does have a
meaning proper. The case feature and the case function are never expressed
by the same case marker at the same time. For example, if an adposition
structurally assigns accusative case to its object (as a feature) this case does
not have any meaning. It does have meaning, however, if there is a possi-
ble case alternation, and the case is assigned as a function. Kracht (2003)
shows how these two different (i.e., feature vs. function) possibilities can
be expressed by the directionality and configuration parts of a spatial case
independently from each other. It is imporant to note that the configura-
tion and the directionality morpheme have to occur together (semantically
empty or not) to form a grammatical case marker. This is illustrated in the
following example:
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Finnish (Kracht, 2003)
(81) a. Ha¨n
He
menee
walks
laiva-l.ta
ship-abl
(alas)
(down)
‘He is going/walking from the ship’
b. Ha¨n
He
lo¨ysi
found
rahansa
money.3px
laiva-l.ta
ship-abl
(*alas/alhaalta)
(down/from downstairs)
‘He found his money on (‘off’) the ship’
c. Ta¨ma¨
This
na¨ytta¨a¨
resemble
laiva-l.ta
ship-abl
(*alas/*alhaalta)
(down/from downstairs)
‘This looks like/resembles a ship’
The configurational and directionality dimensions have different functions
and features. In (81-a) both semantic components are present. In (81-b)
the verb selects a place, and the Source component only has a syntactic
function. In (81-c) both components have null semantics and the verb se-
mantically selects for a thing. This is illustrated by the possibility to replace
laivalta in (81) with the spatial particles alas ‘down’ and alhaalta ‘from
downstairs’ (put between parentheses). So (81) shows that spatial case in
Finnish consists of two elements that can be meaningful or semantically
empty independently from each other.
The Finnish spatial case system makes a configuration distinction be-
tween internal (IN) and external (AT/ON) cases. As postpositions them-
selves express configuration already it is not to be expected that spatial
case makes such a configuration distinction on postpositions. That is, it is
not expected that spatial adpositions inflect for both internal and external
cases as there is no semantic contribution this configuration distinction can
make. Therefore I predict that adpositions choose either the set of internal
(inessive, elative, illative) or the set of external (adessive, ablative, allative)
cases to mark the directionality distinction only. Many postpositions do
not have a complete paradigm. Out of the seventeen adpositions listed in
Sulkala and Karjalainen (1992), only four (al- ‘under’, ja¨lke- ‘often’, la¨he-
‘near’, and ympa¨ri- ‘around’) have either the internal or the external case
forms; seven other adpositions either do not inflect at all or only for nonlocal
cases like partitive, essive, translative and/or prolative.
I investigated two adpositions that do seem to inflect for all six local
cases according to the list in Sulkala and Karjalainen (1992). For this
purpose, I selected six newspapers from the CSC corpus: Demari 2000, a
newspaper of the Social Democrats; Karjalainen 1998 and Aamulehti 1999,
which are two pretty high standard, big newspapers, the latter especially
for the region of Tampere; Hyvinka¨a¨n Sanomat 1997 and Ha¨meen Sanomat
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2000, which are two lower quality, smaller newspapers, and finally Helsin-
gin Sanomat AE 1995, which is generally considered the highest quality
newspaper. From this approximately 26 million word corpus I extracted all
PPs that involved the postpositions sisa¨- ‘in’ and pa¨a¨- ‘on’. The results are
shown in Table 3.14.
pa¨a¨- ‘on’ sisa¨- ‘in’
Inessive 2293 47
Illative 2296 395
Elative 1919 5
Total internal 5408 447
Adessive 882 2052
Allative 1859 186
Ablative 208 208
Total external 2949 2446
Table 3.14: Case forms of Ps in Finnish
At first sight the numbers for pa¨a¨- ‘on’ might look surprising: both the
internal and external case forms are very frequent. One would have ex-
pected to have either the internal or the external case forms but not both.
The explanation is very simple: pa¨a¨- with the internal cases means ‘at the
end of’; only with the external cases does it mean ‘on’ (82). This means
that for the relevant meaning of pa¨a¨- the alternation in configuration is no
longer possible at all. I hypothesize that the internal case forms of pa¨a¨-
were vacant and therefore were able to take up a new meaning ‘at the end
of’.
Finnish (Sulkala & Karjalainen, 1992, 250; 261)
(82) a. Kirja
book
on
be.3sg
po¨yda¨-n
table-gen
pa¨a¨-lla¨.
pa¨a¨-ade
‘The book is on the table.’
b. Tulen
come.1sg
tunni-n
hour-gen
pa¨a¨-sta¨.
pa¨a¨-ela
‘I’ll come in an hour’
As Table 3.14 shows sisa¨- complements have a clear preference for the
external case forms. What differs from the variation with pa¨a¨- is that the
internal and the external forms of sisa¨- seem to express the same meaning
‘in(side)’. Figure 3.6 shows for all sisa¨- ‘in’ objects with which proportion
131
Chapter 3. The Case of Space
they occur with an internal case form of sisa¨-. A proportion of 0 means
that a complement is always selected by an external case form of sisa¨-; a
proportion of 1 means that a complement is always selected by its external
case forms; an intermediate value means that a complement is selected by
both internal and external case forms. The density curve in Figure 3.6 shows
that almost all complements are only selected by the external case forms,
a smaller group is exclusively selected by the internal case forms. There
are very few complements that are selected by both sets. The ones that
do occur as the complements of both forms of sisa¨- occur with a very high
token frequency (for discussion on similar frequency findings, see Lestrade,
2010). (Note that the density curve is smoothened. Proportions below zero
or above one are impossible.)
If we look at the individual constructions, we see that most complements
appear as the object of sisa¨- in either of the two case types exclusively. That
is, there are very few objects with a proportion of internal cases between
0 and 1. This means that the internal and external case forms of sisa¨- ‘in’
select for a different kind of object. However, there seems to be no clear
semantic difference between the two classes of objects (yet). To illustrate
this, in (83) some examples of the three different classes of complements
of sisa¨- ‘in’ are given: complements that almost exclusively (in more than
90% of the cases) go with the external case form of sisa¨-, complements that
almost exclusively go with the internal case form of sisa¨-, and complements
that go with both sets.
(83) a. Examples of complements of sisa¨- with internal cases:
bussin sisa¨a¨n ‘into the bus’
pallon sisa¨a¨n ‘into the ball’
tunnelin sisa¨sta¨ ‘from inside the tunnel’
b. Examples of complements of sisa¨- with external cases:
muutoksen sisa¨lla¨ ‘in the alternation’
talon sisa¨lla¨ ‘in the house’
asunnon sisa¨lle ‘into the house’
c. Examples of complements of sisa¨- with both cases:7
laatikon sisa¨lla¨ ‘in the box’
laatikon sisa¨a¨n ‘into the box’
seina¨n sisa¨lla¨ ‘in the wall’
seina¨n sisa¨a¨n ‘into the wall’
7The grammaticality judgments of native speakers may differ from the corpus findings
and one of the two forms may be preferred.
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Figure 3.6: Division of case over sisa¨- objects
The density plot together with the frequency numbers in Table 3.14 sug-
gests that the internal form of sisa¨- ‘in’ is the marked option.8 Only rarely
and only few complement types occur with these forms of sisa¨-. Given the
clear preference for the external case forms of sisa¨- and given the different
object selection of the internal and external case sets, I expect that the
internal case forms of sisa¨- ‘in’ will become obsolete (like for most other
adpositions), or take up another meaning (as in the case of pa¨a¨-). In the
first case the paradigm will become more economical; in the second case
the internal case forms will become meaningful and hence useful again.
In this section it was shown that configuration distinctions that are
made in spatial case paradigms become meaningless when combined with
adpositions. This redundancy can be resolved in two ways. In Hungarian
the configurational part of the spatial case is simply left out. In Finnish
this is not possible as a spatial case necessarily consists of both subcompo-
nents. In this situation there are again two possibilities. Either adpositions
may combine with spatial cases from one configuration series only, or the
different case series can develop new meaning distinctions.
8The mean frequencies of the different complement classes of sisa¨- differ significantly
according to a Wilcoxon rank sum test with Bonferonni correction; applied to logged
frequencies to correct for outliers: all ps ≈ 0
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter the importance of frequency for spatial case was discussed.
It was assumed that spatial meaning consists of both a directionality and
configuration dimension. It was argued that the directionality dimension
necessarily consists of three basic distinctions, which follows from the anal-
ysis of directionality in terms of a change of configuration over time. Place
directionality is the absence of a change in configuration; Goal direction-
ality is a change into some configuration, and Source directionality is a
change out of some configuration. In contrast, there is no uniform set of
configurational concepts that is similarly privileged in human cognition and
language. As a result the distinctions of directionality are more frequently
used than those of configuration. Because of their frequent use the mark-
ers of directionality grammaticalize. In a number of studies it was shown
that spatial case indeed mainly expresses directionality, as predicted by my
analysis. Within directionality, I argued for an implicational scale that says
that Place is expressed first, then Goal and Source, and only then the de-
rived meanings. This prediction was also borne out by a cross-linguistic
comparison of spatial case paradigms.
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The Optional Use of
(Spatial) Case
This chapter will show how the semi-bidirectional OT model
that was developed in Chapter 2 explains the optional use of
spatial case. The model also straightforwardly extends to var-
ious types of structural differential case marking. In some lan-
guages the use of case can be judged unnecessary which leads
to the omission of case marking. Although other rules of gram-
mar may interfere with this general procedure, I propose that
in principle all DCM can be explained by predictability.
4.1 Introduction
The semi-bidirectional OT model that was introduced in Chapter 2 predicts
the economical use of language. In Section 3.4.3, it was shown how this
model accounts for the alternation between spatial case and more lexical
constructions. In this chapter, the model will be applied to the alternation
between case and an even more economical alternative. Although the use
of case is a relatively cheap strategy to encode argument structure, using
nothing is even cheaper. Therefore, if it is possible, speakers will not use
case. This optional use of case marking is known as differential case marking
(DCM ) and is illustrated in (1).
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Bukharian Uzbek (Aziz Djuraev, p.c.)
(1) a. Siz
you
bozor
market
borasizmi?
go
‘Will you go to the marketplace?’
b. Siz
you
bozor-ga
market-dat
borasizmi?
go
‘Will you go to the marketplace?’
In Bukharian Uzbek dative case expressing location is optional for nouns
that refer to places (Aziz Djuraev, p.c.). Because a marketplace prototyp-
ically has a spatial function, dative case that marks this function can be
omitted in (1-a).
Most case languages exhibit differential case marking to some extent.
It is a relatively well-known phenomenon for the structural use of case.
In many languages, the use of structural case is conditioned by promi-
nence hierarchies of animacy, definiteness or specificity (cf. among many
others Aissen, 2003; de Hoop & Swart, 2008; de Swart, 2007; de Hoop &
Malchukov, 2007).1 Entities that are high-up in these hierarchies behave
differently from entities that are lower down. For example, some languages
restrict the use of case to their pronominal system. In English the pronoun
has a different form in subject (2-a) and object position (2-b); the form of
the full noun phrase however is the same in both functions.
(2) a. He sees the woman.
b. The woman sees him.
In some languages it may also be the case that specific or definite objects
can receive case marking whereas indefinites remain caseless. This is illus-
trated for Hindi in (3).
Hindi (de Hoop & Malchukov, 2008, 576)
(3) a. Wo
he
ek
one
laD.kaa
boy
dekhtaa
seeing
hae
is
‘He sees a boy.’
b. Wo
he
ek
one
laD.ke-ko
boy-acc
dekhtaa
seeing
hae
is
‘He sees the boy.’
1Note that the use of prominence/prominent in this chapter differs from the one in
Chapter 2. In that chapter it referred to predictability of argument functions of particular
predicates.
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The indefinite object in (3-a) does not receive case marking, whereas the
more prominent object in (3-b) does.
Such alternations are generally explained in terms of markedness (Aissen,
2003), or by the identifying or disambiguating function of case (de Hoop
& Malchukov, 2007). Aissen (2003) argues that definite objects are seman-
tically marked (definites most often being subjects) and therefore accord-
ingly morphologically marked by accusative case. Indefinites, on the other
hand, are typical objects and therefore remain unmarked. De Hoop and
Malchukov (2007, cf. Section 4.3 for more elaborate discussion) argue that
such case variation should be explained by principles of economy, distin-
guishability and identification. For reasons of distinguishability, prominent
objects should be marked with accusative case to tell them apart from sub-
jects. Identification says that prominent arguments prefer case marking, no
matter what their syntactic function is. The ranking of these constraints is
language specific.
Aristar (1996, 1997) argues that prominence alternations as illustrated
in (3) also occur in the semantic use of case. Geographical names, for
instance, often have a “lighter” spatial marking than most other nouns,
whereas nouns that refer to animates may have special more elaborate
forms of spatial case (Creissels, 2009b, 612). Aristar (1996, 1997) proposes
a markedness account with typical pairings of case and argument (similar
to the idea of Aissen, 2003). The prototypical pairing of case and argument
is called typing. He discerns three strategies for dealing with potentially
type-incongruent cases and nominals. Firstly, a nominal that does not fit
the typing criteria of some case simply does not occur in that case (blocking ;
cf. also Kiparsky, 2004; Karlsson, 1986). Secondly, a nominal that does not
fit the typing criteria of some case receives additional marking (bridging).
Finally, an atypical combination of a nominal and a case gets reinterpreted
(extension). As illustrated in (4), the second and third strategy are often
applied together.
Yidiny (Australian) (Aristar, 1997, 317)
(4) a. mandi-m
hand-abl
‘from the hand’
b. buña:-ni-m
woman-bridge-abl
‘because of the woman’
In (4) an additional bridging morpheme is used for the type incongruent
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combination of the ablative case with an animate argument. The meaning
is also extended to the abstract domain.
Aristar (1997) argues that the difference between typing effects of struc-
tural and nonstructural cases is that in the former there is a clear alternation
between some marker and zero, whereas in the latter there is no such alter-
nation. Instead, there is an alternation in the use of a bridging morpheme
as illustrated in (4). Each case has its own particular typing criteria. Ac-
cording to Aristar, the reason that typing has not previously been identified
as the coordinating principle in both structural and semantic case is that
the alternation in the use of bridging morphemes is harder to detect than
the alternation between a marker and zero. Aristar (1997) suggests that
because of the resulting focus on differential case marking in the structural
domain only, people did not see the overall typing picture. However, typ-
ing each combination of case function and filler and marking incongruent
pairings is said to explain both structural and semantic case alternations
(Aristar, 1997, 356).
I agree with Aristar that structural and spatial DCM are preferably
explained by the same principles and that the accounts of structural DCM
are too specific for this purpose. However, I disagree with him on two points.
Firstly, as will be shown in Section 4.3, not all case alternations can be
explained by marking marked combinations. Secondly, not all spatial DCM
is between a spatial case and a more elaborate form. In my account of DCM
case sometimes can be omitted when the function that some constituent
performs is already sufficiently clear. Such economical use applies equally
to structural and spatial case. As was illustrated in the first example of
this chapter and as will be elaborated in Section 4.2, we find that spatial
case alternates with zero forms.
In this chapter it will be shown how my model can account for very dif-
ferent kinds of differential case marking. DCM is shown to follow from the
very same principles that already explained the development of case and its
nondifferential use in Chapter 2. The (differential) use of case is explained
by predictability, that is, the semi-bidirectional evaluation of a form candi-
date. Although most use of case probably is a result of fossilization, in some
languages the speaker does not always have to use case. When building a
sentence, the speaker checks whether there are enough cues for the hearer
to derive the interpretation already. If the use of case turns out to be re-
dundant it can be left out in these languages. Obviously the factors that
determine the predictability of some case function differ per function, as
prototypical Agents are not exactly the same as prototypical Goals. Thus,
in the argument domain prominence may account for predictability; in the
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spatial domain, spatial prototypicality does.
Not all behavior of case can be explained by my model. Other rules of
grammar, which are differently motivated, may interact with the ones that
follow from the general principles I propose. Anttila and Fong (2000) argue
for example that there is a general syntactic constraint Case-OCP that
prohibits the use of identical cases on adjacent constituents. For example
Finnish elative case, which normally is assigned to the plural NP of a quan-
titative determiner like one third, is categorically blocked in environments
where the complete DP is assigned elative case by a verb. Instead, the NP
receives partitive case marking as illustrated in (5).
Finnish (Anttila & Fong, 2000, 10, 15)
(5) a. Kolmasosa
one.third
munkke-i-sta
monk-pl-ela
/
/
??munkke-j-a
monk-pl-part
on
are
italialaisia.
Italians
‘One third of the monks are Italians.’
b. Sointu-sta
Sointu-ela
tuli
became
munkki.
monk
‘Sointu became a monk.’
c. [Kolmasosa-sta
one.third-ela
[*mieh-i-sta
man-pl-ela
/
/
mieh-i-a¨]]
man-pl-part
tuli
became
munkkeja.
monks
‘One third of the men became monks.’
Yet another example of variation I cannot account for is the variation among
grammatical constructions in which case redundancy is allowed. For exam-
ple, Latin always exhibits case concordance between adjective and head
noun whereas in Hungarian this is not the case in attributive constructions,
but it is the case in predicative ones (Stiebels, 2002). In short, I do not
pretend to explain all uses of case. My model is concerned with very general
principles of case that may be overruled by various more specific ones.
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, cross-linguistic examples of
the optional use of spatial case will be discussed. In Section 4.3 structural
DCM and some OT accounts that have been proposed for this type will
be discussed. In Section 4.4 it will be shown how my account can describe
all versions of differential case marking. Finally, in Section 4.5, it will be
shown how it straightforwardly accounts for other, lesser known types of
DCM.
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4.2 Spatial Differential Case Marking
This section will discuss cross-linguistic examples of the optional use of spa-
tial case because of predictability. The general observation is that some-
times spatial case does not have to be used if the speaker thinks the meaning
contribution it would make is sufficiently clear already.
As illustrated in the previous section, in Bukharian Uzbek the spatial
marker -ga can be dropped when added to nouns with semantics of place.
Bukharian Uzbek (Aziz Djuraev, p.c.)
(6) a. Siz
you
bozor-ga
market-dat
borasizmi?
go
b. Siz
you
bozor
market
borasizmi?
go
‘Will you go to the marketplace?’
A marketplace is a prototypical ground (cf. Section 3.2). Because of this
predisposition it is not necessary to mark its spatial function explicitly (6-b).
Creissels (2006a) observes a similar phenomenon for Tswana. Consider
the following example.
Tswana (Creissels, 2006a, 26)
(7) a. Ke
S1sg
tlaa
fut
huduga
move
Kanye.
Kanye
‘I am going to move from Kanye.’
b. Ke
S1sg
tlaa
fut
huduga
move
(ko)
loc
motse-ng.
village-loc
‘I am going to move from the village.’
c. *Ke tlaa huduga (ko) motse.
In (7-a) the spatial function of the place Kanye is not explicitly marked.
This is done by the locative suffix -ng and an optional additional preposition
for motse ‘village’ in (7-b). As (7-c) shows, it is not possible to leave out
the locative suffix for the full DP. According to Creissels (2006a, 26-27)
the use of place names as spatial arguments or adjuncts does not have to
be marked with the spatial markers that are obligatory for common nouns
fulfilling the same functions, because their very meaning predisposes them
to be interpreted as a ground.
In Korean, just like most other case markers, spatial markers can be
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dropped in casual speech if no emphasis, exclusiveness, or contrast is ex-
pressed:
Korean (Sohn, 1994, 231)
(8) a. Minca-uy
Minca-gen
tongsayng-i
brother-nom
hakkyo-ey
school-Goal
ka-ss-ta.
go-past-decl
b. Minca-uy
Minca-gen
tongsayng-i
brother-nom
hakkyo
school
ka-ss-ta.
go-past-decl
‘Minca’s brother went to school.’
Given a context of going, the school is easily understood as the goal in
(8). Explicit marking is therefore not necessary.
In Maricopa too, spatial case marking is optional (Gordon, 1986, 48).
According to Gordon (1986), its absence does not result in much ambiguity
or processing difficulty because of the inherent properties of the noun ref-
erent and/or by information from the context. From this discussion it does
not become exactly clear whether this optionality is general or restricted to
situations in which the function of the case is predictable.
Maricopa (Gordon, 1986)
(9) a. Kwnho
basket
lames-k
table-loc
’-shvaw-k.
1-put-real
b. Kwnho
basket
lames
table
’-shvaw-k.
1-put-real
‘I put the basket on the table.’
In (9) the locative marker -k is optional as the function of the table is
clear from the context. If you put a basket somewhere and there is a table
involved, the table is probably the place where you put the basket.
Furthermore, Kittila¨ (2008) shows how in the Indo-Iranian languages
Nepali and Gujarati goal marking for place names is dropped. Firstly con-
sider the example from Nepali.
Nepali (Kittila¨, 2008, 255)
(10) a. Sikchak-le
teacher-erg
eutaa
one
kiitaab
book
maanche-lai
man-dat
pathaa-yo.
send-past
‘The teacher sent a book to the man.’
b. Maanche-le
man-erg
kiitaab
book
pustakaalaya-ma
library-IN
pathaa-yo.
send-past
‘The man sent the book to the library.’
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c. Sikchak-le
teacher-erg
eutaa
one
kiitaab
book
maisore
Mysore
pathaa-yo.
send-past
‘The teacher sent a book to Mysore.’
Animate goals receive dative marking (10-a), inanimate goals are marked
with -ma ‘IN’ (10-b), the place name in (10-c) remains unmarked.
A similar pattern holds for Gujarati. Both animates and inanimates are
marked with dative case, whereas place names are zero marked.
Gujarati (Kittila¨, 2008, 255)
(11) a. Sikshak-e
teacher-erg
vidaarthi-ne
student-dat
pustak
book.n.sg
mokl-y-un.
send-past.perf-n.sg
‘The teacher sent a/the book to the student.’
b. Sikshak-e
teacher-erg
pustakalaya-ne
library-dat
pustak
book.n.sg
mokl-y-un.
send-past.perf-n.sg
‘The teacher sent a/the book to the library.’
c. Sikshak-e
teacher-erg
delhi
Delhi
pustak
book.n.sg
mokl-y-un.
send-past.perf-n.sg
‘The teacher sent a/the book to Dehli.’
As the contrasts between the b and c examples show, the case variation
cannot be explained by a simple interaction between case and animacy only.
Both humans and inanimate goals receive marking. Only for place names,
which are inherent locations by definition, goal marking can be dropped.
In Tariana, a language from the Arawakan family, the locative and in-
strumental case markers are optional. They can be omitted if a constituent
is repeated in the same function (only the first occurrence of the constituent
then is marked); if the meaning can be recovered from the context, and from
inherently instrumental or locational nouns (Aikhenvald, 2003, 154-155).
The spatial case marker -se is used to mark Place, Goal, and Source, as
illustrated in (12).
Tariana (Aikhenvald, 2003, 148)
(12) a. Na-pidana
3pl.go-remp.rep
uni-se.
water-loc
‘They went into water.’
b. Nawiki
people
pa:-putSita-se
one-cl:clearing-loc
nehpani-pidana.
3pl.work-remp.rep
‘People were working on a clearing.’
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c. Hi˜
dem.anim
wyaka-se
far-loc
ka-nu-kaRu
rel-come-past.rel.fem
dhuma-naka
3sg.fem.hear-pres.vis
waku-nuku.
1pl.speech.top.nonA/S
‘She who came from far away understands our speech.’
(13) illustrates the omission of this locative marker because of recover-
ability from the context. The example comes from a text in which a girl
escaped from her ritual seclusion while her parents went to the garden.
Tariana (Aikhenvald, 2003, 155)
(13) Ha-niRi
parent-masc
hinipuku
garden
ka:-kaRi
rel.go-past.rel.masc.sg
di-dia-ka
3sg.nonfem-return-sub
di-nu-pidana
3sg.nonfem-come-remp.rep
di-ka
3sg.nonfem-see
pamun˜a-sawa-se
middle-class:group-loc
hipa-da-sawa-se
ground-class:round-class:group-loc
yaru-maka-si-pe
thing-class:cloth-nonposs-pl
dhupa-ka-pidana.
3sg.fem.wash-sub-remp.rep
‘When the father who had gone returned from the garden, he saw
that she was washing clothes on the middle heap of stones.’
In (13) the father is coming back from the garden. Hinipuku ‘garden’ need
not be marked with locative case. It has already been said at the beginning
of the story that her parents went to the garden. Therefore the Source
function is obvious from the context (Aikhenvald, 2003, 155).
(14) illustrates the omission of the locative marker on an inherently lo-
cational noun, viz. a place name.
Tariana (Aikhenvald, 2003, 155)
(14) PapuRi-nuku
Papuri-top.nona/s
na-wa
3pl-enter
na:-pidana
3pl.go-remp.rep
‘They (Tariana forefathers) came onto the Papuri river.’
In my proposal the different conditions Aikhenvald (2003) discerns are
variants of the same principle. Spatial case is not used when the spatial
meaning is predictable.
All examples above concern instances of differential case marking. How-
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ever, as I said in the introduction, this pattern is not expected to be re-
stricted to case but should hold for other types of linguistic constructions
too. For the spatial domain, languages that use prepositions to express spa-
tial meaning are a case in point. In German for instance, prepositions can
be omitted with names of metro and railway stations and the like (Gisbert
Fanselow p.c.).
German (Gisbert Fanselow p.c.)
(15) a. Sie
you
mu¨ssen
must
am
at.the.dat
Domplatz
Domplatz
aussteigen.
exit
b. Sie
you
mu¨ssen
must
Domplatz
Domplatz
aussteigen.
exit
‘You must exit at Domplatz.’
In Yukatek Maya, prepositions are also used to express spatial mean-
ing. However, place names, cardinal directions, and prototypical grounds
go without a preposition.
Yukatek Maya (Bohnemeyer & Stolz, 2006, 284, 285; glosses adapted, SL)
(16) a. Sa´amal
tomorrow
walakil-a’
this.time-prox
yan
oblig
in
1sg
bis-ik-ech
go:caus-inc-2sg
Carrillo.
Carrillo
‘Tomorrow at this time, I will take you to (the town of) Car-
rillo.’
b. (. . . )
. . .
u
3
che’-il,
wood-rel
mehen
small
che’il-o’b
and-rel-pl
be`ey-a’,
thus-prox
k-u
impf-3
lu´ub-ul
fall-inc
lu’m
earth
‘(. . . ) the trees, like the small trees, they fall to the ground’
c. Le
def
lu`uch-o
cup-dist
ti’=ya`an
loc=exist.3sg
y-o´ok’ol
3-top
le
def
me`esa-o’.
table-dist
‘The cup, it’s there on the table.’
The place name Carrillo and the inherent ground lu’m ‘earth’ are used as
bare nouns (16-a,b) other grounds like me`sa ‘table’ need to combine with
a preposition (16-c) in their spatial use.
As a final example consider the following example from Ye´lˆı Dnye.
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Ye´lˆı Dnye (Levinson, 2000a, 10)
(17) a. Kpˆıdˆı
cloth
pee
piece
pi
person
keˆpa
forehead
mbeˆmeˆ
on
ka
tam
t:a.
hanging
‘The piece of cloth is hanging on the person’s forehead.’
b. Kpˆıdˆı
cloth
pee
piece
pi
person
keˆpa
forehead
ka
tam
t:a.
hanging
‘The piece of cloth is hanging (around) the person’s forehead.’
The adposition used in (17-a) is omitted in (17-b), which is otherwise the
same. According to Levinson (2000a) the omission of postpositions is only
possible for expected, stereotypical relations. The explicit use in (17-a)
results in a marked reading in which the head-band is perched on top of
the head.
The examples in this section show that spatial case can alternate with
zero marking, just like structural case. We have also seen that case marking
not only results from inherent markedness. Case can rather sometimes be
omitted if predictable, whether from context or inherently.
The variation is easily captured by my semi-bidirectional account. The
constraint AddW (“use world knowledge to enrich an utterance”) tells the
hearer to interpret an unmarked constituent with the most likely argument
function. The constraint Economy (“be economical in expressing what you
want to say”) dictates the speaker to omit case if she thinks the function
of a constituent is predictable enough to have the hearer fill it in himself.
Consider the example from Maricopa again, which is repeated in (18):
Maricopa (Gordon, 1986)
(18) a. Kwnho
basket
lames-k
table-loc
’-shvaw-k
1-put-real
b. Kwnho
basket
lames
table
’-shvaw-k
1-put-real
‘I put the basket on the table.’
The optimization procedure is illustrated in Tableau 4. The violation of
AddW is parenthesized, as the omission of the spatial case marker is op-
tional, not obligatory. Economy prohibits the use of this marker and there-
fore the zero marked form is preferred from the perspective of the speaker.
Depending on her evaluation of AddW , the speaker may use the spatial
case anyway. If she thinks world knowledge is insufficient, the unmarked
candidate is judged ambiguous and locative case has to be used. However,
if she thinks the semantic role of the table is sufficiently clear from context,
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she can use a zero marker.
Prod: Put(e) & Agent(e, I) &
Theme(e, basket), Ground(e, table) FaithL AddW Economy
+(,) a. table-∅
, b. table-loc *
Int: a. table-∅ FaithL AddW Economy
table = Instrument (*)
(+) table = Ground
Int: b. table-loc FaithL AddW Economy
table = Instrument * (*)
+ table = Ground
Tableau 4: Semi-Bidirectional Analysis of spatial marking in Maricopa
The same analysis can be applied to all other examples. The speaker
prefers the most economical form, which she actually uses if she thinks the
hearer will find out the ground function himself. If she does not think so,
she will add more material until she thinks she will be understood.
In the next section, structural DCM and some of the OT accounts that
have been proposed to deal with this type will be discussed. In Section 4.4
it will be shown how my model accounts for it.
4.3 Structural Differential Case Marking
In this section the optional use of structural case and some of the optimality
theoretic accounts that have been proposed for this type of DCM will be
discussed.
4.3.1 Markedness, Identification and Distinguishabil-
ity
An explanation of structural differential case marking in terms of marked-
ness is proposed by Aissen (2003). Meaning can be recoverable because of
a typical combination of some function with a performer. In these cases it
is not necessary to use case marking. The case marking of marked com-
binations is used precisely because of the markedness of that combination.
From a functional perspective the hearer is told that its unexpectedness
146
4.3 Structural Differential Case Marking
notwithstanding, the argument structure is as it is. For example, it is typ-
ical for subjects to be animate and definite. If the actual subject indeed is
animate and definite there will be no case marking. However, if the subject
is inanimate and/or indefinite, there will be case marking. The opposite
pattern holds for direct objects.
The predictions Aissen (2003) makes are borne out in some languages,
but in the subject domain differential use of case marking exhibits more
variation (see de Hoop & Swart, 2008). De Hoop and Malchukov (2008,
cf. also de Hoop & Swart, 2008; de Hoop & Malchukov, 2007) argue that
differential case marking is better explained by the two main functions of
case identified in functional-typological literature, the distinguishing and
the identifying function (Mallinson & Blake, 1981; de Hoop & Malchukov,
2008). The identifying and distinguishing function together help in ex-
plaining differential object marking (DOM) and the more varied differential
subject marking (DSM).
(19) a. Id(entify): Encode internal argument properties (i.e., erga-
tive case identifies strong subjects and accusative case identifies
strong objects)
b. Dist(inguishability): The two arguments of a transitive
clause should be distinguishable
According to de Hoop and Malchukov (2008) the identifying function
encodes prominent (animate) arguments and the distinguishing function
ensures that prominent objects are not misunderstood as subjects or that
low-prominent subjects are not misunderstood as direct objects. The two
functions of case considerably overlap in the argument domain: if a tran-
sitive argument is identified, it can be distinguished from the other; if it
is distinguished, it can be identified. However, the two functions diverge
in the subject domain, as de Hoop and Malchukov (2008) argue. Because
of the identifying function, prominent subjects should be case marked, but
because of the distinguishing function non-prominent subjects should be
case marked. Instead, they work in the same direction in the object do-
main, both marking prominent objects. Because of this, differential object
marking is much more uniform across languages than differential subject
marking.
The interaction of these two constraints with Economy accounts for
the differential use of case marking. Consider the following example from
Manipuri:
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Manipuri (de Hoop & Malchukov, 2008)
(20) a. @y-n@
I-erg
teb@l-d@
table-loc
theNNi.
touched
‘I touched the table (volitionally).’
b. @y
I
teb@l-d@
table-loc
theNNi.
touched
‘I touched the table (involuntarily).’
The volitional Agent in (20-a) is marked with ergative case, whereas the
nonvolitional one in (20-b) remains unmarked. Note that the markedness
account of Aissen (2003) predicts exactly the opposite pattern, Agents typ-
ically being volitional and therefore nonvolitional Agents are expected to
become case marked.
The optimization procedure for this example is illustrated in Tableau 5.
As opposed to what we have seen so far, de Hoop and Malchukov (2008)
use a bidirectional OT analysis. In this approach, form-meaning pairs are
evaluated simultaneously, which explains the different notation. For reasons
of clarity, tableaux taken from de Hoop and Malchukov (2008) are marked
with (dHM).
Subject Id Economy
, [erg, A] *
[erg, a] * *
[∅, A] *
, [∅, a]
Tableau 5: DSM in Manipuri (dHM)
The use of case violates Economy. The use of ergative case for a low-
prominent A (a) and the lack of ergative case for a prominent A (A) are
violations of Id. The only form-meaning pair that does not violate a single
constraint is the combination of the low-prominent A with a zero expression.
As a result, this combination becomes the first superoptimal form-meaning
pair.
In bidirectional OT (Blutner et al., 2006) (which should be distinguished
from the semi-bidirectional version of de Swart (2007, in prep.)) optimiza-
tion goes in two rounds. In the first round, the best combination of form and
meaning becomes optimal. If the speaker wants to express a more marked
meaning, she cannot simply choose the most economical form as she knows
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the hearer will understand this in the wrong way. This combination of a
marked meaning with an unmarked form is said to be blocked by the first
superoptimal pair. To express the marked meaning, the speaker has to
use a more marked form. The hearer, in his turn, will not interpret this
marked form with an unmarked meaning as he knows that there is a more
economical expression for this unmarked meaning. Since this combination
is blocked he will interpret it with the marked meaning.
By such bidirectional reasoning, the combination of the prominent A
with ergative case becomes the second superoptimal candidate, in spite of its
violation of Economy. It is the only possible form to express a prominent
Agent that does not have another interpretation already and it is the only
possible interpretation for the ergative case that is not assigned to another
form already.
Now consider the following example from Fore:2
Fore (Scott, 1978, 115-116)
(21) a. Yaga:-wama
pig-erg
wa´
man
aegu´ye.
3sg.obj.hit.3sg.su.ind
‘The pig attacks the man.’ not: ‘The man kills the pig.’
b. Yaga:
pig
wa´
man
aegu´ye.
3sg.obj.hit.3sg.su.ind
‘The man kills the pig.’ not: ‘The pig attacks the man.’
This pattern can be explained by the interaction of the distinguishing func-
tion with Economy, as illustrated in Tableau 6.
Subject Dist Economy
[erg, A] *
, [erg, a] *
, [∅, A]
[∅, a] *
Tableau 6: DSM in Fore (dHM)
In Fore ergative case is not used to identify prominent As, but to keep
low-prominent ones apart from Ps. That is, it is the relative instead of the
absolute prominence of the Agent (in terms of animacy) that determines
2What is called ergative case by de Hoop and Malchukov (2008) in (i) is analyzed as
a delineator by Scott (1978).
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case marking. In OT terms this means that it is Dist rather than Id that
is ranked above Economy, as illustrated in Tableau 6. The only faultless
form-meaning pair is the combination of the prominent A with a zero ex-
pression. The combination of the ergative case with the low-prominent A
follows from bidirectional reasoning. There is a better interpretation for a
zero marked form and a better form for the unmarked meaning. Thus in
differential subject marking, depending on which of the two main functions
outranks Economy, either strong As (ID) or weak ones (Dist) receive
ergative case marking.
In differential object marking the pattern is more uniform. Consider the
following example from Hindi again.
Hindi (de Hoop & Malchukov, 2008, 576)
(22) a. Wo
he
ek
one
laD.kaa
boy
dekhtaa
seeing
hae
is
‘He sees a boy.’
b. Wo
he
ek
one
laD.ke-ko
boy-acc
dekhtaa
seeing
hae
is
‘He sees the boy.’
The pattern in (22) can be explained by either the analysis in Tableau 7
or the one in Tableau 8. Both analyses lead to the same results in which
prominent Ps receive accusative case marking. Since the two functions point
in the same direction it is not always possible to see which of the two is
really at play in DOM.
Subject Id Economy
, [acc, P] *
[acc, p] * *
[∅, P] *
, [∅, p ]
Tableau 7: DOM by Id in Hindi (dHM)
Differential case marking that is sensitive to the appropriateness of a
given noun for some argument is called local DCM (Malchukov & de Swart,
2009). In (the less common) global DCM the properties of a given argument
are compared with those of the other argument of the transitive clause. In
global DOM, the use of object marking depends on the properties of both
the object and the subject, that is, the relation between the two. This was
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Subject Dist Economy
, [acc, P] *
[acc, p] *
[∅, P] *
, [∅, p]
Tableau 8: DOM by Dist in Hindi (dHM)
illustrated above for Fore already and is illustrated again for Awtuw in (23).
Awtuw (de Hoop & Malchukov, 2008, 577)
(23) a. Tey
3fem.sg
tale
woman
yaw
pig
dæli.
bit
‘The woman bit the pig.’
b. Tey
3fem.sg
tale-re
woman-acc
yaw
pig
dæli.
bit
‘The pig bit the woman.’
Generally speaking, subjects are higher in animacy than objects (Comrie,
1981, 128). If this default pattern applies, case marking is unnecessary in
Awtuw (23-a). However, if the object outranks the subject in animacy,
the object marker -re has to be used. Crucially, it is not the animacy of
the arguments per se, but the animacy of the subject in relation to that
of the object that determines the case marking. If this animacy relation is
unexpected, case marking is necessary.
In the Awtuw example above, the object is only marked with accusative
case if it outranks the subject in animacy. In local DOM the use of object
marking is only dependent on the properties of the object. This can be
illustrated with the following examples from Central Pomo:
Central Pomo (de Hoop & Malchukov, 2008, 578)
(24) a. M’u·tu
he.acc
Pa·hk’u´m.
I.killed
‘I killed him.’
b. Mu·l
he
Pa·hk’u´m.
I.killed
‘I killed it.’
In Central Pomo human objects are case marked and inanimates are not.
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One could still explain this pattern by distinguishability if the pattern did
not carry over to differential subject marking:
(25) Q’ala´·w
died
m’u·tu.
he.acc
‘He died.’
The accusative marker in (25) cannot be explained by distinguishability as
there is no other argument to confuse the subject with.
Differential object marking is normally found in nominative accusative
languages, while differential subject marking is usually found in ergative
languages (Bossong 1985, Drossard 1991; cited in de Hoop & Malchukov,
2008). To account for this observation, de Hoop and Malchukov (2008) re-
place the general Economy constraint with Malchukov’s (2006) constraint
Paip, originally for Primary Actant Immunity Principle. The primary ac-
tant refers to the unmarked argument of a transitive clause, that is, the
argument that is encoded like the intransitive subject.
(26) Paip: Avoid (case) marking of the unmarked argument.
In accusative languages, where the subject of the transitive clause is the
unmarked argument, DOM does not violate Paip: the nominative subject
is unmarked. In ergative languages, in which the object of the transitive
clauses is the unmarked argument, DOM would lead to a violation of Paip.
In order to prevent this from happening, these languages may use an an-
tipassive construction. Consider the following example from Greenlandic
Eskimo:
Greenlandic Eskimo (Bittner 1988; cited in de Hoop & Malchukov, 2008)
(27) a. Jaaku-p
Jacob-erg
arnaq
woman
tuqut-p-aa.
kill-ind-3sg.erg/3sg.nom
‘Jacob killed the woman.’
b. Jaaku
Jacob
arna-mik
woman-instr
tuqut-si-v-uq.
kill-ap-ind-3sg.nom
‘Jacob killed the woman.’
The object in the transitive construction in (27-a) is specific, whereas it is
nonspecific in the antipassive construction in (27-b). Thus by shifting to an
antipassive construction ergative languages avoid the violation of Paip that
marking the alternation on the unmarked object would cause. In an an-
tipassive construction, the subject is unmarked for case, thereby satisfying
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Paip.
In the same line of reasoning the marking of a weak Agent in accusative
languages is not expected to take place via DSM. Indeed, a weak Agent
regularly leads to passivization in such languages. Also, in some languages
passive forms are used to indicate nonvolitionality of the subject according
to de Hoop and Malchukov (2008).
In conclusion, Paip nicely explains the fact that features that lead to
differential subject marking in ergative languages may cause the use of
the passive constructions in accusative languages and features that trigger
differential object marking in accusative languages may cause the use of an
antipassive construction in ergative languages. Only in this way, there is
always an unmarked argument. Note that de Hoop and Malchukov (2008)
really need two distinct economy constraints as they cannot use Paip in the
DCM part of their analysis. For example in Tableau 6 it would not penalize
the use of ergative case.
In DCM structural case can alternate with a zero expression as in the
discussion above, or with another (overt) case.3 The latter phenomenon is
called symmetrical DCM; the former asymmetrical (de Hoop & Malchukov,
2008; Malchukov & de Swart, 2009). An example of symmetrical DCM
from Lezgian is given in (28).4
Lezgian (Haspelmath, 1993, 292)
(28) a. Zamira-di
Zamira-erg
get’e
pot
xana.
break.aor
‘Zamira broke the pot.’
b. Zamira-di-waj
Zamira-erg-abl
get’e
pot
xana.
break.aor
‘Zamira broke the pot accidentally/involuntarily.’
The explanation in the bidirectional OTmodel of de Hoop and Malchukov
(2008, 574) goes as follows. Both pairs violate Economy as both involve
morphological case. An “accidental” meaning attributes a less strong inter-
pretation to the A. Because of this, both the combination of ergative case
with a non-volitional A and the combination of oblique case with a voli-
tional A violate the constraint Id. Thus, the combinations of volitional A
with ergative case and non-volitional A with the oblique case both become
optimal in the first round of optimization. This is illustrated in Tableau 9.
3Note that this is contra the claim of Aristar (1996, 1997).
4Haspelmath (1993) glosses -waj as adelative case; for reasons of consistency in this
thesis, it is called ablative.
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Subject Id Economy
, [erg, A] *
[erg, a] * *
[obl, A] * *
, [obl, a] *
Tableau 9: Symmetrical differential case marking in Lezgian (dHM)
I do not analyze symmetrical case variation as differential case marking.
I think the spatial case that is involved in the alternation is semantically
used. Ablative case directly marks nonvolitionality. I will not elaborate on
symmetrical DCM here, as it will be the topic of Chapter 5.
The bidirectional OT account of de Hoop and Malchukov (2008) straight-
forwardly explains different kinds of structural differential case marking.
However, in its present form it cannot account for spatial DCM. The con-
straints Dist and Id are too specific for this purpose. This can easily be
solved by thinking of them only as specific structural instances of the more
general principles distinguishability and identification (which they are in
fact). However, I have some more fundamental problems with their pro-
posal, and with bidirectional OT in general. First, the two principles de-
scribe the semi-bidirectional optimization process rather than that they are
used in it as constraints. Identification of some semantic property is always
necessary if the interpretation check shows that some semantic property is
not recoverable yet. Distinguishability is really the same thing, but then
for argument functions. If the argument structure is not clear, case should
be used. Secondly, bidirectional OT assumes that optimization involves the
comparison of form-meaning pairs, which I find implausible. Meanings do
not come in predefined pairs. For instance, in the last Lezgian example it
is unclear to me why a hearer should consider ‘nonvolitional touching’ as a
meaning alternative for the unmarked form instead of ‘aggressive touching’
or ‘nervously touching’. In my analysis, this meaning alternative is only
there because it is the direct interpretation of the ablative case marked
form. Finally, bidirectional OT is too rigid as it cannot explain variation
in which the unmarked form may sometimes express marked meanings or
the other way around.
Because of these problems, I follow Zeevat (2000) in assuming an asym-
metric account in which optimization procedures go from meaning to form.
Speaking is an active process in which the speaker has control; listening is
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essentially a passive activity. As a result, there is a naturalistic interpreta-
tion of conflicting constraints in language production in the choice between
more economical and more elaborate ways of expression. In contrast to pro-
duction, there is no such interpretation for language interpretation (Zeevat,
2000, 246-248).
Before I introduce my own analysis of differential case marking in Sec-
tion 4.4, I will discuss the semi-bidirectional version of OT in which it is
couched as proposed by de Swart (2007, in prep.).
4.3.2 Recoverability
De Swart (2007, in prep.) shows how the differential use of case mark-
ing is motivated by an assessment by the speaker of the recoverability of
the grammatical roles in the clause. Crucially differently from bidirectional
approaches, in this semi-bidirectional version of OT, there is only one mean-
ing input, for which there are multiple output candidates. If the speaker
thinks that there are enough semantic and/or syntactic cues already for
the hearer to tell the arguments from each other, she will avoid the use of
morphological case for economy reasons.
De Swart (2007) proposes the following constraints:
(29) a. Economy: avoid the use of overt case marking.
b. FaithInt: make use of available morphosyntactic information.
c. Bias: interpret a sentence according to the following regulari-
ties:
(i) As are +animate, +definite, given, pronominal, and/or
topic;
(ii) Os are ±animate, ±definite, ±, ±nominal, and/or com-
ment.
d. Selection: obey the selection restrictions of the verb.
Their working is illustrated in Tableau 10 for the following example from
Malayalam.
Malayalam (Asher & Kumari, 1997, 204)
(30) a. Kappal
ship.nom
tiramaalakaí-e
waves-acc
bheediccu.
split.past
‘The ship broke through the waves.’
b. Tiramaalakaí
waves.nom
kappal-e
ship-acc
bheediccu.
split.past
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‘The waves split the ship.’
As the two sentences in (30) show, ships and waves are both possible sub-
jects of the verb ‘to split’ in Malayalam. To mark the Agent from the
Patient, case is used.
The optimization procedure for example (30-a) in de Swart’s model is
given in Tableau 10. The candidate that is not marked with accusative case
is more economical and therefore, from the speaker’s perspective, preferred.
However, as the interpretation check of this candidate shows, the hearer will
not be able to choose between the two relevant possible meaning candidates.
The less preferred form candidate that makes use of accusative case does
lead to an unambiguous interpretation. Therefore, if the speaker wants to
be understood, she has to choose this form.
Prod: split(ship, waves) Econ Faith Sel Bias
+ a. ship.nom waves.nom split
, b. ship.nom waves.acc split *
Int: a. ship.nom waves.nom Econ Faith Sel Bias
+ (i) split(ship,waves) *
+ (ii) split(waves, ship) *
Int: b. ship.nom waves.acc Econ Faith Sel Bias
+ (i) split(ship,waves) *
(ii) split(waves, ship) *! *
Tableau 10: Evaluation of waves and ships in Malayalam (dS)
Now consider the following example, in which it is possible to use zero
marking.
Malayalam (Asher & Kumari, 1997, 204)
(31) Tiiyy@
fire.nom
kuúil
hut
naSippiccu.
destroy.past
‘Fire destroyed the hut.’
In (31) no accusative case is used. Fires are more likely destroyers than
huts, and huts are more easily destroyed than fires. The optimization pro-
cedure is given in Tableau 11. The difference with the previous optimiza-
tion process is that the more economical form candidate is unambiguous
and therefore can be used. Also the accusative candidate would lead to the
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right interpretation, but this form is dispreferred because of Economy.
Prod: destroy(fire, hut) Econ Faith Sel Bias
,+ a. fire.nom hut.nom destroy
b. fire.nom hut.acc destroy *
Int: a. fire.nom hut.nom Econ Faith Sel Bias
+ (i) destroy(fire,hut) *
(ii) destroy(hut, fire) *! *
Int: b. fire.nom hut.acc Econ Faith Sel Bias
+ (i) destroy(fire,hut) *
(ii) destroy(hut, fire) *! * *
Tableau 11: evaluation of fire and huts (dS)
De Swart (2007) acknowledges the effect of prominence in addition to re-
coverability. Generally case is used independently of ambiguity. With some
exceptions, animate objects in Malayalam receive accusative case marking
-e (32-a), inanimate objects are zero marked (32-b) (Asher & Kumari, 1997,
202).
Malayalam (Asher & Kumari, 1997, 203)
(32) a. Avan
he
pustakam
book
vaayiccu.
read.past
‘He read the book.’
b. Avan
he
oru
a
paSuvin-e
cow-acc
vaaNNi.
buy.past
‘He bought a cow.’
The cow in (32-b) is almost as unlikely an Agent of ‘to buy’ as the book is
of ‘to read’ in (32-a). Nevertheless, the cow is case marked. This is even
more obvious in the next example from Hindi.
Hindi (de Swart, 2007, 127)
(33) Ilaa-ne
lla-erg
bacce-*(ko)
child-P
uthayaa.
lift.perf
‘Ila lifted the/a child.’
Patient marking is obligatory on human objects in Hindi, even if the Agent
is marked with ergative case already.
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Apparently, in these languages a constraint like Prominence → P
marking is active, dictating obligatory marking of prominent arguments.
As I have explained in Chapter 1, this use of case is due to the fossilization
of optimization processes. Instead of checking whether it is really necessary
to use case, the speaker simply uses it for all members of a class. De Swart
(2007, 126-133) illustrates for the Spanish direct object marker a how such
a constraint could have developed out of recoverability. Eventually, the
use of case marking for disambiguation is generalized to the marking of all
prominent arguments, irrespective of ambiguity. Such extension of its use
is not unexpected given the fact that case is a very cheap instrument after
all, as evidenced by languages that do not exhibit differential case marking
(cf. Chapter 2).
The advantage of the semi-bidirectional model of de Swart (2007) is that
recoverability results from the optimization procedure itself and does not
have to be stipulated as a separate constraint like Distinguishability, as
in de Hoop and Malchukov (2008, 2007). Therefore, it is more parsimonious.
In addition, the bidirectional version of OT suffers from an overgeneration
of form-meaning pairs: it is not always the case that there is a marked
form alternative (cf. de Swart, in prep.; for a more elaborate discussion of
different OT models, cf. Beaver and Lee (2004)).
4.4 A General Account of Differential Case
Marking
In the previous sections, we have seen various ways in which the meaning
contribution of case can become redundant. First, case can be redundant
because of the inherent properties of a noun referent. Some entities are
prototypical performers of some functions and therefore the cases that ex-
press these functions need not be used on the nouns that refer to these
entities. According to Comrie (1981, 128), the most natural kind of tran-
sitive construction has an A that is high in animacy and definiteness, and
a P that is low(er) in animacy or definiteness. For example, we have seen
that in Malayalam, an animate object is deemed unexpected and therefore
needs accusative case marking. In the spatial domain, place names are in-
herent grounds and therefore remain unmarked in Tariana, for example.
Secondly, the use of case can be superfluous because of the selection restric-
tions of the verb. For example, in the argument structure of the predicate
‘to read’, books are better readees than readers. The difference between
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these two predictability types is the level of generalization. The first type
corresponds to high or medium levels of generalization, the second type to
low levels (cf. Chapter 2). Slightly different from this second type is global
predictability. In the presence of a human argument, a second, nonhuman
argument is more likely to be the Patient. In the spatial domain, in the
context of a basket that is put somewhere, a table, if involved, probably is
the ground. Whereas the first two types are concerned with the appropri-
ateness of an argument in a given function, this third global type takes into
consideration all arguments and only then assigns functions. Languages
may simultaneously use more than one strategy and distinguishing between
local and global DCM or choosing between explanations in terms of (verbal)
selection criteria or universal animacy hierarchies is not always easy. For
the OT evaluation in my model this does not matter. All three types are
instances of the application of world knowledge (AddW ).
Ignoring symmetrical DCM for the moment (but see Chapter 5), my
account differs from the one proposed by de Hoop and Malchukov (2008)
in that it does not considers form-meaning pairs but takes a single mean-
ing as the input of an optimization procedure (cf. Section 4.3.2). Consider
the example from Manipuri again, repeated in (34) for convenience. Recall
that de Hoop and Malchukov (2008) argue that ergative case is used here
to mark the prominent Agent.
Manipuri (de Hoop & Malchukov, 2008)
(34) a. @y-n@
I-erg
teb@l-d@
table-loc
theNNi.
touched
‘I touched the table (volitionally).’
b. @y
I
teb@l-d@
table-loc
theNNi.
touched
‘I touched the table (involuntarily).’
The object in (34) bears locative case marking. This means that it can
already formally be distinguished from the subject. Since distinguishability
is already satisfied, ergative case can be used to identify prominence features
like volitionality, which is one of the prototypical properties of the Agent
(cf. Chapter 2).
The optimization procedure under my analysis is illustrated in Tableau 12.
Recall the definitions of my constraints from Chapter 1, repeated in (35).
(35) a. FaithL: interpret linguistic signs
b. AddW : use world knowledge to enrich an utterance
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c. Economy: be economical in expressing what you want to say
Any use of case is a violation of Economy, multiple uses are multiple vi-
olations. Because of the locative case marking on the object in (34), there
is no need to mark the subject for distinguishing it from the object. As
illustrated in Tableau 12, both forms will indeed lead to the interpretation
in which the table is the object of the touching event. Identification of
volitionality, however, does need the use of ergative case. It does not (suf-
ficiently) follow from world knowledge that the Agent touched the table on
purpose.
Prod: Touch(e) & Agent(e, I) &
Theme(e, table) & Volitional (I) FaithL AddW Economy
+ a. I-∅, table-loc *
, b. I-erg, table-loc **
Int: a. I-∅, table-loc FaithL AddW Economy
Agent(e, I) & volitional(I) *
+ Agent(e, I) & nonvolitional(I)
Agent(e, table) & volitional(I) * **
Agent(e, table) & nonvolitional(I) * *
Int: b. I-erg, table-loc FaithL AddW Economy
+ Agent(e, I) & volitional(I) *
Agent(e, I) & nonvolitional(I) *
Agent(e, table) & volitional(I) ** **
Agent(e, table) & nonvolitional(I) ** *
Tableau 12: Semi-bidirectional optimization process for Manipuri
As is shown in the first part of Tableau 12, the non-ergative form is
preferred because of Economy. Ergative case is needed to mark the voli-
tionality of the Agent, as this does not follow from world knowledge. The
optimal interpretation of the non-ergative form is ‘I touched table’; that of
the ergative form is ‘I touched the table on purpose’.
This is different from DCM in Fore in which ergative case is needed to
mark the argument structure of the clause.
Fore (Scott, 1978, 115-116)
(36) a. Yaga:-wama
pig-erg
wa´
man
aegu´ye.
3sg.obj.hit.3sg.su.ind
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‘The pig attacks the man.’ not: ‘The man kills the pig.’
b. Yaga:
pig
wa´
man
aegu´ye.
3sg.obj.hit.3sg.su.ind
‘The man kills the pig.’ not: ‘The pig attacks the man.’
First, let’s consider the optimization procedure of (36-a): ‘The pig at-
tacks the man’. If the speaker does not use ergative case on yaga: ‘pig’, the
hearer would get the wrong interpretation. World knowledge would lead
him to believe that the man, not the pig, is the Agent, since humans more
often act on animals than the other way around. Alternatively, and not
illustrated here, such world knowledge may have developed into a rule of
grammar saying that subjects should be higher on the animacy scale than
objects. Then the second interpretation candidate for form a in Tableau 13
would violate FaithL. In both analyses, by using a slightly more elaborate
form, i.e. marking the pig with ergative case, the speaker can overrule this
preference.
Prod: Attack(e) & Agent(e, pig) &
Patient(e, man) FaithL AddW Economy
+ a. pig-∅, man-∅
, b. pig-erg, man-∅ *
Inta: pig-∅, man-∅ FaithL AddW Economy
+ Agent(e, man)
Agent(e, pig) *
Intb: pig-erg, man-∅ FaithL AddW Economy
Agent(e, man) *
+ Agent(e, pig) *
Tableau 13: Semi-bidirectional optimization process for Fore
Now let’s consider the optimization procedure of (36-b): ‘The man kills
the pig’. The crucial difference of Tableau 14 with the previous two tableaux
(and a bidirectional analysis) is that there is one form candidate that is
optimal from both a unidirectional and bidirectional perspective. Both
form candidates lead to the same correct interpretation result, and because
of that the more economical version can be chosen. The addition of ergative
case would not change the meaning and therefore is forbidden by Economy.
In the first two tableaux, however, the use of case was necessary to express a
meaning that would otherwise not be conveyed. Note that in a bidirectional
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analysis, there would be a remaining marked form alternative, i.e. candidate
b, that needs to be combined with some marked meaning.
Prod: Kill(e) & Agent(e, man) &
Patient(e, pig) FaithL AddW Economy
,+ a. man-∅, pig-∅
b. man-erg, pig-∅ *
Inta: man-∅, pig-∅ FaithL AddW Economy
+ Agent(e, man)
Agent(e, pig) *
Intb: man–erg, pig-∅ FaithL AddW Economy
+ Agent(e, man)
Agent(e, pig) * *
Tableau 14: semi-bidirectional optimization process for Fore II
In semi-bidirectional OT, there is only one meaning for the expression
of which in principle only one form is considered. Although differential
may not be the best term to use as it suggests that case marking is used
to differentiate between different meaning inputs, I will stick to it as it
has been firmly established to describe the type of case variation discussed
in this chapter. The speaker checks whether the economical form of her
preference will do to express this meaning. If not, she uses a slightly more
elaborate form that does express the intended meaning.
Recall that de Hoop and Malchukov (2008) explain the observation that
differential subject marking mostly appears in ergative languages and dif-
ferential object marking mostly in accusative languages by the stipulation
of an economy constraint Paip, that says to avoid (case) marking of the
unmarked argument. It is not necessary to adopt such a more specific econ-
omy constraint, however. The voice alternations that it explains also follow
from my account, as I will show now.
Any use of case is a violation of Economy, the use of more than one
case leads to multiple violations. Differential object marking in accusative
languages restricts the number of cases in a transitive construction to one,
just like differential subject marking in ergative languages. Marking weak
subjects in accusative languages by passive constructions and weak objects
in ergative languages by antipassive constructions is the optimal solution
in my model too, under the crucial assumption that verb morphology is a
less serious violation of Economy than case marking. This is illustrated in
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the abstract for accusative languages in Tableau 15, in which I ignore word
order.
Prod: Agent(e, x), Patient(e, y), weak(x) FaithL AddW Economy
a. x-∅ y-acc V **
+ b. x-∅ y-∅ V-passive *
c. x-obly-acc V ****
, d. x-obly-∅ V-passive ***
Inta: x-∅ y-acc V FaithL AddW Economy
+ Agent(e, x), Patient(e, y)
Agent(e, x), Patient(e, y),weak(x) *
Agent(e, y), Patient(e,x) *
Agent(e, y), Patient(e,x),weak(x) * *
Intb: x-∅ y-∅ V-passive FaithL AddW Economy
+ Agent(e, x), Patient(e, y)
Agent(e, x), Patient(e, y),weak(x) *
+ Agent(e, y), Patient(e,x)
Agent(e, y), Patient(e,x),weak(x) *
Intc: x-obl y-acc V FaithL AddW Economy
Agent(e, x), Patient(e, y) *
+ Agent(e, x), Patient(e, y),weak(x)
Agent(e, y), Patient(e,x) **
Agent(e, y), Patient(e,x),weak(x) *
Intd: x-obl y-∅ V-passive FaithL AddW Economy
Agent(e, x), Patient(e, y) *
+ Agent(e, x), Patient(e, y),weak(x)
Agent(e, y), Patient(e,x) **
Agent(e, y), Patient(e,x),weak(x) *
Tableau 15: Voice alternations in accusative languages
If we just use the default transitive form, we get the default transitive
interpretation, as the interpretation of candidate a shows. Therefore, we
cannot use this candidate to express a nonprominent Agent. Note that the
double violation of Economy follows from the assumption that the use of
case marking is less economical than using a passive marker, which only
causes one violation. If we only use a passive marker on the verb without
any case marking on the arguments, we cannot tell the subject from the
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object (interpretation b). Therefore, we cannot use candidate b, which is
optimal from a unidirectional perspective. If we simply use the default
transitive construction but mark the subject with oblique case in addition,
this leads to quadruple violation of Economy. Although it will lead to
the right interpretation, there is a more economical alternative. The fourth
candidate yields a triple violation of Economy. As such, it is the most
economical candidate that expresses the intended meaning. The passive
marker on the verb makes sure that the subject role is correctly understood
as a Patient, the oblique case marker on the Agent marks its weakness.
Thus, there is no need for Paip.
In sum, the semi-bidirectional OT analysis I adopt assumes the opti-
mization procedure of a single meaning input in which different forms are
considered. This procedure has the advantage over bidirectional versions
in that it does not assume, let alone overgenerate, form-meaning pairs and
that recoverability does not have to be stipulated as a constraint but fol-
lows from the procedure itself. Also, in my view it is never just markedness
per se for which another form is used. Instead, the use of a form is always
intrinsically motivated (cf. also Chapter 5).
4.5 Special Types of Structural DCM
In the above, I have discussed a relatively well-known version of DCM in
which the use of structural case depends on inherent prominence properties
of the argument(s). If the speaker thinks that the information case would
convey can be derived from these clues already, case will not be used. How-
ever, there are other information sources that can lead to the predictability
of argument structure, and my model predicts that these can similarly cause
the optional use of case. In this section, I will discuss DCM driven by tense
and structural position.5
4.5.1 DCM by Tense
Case and tense, or case and aspect, seem totally unrelated at first sight, the
first one pertaining to the nominal domain, denoting properties of individ-
uals, the second one to the verbal domain, denoting properties of events.
Case alternations triggered by tense (or aspect), however, are not at all
uncommon. Usually, it is only transitive and unergative clauses in the past
5The first discussion is joint work with Helen de Hoop, the second a spin-off from
joint work with Kees de Schepper, Steven Westelaken, and Helen de Hoop.
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that have an ergative marked subject (Butt & Poudel, 2007; Dixon, 1994;
Trask, 1979, 100). The question, of course, is why. In Lestrade and de Hoop
(2009) we provide an explanation for this type of differential case marking.
We analyze the case-tense interaction in terms a verification procedure for
factuality. That is, we argue that morphological case on a subject or an
object may be required in situations when the hearer is not able to check
the factuality (realization) of the denoted event. In the terminology of this
thesis: The ability to check the factuality of an event makes the use of case
redundant. Before I get to the details of this proposal, I will discuss two
alternative accounts of this interaction.
According to Woolford (2007a), the primary function of an aspect split
is to provide a cheap way of (redundantly) marking aspect. Because the use
of case is only blocked for specific aspect levels, e.g. imperfective aspect, the
mere presence of case marking provides information about aspect. Consider
the following example from Urdu/Hindi:
Urdu/Hindi (Woolford, 2007a)
(37) a. Ram
Ram.nom
gari
car
cala-yi
drive-impf
(hai).
bepres
‘Ram drives a car.’
b. Ram-ne
Ram-erg
gari
car
cala-ta
drive-perf
(hai).
bepres
‘Ram has driven a/the car.’
In (37-a), the use of Ergative case is omitted in the imperfective. As a
result, aspect is redundantly marked.
Technically, Woolford (2007a) explains this alternation using a faithful-
ness constraint IdentPerf(ective) (erg(ative)) says to preserve ergative
case in the perfective aspect. This constraint is ranked higher than the
markedness constraint *erg(ative), which penalizes the use of ergative
case. This latter constraint in its turn is ranked higher than a general erga-
tive faithfulness constraint. This is illustrated in the (unidirectional OT)
tableau below.
In Tableau 16, in the first competition, the highest ranked constraint IdentPerf
(erg) is fatally violated by the zero marked candidate as the ergative case of
the perfective input is not preserved by this candidate. In the second com-
petition, IdentPerf (erg) is vacuously satisfied as it only applies to perfec-
tive environments, whereas the input to this second optimization procedure
is imperfective. As a result, in the second competition the markedness
constraint *erg becomes decisive and the zero marked candidate optimal.
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INPUT: DP-erg IdentPerf (erg) *erg Ident (erg)
(perfective)
+ DP-erg *
DP-∅ *! *
INPUT: DP-erg IdentPerf (erg) *erg Ident (erg)
(imperfective)
DP-erg *!
+ DP-∅ *
Tableau 16: OT analysis of aspectual split in Hindi (Woolford 2007)
Thus, Woolford (2007a) argues for the use of contextually restricted
faithfulness constraints. The expression of ergative case is more important
in the perfective aspect than in the imperfective aspect. As a result, erga-
tive case is correctly predicted only to be preserved in perfective contexts.
However, the constraint IdentPerfective (ergative) (and the ranking of
the constraints) remains unmotivated. It is unclear why the expression of
ergative case is more important in perfective aspect than in imperfective as-
pect. Therefore, in Lestrade and de Hoop (2009), as I will illustrate shortly,
we prefer a more general approach, having context dependent differences
following from different inputs in optimization procedures with general con-
straints.
Poudel (Poudel, 2007; Butt & Poudel, 2007) discusses differential sub-
ject marking in Nepali and Manipuri. Consider the following example:
Nepali (Butt & Poudel, 2007, 3)
(38) a. Mai=le
pron.1sg=erg
sodhpartra
research.paper
lekh-ye-e˜.
write-past-1sg
‘I wrote the/a research paper.’
b. Mai
pron.1sg
sodhpartra
research.paper
lekh-chu.
write-nonpast-1sg
‘I (will) write the/a research paper.’
In (38-a), the subject of a clause with past tense marking bears Ergative
case. In (38-b), the subject of a clause with nonpast tense marking is zero
marked. We find the same pattern in (39).
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Nepali (Butt & Poudel, 2007, 3)
(39) a. Goru=le
bullm.3sg=erg
mut-yo.
urinate-past-m3sg
‘The bull urinated.’
b. Goru
bullm.3sg
mut-cha.
urinate-nonpast-m3sg
‘The bull will urinate.’
However, in Nepali ergative subjects may show up in non-past clauses too.
Poudel argues that this case alternation can be analyzed in terms of a dif-
ference between stage and individual level predication. Ergative case is
used for individual level predication, nominative case is used for stage level
predication. Stage level predication says something about the property of a
referent that only holds momentarily; individual level predicates predicate
an inherent property of a referent. As a result, it is not possible to modify
individual level predicates with temporal adverbial phrases (40-a), which is
perfectly fine for stage level predicates (40-b).
Nepali (Butt & Poudel, 2007)
(40) a. Raam=le
Raam-erg
(#aajaa)
today
angreji
English
jaan-da-cha.
know-impf-nonpast.m.3sg
‘Ram knows English (#today).’ (individual level)
b. Raam
Raam
(aajaa)
today
angreji
English
bod-da-cha.
speak-impf-nonpast.m.3sg
‘Ram will speak English (today).’ (stage level)
Butt and Poudel (2007) show how ergative case is indeed used as ex-
pected for a number of contexts in which stage and individual level predi-
cation behave differently. For example, individual level predication entails
a presuppositional interpretation, whereas stage level predication correlates
with an existential assertion. This is illustrated in (41):
Nepali (Butt & Poudel, 2007)
(41) a. Caalak=le
driver=erg
gaar
˙
i
vehicle
calaau-cha.
drive-nonpast.m.3sg
‘The driver drives the vehicles.’
b. Guru
teacher
gaar
˙
i
vehicle
calaau-cha.
drive-nonpast.m.3sg
‘The teacher is driving/will drive the vehicle.’
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Butt and Poudel (2007, 9) say that in the past the distinction between
stage and individual level predication collapses as in the past everything
necessarily is stage level. But note that on this account, contrary to what
we find, we would expect zero marking in the past. Except for this false
prediction, I think the explanation for the use of ergative case of Poudel is
very interesting and on the right track. In Lestrade and de Hoop (2009)
we propose that it can be put in more general terms, covering both the
aspectual distinction and the distinction between stage and individual level
predication.
Lestrade and de Hoop (2009) argue that a checkability account explains
both differential case marking driven by an aspectual distinction and DCM
driven by a distinction between stage and individual level predication. Be-
cause of Economy, the speaker uses ergative case only if the hearer cannot
determine the argument structure himself already. Since the hearer cannot
check the truth of a state of affairs in the past, he literally has to take the
word of the speaker for it. Propositions that concern the present, on the
other hand, can in principle be observed directly. Because the argument
structure can thus be derived from the here and now, the speaker can be
more economical in her utterance, omitting the case. It is easy to show how
this proposal can account for the examples discussed above.
First, it accounts for the use of ergative case on the subject of individual
level predicates only, as evidenced in Nepali and Manipuri. A stage level
predicate can be evidenced by a hearer. It is however inherently impossi-
ble to check the truth of an individual level predicate, as it is an inherent
property that holds generally. At best, it can be proven wrong. This is
illustrated in the following example.
Manipuri (Poudel, 2007)
(42) a. Imaa=naa
mother=erg
caak
food
thong-i.
cook-real
‘Mother cooks food.’
b. Imaa
mother
caak
food
thong-i.
cook-real
‘Mother is cooking food.’
In (42), it is not possible to use the here and now to check if it is true that
mother generally cooks food. It is however possible to check whether she is
cooking right now.
Secondly, a checkability account explains the use of ergative case in the
past tense.
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Marathi (Pandharipande, 1997)
(43) a. Lili
lili.nom
pust@k
book
vac-@t
read-pres
ahe.
is
‘Lili is reading a book.’
b. Lili-ne
lili-erg
pust@k
book
vac-l-e.
read-past-3sg
‘Lili read a book.’
Again, it is not possible to use the here and now to check whether it is true
that Lili read a book (43-b). It is however possible to check whether see is
doing that right now (43-a).
Moreover, the proposal of Lestrade and de Hoop (2009) also accounts
for the following example where the location is of importance:
Manipuri (Poudel, 2007)
(44) a. Tomba
Tomba
iruja-re
bathe-ant.real
aikhoi
1pl
cat-si
move-hort
‘Tomba has taken a bath; let’s move’
b. Tomba=naa
Tomba=erg
iruja-re
bathe-ant.real
adugaa
and
Imphal
Imphal
cat-le
go-ant.real
‘Tomba has taken a bath and went to Imphal’
Both events of Tomba taking a bath took place in the past. However in
(44-a) the hearer can check the state of affairs himself directly, whereas he
cannot in (44-b).
In addition to the use of ergative case with individual level predicates
and past tense, examples of differential case marking in which evidentiality
plays a role can also be accounted for. Consider the following example:
Georgian (DeLancey, 1981, 648)
(45) a. kaceb-i
men-nom
c
˙
er-en
write
c
˙
eril-s
letter-dat
‘The men are writing a letter.’ (imperfect)
b. kaceb-ma
men-erg
da-c
˙
er-es
aor-write-3pl
c
˙
eril-i
letter-nom
‘The men wrote a letter.’ (aorist)
c. kaceb-s
men-dat
u-c
˙
er-is-t
3rd-write-perf-pl
c
˙
eril-i
letter-nom
‘The men have [apparently] written a letter.’ (perfect)
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As we saw previously, nominative is used if the here and now can be used
to determine the argument structure, whereas ergative is used for the past.
Interestingly however, if the speaker herself is not sure about the truth of
her statement: in case of hear-say, she uses dative case (45-c).
Finally, our proposal can be used to explain differential case marking
that concerns volitionality, illustrated in the following examples.
Urdu (Butt & King, 2004)
(46) a. Nadya=ne
Nadya.F=erg
zu
zoo
ja-na
go-inf
hE.
be-pres.3sg
‘Nadya wants to go to the zoo.’
b. Nadya=ko
Nadya.F=dat
zu
zoo
ja-na
go-inf
hE.
be-pres.3sg
‘Nadya wants/has to go to the zoo.’
The hearer might be able to check the external force that makes Nadya go
to the zoo, but he cannot as easily tell whether Nadya likes going. By using
ergative case, the speaker makes this intention explicit. Similarly, in (47),
the hearer has to take the word of the speaker on the intentions of Tomba
to touch the table.
Manipuri (Poudel, 2007)
(47) a. Tomba=naa
Tomba=erg
teba=daa
table=loc
theng-i.
touch-real
‘Tomba touched the table (intentionally).’
b. Tomba
Tomba.nom
teba=daa
table=loc
theng-i.
touch-real
‘Tomba touched the table (unintentionally).’
The drop of accusative case in imperative constructions can be explained
in the same vein, as Malchukov and de Hoop (to appear) show. The subject
in imperative constructions is clear from the context, since it necessarily is
the addressee who is told to do something. As a result, there is no need to
mark the object as such. Consider the following example from Finnish.
Finnish (Malchukov & de Hoop, to appear)
(48) a. Nainen
woman
na¨wi
saw
poja-n.
boy-acc
‘The woman saw the boy.’
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b. Hae
fetch.imper
poika.
boy
‘Fetch the boy!’
In (48-a), the direct object is marked with accusative case. This marker can
be dropped however if the role of its bearer becomes unambiguously clear
already from the construction it appears in. Although the details of the
analysis of Malchukov and de Hoop (to appear) differ, the general idea is
largely the same. If the meaning contribution case would make is derivable,
case is suspended. Case is only used when necessary.
If checkability was the only factor of importance in differential case
marking along the lines of tense and aspect, we could not account for ex-
amples like the following.
Manipuri (Poudel, 2007)
(49) a. Tomba=naa
tomba=erg
cithi
letter
amaa
one
i-ra-e.
write-ant-real
‘Tomba has written a letter.’ (perfective)
b. Tomba=naa
tomba=erg
cithi
letter
amaa
one
i-i.
write-real
‘Tomba wrote a letter.’ (past)
c. Tomba
tomba
cithi
letter
i-i.
write-real
‘Tomba writes letters.’ (present)
d. Tomba
tomba
cithi
letter
amaa
one
i-gani.
write-irr
‘Tomba will write a letter.’ (future)
Just like it is not possible for the hearer to check the truth of events that
happened in the past, he cannot check the truth of events that are still
going to happen. As a result, we would expect ergative case in both tenses,
which is not borne out. This can be explained by optimization procedures
fossilizing into rules of grammar, as explained in the introduction chapter.
According to such a rule, Agents of events in the past have to be marked
with ergative case.
In sum, Lestrade and de Hoop (2009) argue that the differential use of
ergative case can be explained by checkability. If its meaning contribution
cannot be derived, ergative case is used. But if there are enough clues to
the argument structure already, ergative case does not have to be used.
Differently from most other case accounts, we propose that also situational
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information like the here and now can be taken into consideration for this
decision. Similarly, Svorou (1993, 6-7) notes that we can use more general
expressions if we share the here and now, and talk about entities in the
context. A higher degree of explicitness is necessary in cases in which we
talk about situations that are removed from the here and now temporally
and spatially.
4.5.2 DCM by Structural Position
In this section I will show that DCM sometimes is dependent on the (struc-
tural) position of its potential bearer.
Yang and van Bergen (2007) show that in Mandarin Chinese scrambled
objects in principle are marked with ba. Mandarin Chinese has an SVO
basic word order. When the word order changes, the argument functions
can no longer be told from the relative position with respect to the verb
and ba is used to distinguish subjects from objects. (In postverbal posi-
tion, ba is never used.) Both definiteness and animacy DCM of scrambled
objects. First, the marker can be dropped if the argument function can be
told from the animacy of the referents. Animate objects require ba mark-
ing. Independently from this animacy principle, lexically indefinite NPs are
obligatory marked with ba. In principle, the preverbal position in Chinese
requires a specific and definite reading for its filler. The case marker ba is
used to license indefinite objects to occur in preverbal position.
The two principles explain variation in case marking that is otherwise
incomprehensible. Consider the following example:
Mandarin Chinese (Yang & van Bergen, 2007, 1630)
(50) Ta
He
*(ba)
BA
zhe-tiao
this-cl
she
snake
dasi
hit.dead
le.
prt
‘He killed this snake.’
Although the scrambled object meets the prominence requirements of the
preverbal position (it is definite because of which ba does not have to be
used), it is is animate, making case marking obligatory. Now consider
example (51).
(51) Ta
He
*(ba)
BA
yi-ge
one-cl
pingguo
apple
chi
eat
le.
prt
‘He ate an apple.’
Although the scrambled object is inanimate (because of which ba does not
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have to be used), it does not meet the prominence requirements of the
preverbal position (it is indefinite), making case marking obligatory again.
Finally consider Example (52).
(52) Ta
He
(ba)
BA
na-ge
that-cl
pingguo
apple
chi
eat
le.
prt
‘He ate that apple.’
Because the scrambled object is inanimate, ba does not have to be used to
distinguish the subject from the object. Also, because the scrambled object
is definite, it meets the prominence requirements of the topic position, and
ba is unnecessary. Nevertheless, because the object has scrambled, ba is
optional.
Thus, Yang and van Bergen (2007) conclude that to understand differen-
tial case marking in Chinese, one needs to take into consideration syntactic
position too. If the argument structure can be told from SVO word order,
no case marking is necessary. If the verb does not separate the subject from
the object and animacy does not tell them apart, case marking has to be
used. In addition, if the scrambled object does not meet the definiteness
criteria of the preverbal position, case marking has to be used too.
In the remainder of this section, I will discuss a number of genetically
unrelated languages in which the use of case is sensitive to position. As I
will show, in each case, the use of case can be understood as being subject
to an economy principle.
Mu¨ller (2002) argues that free word order is a prerequisite for morpho-
logical case, rather than the other way around as it is often claimed, because
(i) only languages that have free word order have morphological case (not
the other way around) and (ii) not all objects that stay in base position
receive morphological case. An example of the second observation is given
in (53).
Korean (Mu¨ller, 2002, translations are mine, SL)
(53) a. Suna-ka
Suna-nom
nuku(-luˆl)i
who(-acc)
manna-ss-ni?
meet-past-Q
‘Who did Suna meet?’
b. Nuku?*(-luˆl)i
who(-acc)
Suna-ka
Suna-nom
ti
ti
manna-ss-ni?
meet-past-Q
‘Suna met who?’
As illustrated in (53-a), in Korean, a direct wh-object may or may not
bear a morphological case in situ, that is, directly in front of the verb. In
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contrast, it must bear morphological case when scrambled, as illustrated by
the ungrammaticality of its omission in (53-b).
Mu¨ller explains these findings by a constraint Case that says that “a
DP at the edge of vP has morphological Case”, in which edge is defined
as the outer specifier of XP. My proposal can be seen as the motivation
behind such a constraint, making its stipulation superfluous indeed. If
its preverbal position already informs about the syntactic function of a
constituent, case marking is optional. If the position of a constituent does
not give information about its syntactic function, case can be used to do
so.
Consider the following example from Warlpiri. In this language, case
concord only takes place if the adjective is nonadjacent to the noun.
Warlpiri (Moravcsik, 2009)
(54) a. Tjantu
dog
wire-ngki
big-erg
tji
me
yalkunu.
bit
‘The big dog bit me.’
b. Tjantu-ngki
dog-erg
tji
me
yalkunu
bit
wire-ngki.
big-erg
‘The big dog bit me.’
In the next tableau, I illustrate the optimization process for (54-b). The
use of case is dependent on the position of the constituents it marks. If
the function or relation of this constituent is made sufficiently clear by
its position already, case is unnecessary and therefore omitted because of
Economy.
Prod: ‘the big dog bit me’ FaithL AddW Economy
+ a. dog-erg me bit big
, b. dog-erg me bit big-erg *
Inta: dog-erg me bit big FaithL AddW Economy
+ ‘the big dog bit me’
+ ‘the dog bit the big me’
Intb: dog-erg me bit big-erg FaithL AddW Economy
‘the big dog bit me’
+ ‘the dog bit the big me’ *
Tableau 17: Optimization procedure for Warlpiri example b
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Without the use of ergative case on the adjective, it is not clear to which
nominal it belongs. By the use of ergative case, the speaker makes sure that
the hearer does get the right interpretation.
The intuitive motivation for this variation in case marking is very simple
(see Lestrade, de Schepper, Westelaken, & de Hoop, 2009, for a slightly
different argumentation). If the relation between a verb and its object, or
more generally, a head and its dependent, is not clear from word order,
the speaker should use case to express this relation. If an object stands in
canonical object position, using morphological case to mark it as such would
be redundant, which is penalized by Economy. Only when the objecthood
cannot be told from the word order, morphological case is used.
Note that this idea squares nicely with the distinction between strong
and weak case, as proposed by de Hoop (1996). Weak case is seen as a
structural default case, establishing a direct relation between a structural
position and the type of case. Objects that bear weak case may not move
from their original (structural) position. Only strong case is inherited under
movement, and therefore only moved NPs that are marked with strong case
can survive the case filter.
In Turkish, in addition to structural position, the use of case is sensitive
to specificity. Specific objects, that is, objects whose reference is presup-
posed by the speaker, bear accusative case; non-specific objects don’t. Only
accusative case marked objects can scramble. Zero marked objects have to
remain in situ, directly adjacent to the verb, as illustrated in (55).
Turkish (Kornfilt, 2003, 127-128)
(55) a. Ahmet
Ahmet
du¨n
yesterday
aks¸am
evening
yag-tıgˇ-ım
make-f.nom-1sg
s¸ahane
fantastic
bir
a
pasta-yı
cake-acc
ye-di.
eat-past
‘Ahmed ate a fantastic cake which I made yesterday evening.’
b. Ahmet
Ahmet
s¸ahane
fantastic
(bir)
a
pasta-yı
cake-acc
du¨n
yesterday
aks¸am
evening
ye-di.
eat-past
‘Ahmed ate a fantastic cake [+specific] yesterday evening.’
c. Ahmet
Ahmet
du¨n
yesterday
aks¸am
evening
s¸ahane
fantastic
bir
a
pasta
cake
ye-di.
eat-past
‘Ahmed ate a fantastic cake yesterday evening.’
d. *Ahmet
Ahmet
(bir)
a
pasta
cake
du¨n
yesterday
aks¸am
evening
ye-di.
eat-past
Intended: ‘Ahmed ate (a) cake [–specific] yesterday evening.’
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In (55-a), the specific object is case marked and directly adjacent to the
verb. In (55-b), the case marked object scrambled. In (55-c), the nonspe-
cific object remains caseless. As (55-d) shows, this unmarked object cannot
scramble. Thus, objects that do not bear object case are confined to the im-
mediate left of the verb, while objects that do bear accusative case marking
may move around (Kornfilt, 2003, 127). In my analysis, this is explained
by the possibility to tell the syntactic function of the case marked object
by its case.
Finally, in Hungarian, we find the same kind of variation. Consider the
following example:
Hungarian (Nikolaeva, 2002)
(56) a. Pe´ter-nek
Peter-dat
a
the
kalap-ja
hat-3sg
‘Peter’s hat’
b. (a)
the
Pe´ter
Peter
kalap-ja
hat-3sg
‘Peter’s hat’
When the possessor is external to the DP dative marking is used. This
marking is omitted when the possessor appears prenominally. Again, the
relation between the possessor and the possessee is clear from word order
in (56-b), but less so in (56-a), hence the case marking in the latter.
In conclusion to this section, also word order can be used as a clue to
the argument structure of the clause, because of which case marking can be
suspended.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, it was shown how various instances of differential case mark-
ing (structural and spatial, subject and object, asymmetrical and symmet-
rical, local and global, and DCM by markedness, prominence, ambiguity,
tense, and structural position) can all be straightforwardly accounted for
in the same semi-bidirectional OT model, using the same small number of
constraints. In this model, the speaker checks if the utterance of her pref-
erence is sufficiently informative. If not, she resorts to a more elaborate
form.
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The Structural Use of
Spatial Case
I discuss the use of spatial case where one would have expected
structural case. I argue that the choice of spatial case in the
argument domain is semantically motivated. By forcing a con-
stituent with a human referent into a spatial case construction,
the argument has to give up some properties that are especially
incompatible with ground meaning. Thus, by using a spatial
case on an argument, the speaker suspends animacy inferences
like volitionality and sentience.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss the use of spatial case as an alternative for struc-
tural case. At first sight, such use is unexpected as structural case already
is the perfect strategy to express argument structure. As can be expected
then, the use of a more elaborate alternative is semantically motivated.
Consider the following example:
Guugu Yimidhirr (Haviland, 1979, 125)
(1) a. Ngayu
1sg.nom
galga
spear.abs
nhanu
2sg.gen.abs
dumbi.
break.past
‘I broke your spear [on purpose].’
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b. ngayu
1sg.nom
ngamu-ugal
mother-ades
nhin.gaalngga-y
sit.redup-past
biu-u(y)nh-gu.
hip-super-gu
‘I was sitting with my mother on/by [her] hip.’
c. Ngadhun.gal
1sg.ades
galga
spear.abs
nhanu
2sg.gen.abs
dumbi-idhi.
break-ref.past
‘I broke your spear [by accident].’
In (1-a) structural case is used. In (1-b) adessive case is used properly, to
express spatial meaning. In (1-c) this spatial case is used instead of struc-
tural case. This change in form goes together with a change in meaning,
the breaking being done purposefully in (1-a) but accidentally in (1-c).
I will argue that the use of spatial case in the structural domain is to
cancel animacy inferences or expected argument properties. For example,
Agents are expected to act on purpose and to cancel this expectation, spa-
tial case is used in (1). The choice for spatial case is semantically motivated
and does not simply follow from markedness principles for which any non-
structural case would do. I will argue that spatial case inherently signals
inanimacy.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, I will first show
that spatial case is more generally used for non-spatial purposes and that
there are different types of its use in the structural domain. In Section 5.3 I
will argue that spatial constructions are used to cancel animacy inferences
and to mark demoted Agents. Among other things, I will account for the
fact that it is mostly subjects that are involved in this alternation. In
Section 5.4, I will show how the different types of the structural use of
spatial case can all be understood as instances of paradigmatic selection. I
will end with a short discussion of localist grammar in Section 5.5.
5.2 The Extended Use of Spatial Case
Spatial language is not only used for spatial purposes. A very common
extension of spatial markers is to the domain of time. According to Heine
and Kuteva (2002, 205) this is even one of the most frequently employed
conceptual metaphors. An example from English is given in (2):
(2) a. Lucas is still lying in bed.
b. In a few days, he will fly to Australia.
In (2-a) in is used to express spatial meaning. In (2-b) the same morpheme
is used to express temporal meaning. In both cases, some event or event
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participant is located. In the first case, it is located in space; in the second
case, it is located in time. According to Haspelmath (1997), such spa-
tial expression of temporal notions is extremely widespread in the world’s
languages, being limited neither genetically (e.g. to Indo-European), nor
geographically (e.g. to Europe), nor typologically (e.g. to languages with
SVO word order).
Another frequently attested extension of spatial meaning is the expres-
sion of possession (Heine & Kuteva, 2002; Stassen, 2009), illustrated in (3).
Agul (Ganenkov, Maisak, & Merdanova, 2008, 174)
(3) Za-q
I-post
Üu
two
rusˇ=na
daughter.abs=and
sa
one
gada
son.abs
qa-a.
post.be-pres
‘I have two daughters and one son.’
The literal translation of this example would be ‘two daughters and a son
are behind me’, or more generally for such constructions ‘X is at Y’. Such
a spatial relation is argued to be at the core of the semantics of possession
by many authors (in addition to being in control; see Stassen, 2009, 11-12).
For more complete overviews of language-specific extensions of spatial
cases, I refer to the studies of Creissels (2009a) on Northern Akhvakh and
Forker (2010) on Tsezic.
The use of spatial case beyond the expression of spatial meaning can be
motivated both by its form and meaning. As explained in Chapter 2, eco-
nomical forms like morphological case acquire new meanings and functions
more easily than costly forms (Zipf, 1965). Since spatial case is among the
most frequent expressions, it is hardly a surprise that it is used for other
meanings too.
In addition however, spatial meaning is a factor of relevance in the exten-
sion of its use. Spatial reasoning is often thought to be at the basis of our
thinking (see, among others, Anderson, 1971; Jackendoff, 1990; O’Keefe,
1996; Haspelmath, 1997; Talmy, 2000). From an evolutionary perspective,
we needed some understanding of the space around us way before we started
thinking, for example, in terms of possession. This does not necessarily
mean that we understand abstract meaning in spatial terms. For example,
Jackendoff (1983, 188-189) acknowledges the use of spatial concepts for or-
ganizing domains that lack perceptual counterparts. However, according to
Jackendoff, there is a more abstract, more general organization that can be
applied to any field. The spatial field is primary only (if at all) because of
the strong nonlinguistic cognitive support (Jackendoff, 1983, 210). In con-
trast, Haspelmath (1997, 3) argues that, for the temporal domain, spatial
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thinking is really basic. Cross-linguistically, time expressions can be shown
to be based on spatial ones by synchronic data. Haspelmath concludes that
this cannot be explained by a general abstract organization, only by the
use of spatial metaphor (in which a metaphor is understood as a conceptu-
alization of target domain in terms of a source domain; Haspelmath, 1997,
140). Whereas Haspelmath is concerned with the temporal domain only,
localist theories make a similar claim more generally. In localist theories,
all thinking is based on concrete (spatial) metaphor (Anderson, 1971, 2009;
Croft & Cruse, 2004). Below, I will show how the mapping between struc-
tural arguments and specific directionality distinctions can be explained by
localist reasoning. Nevertheless, I choose to remain neutral in the discus-
sion about the exact nature of spatial conceptualization. In either case,
spatial meanings are among the most frequently mentioned sources in The
world lexicon of grammaticalization (Heine & Kuteva, 2002), which summa-
rizes the most salient cross-linguistic generalizations on grammaticalization
paths. Heine and Kuteva (2002, 5) neutrally summarize their findings as
follows: “[U]nderlying human behavior there appears to be a strategy of lin-
guistic processing whereby more abstract functions are expressed in terms
of forms of concrete concepts.”
Surprisingly, spatial language is also used in a domain in which there
already is a perfect alternative expression. That is, sometimes spatial case
is used instead of structural case. We can discern four types of such exten-
sions of its primary use. The first is the obligatory use of spatial case on
the arguments of specific classes of verbs. For example, according to Forker
(2010), the subject argument of ‘to find’ in Hinuq is marked with spatial
case, as illustrated in (4).
Hinuq [Tsezic; Nakh-Daghestanian] (Forker, 2010)
(4) Hadze-qo
they.obl-ad
hago
this
uzˇi
boy(I)
∅-asˇi-yo
I-find-prs
gom.
be.neg
‘They do not find the boy.’
In (4), the argument hadze-qo is marked with a spatial case that normally
denotes Place. In the English translation however, it is just a transitive
subject, having the form they. Other examples of such obligatory use are
arguments of verbs of speech, perception and emotion in different languages,
like illustrated for Tsez and its English translation in (5).
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Tsez [Tsezic; Nakh-Daghestanian] (Forker, 2010)
(5) K’et’u-ňor-no
cat-superl-and
b-ezu-n
III-look-cvb
zir-a
fox(III).obl-erg
Pesir-no.
ask-uwpast
‘The fox looked at the cat and asked.’
The object of ‘to look’ in (5) is marked with superlative, standardly used
to express motion to a surface. Here, English behaves alike, also marking
the object argument as an oblique. As discussed in Section 2.4, cross-
linguistically the standard transitive construction that makes use of struc-
tural case is generally used with prototypical transitive verbs only (Tsunoda,
1985; Malchukov, 2005). Less prototypical transitive verbs assign oblique
case to their arguments. In principle, my account only motivates the use of
spatial case in these alternations. However, in Section 5.5, I will discuss a
proposal that actually motivates the directionality meaning of this spatial
marker.
Secondly, the use of spatial case can be obligatory in causative construc-
tions. This is illustrated for Guechua in (6).
Imbabura Guechua [Quechua] (Rice & Kabata, 2007)
(6) a. Maria
Maria
n˜uca-man
1sg-all
pata-ta
potato-acc
yanu-chi-rca.
cook-caus-3.past
‘Maria let me cook potatoes.’
b. Wasi-man-mi
house-all-validator
ri-ju-ni.
go-prog-1sg
‘I am going to the house.’
Normally, structural case is used for the arguments of the predicate to cook.
In the causative construction in (6-a) however, the allative case is used,
which normally expresses Goal meaning, as (6-b) shows.
Thirdly, the use of spatial case on the arguments of a given verb can
be optional. This is illustrated in the by now familiar example from Lezgian:
Lezgian (Haspelmath, 1993, 292)
(7) a. Zamira.di
Zamira.erg
get’e
pot
xana.
break.aor
‘Zamira broke the pot.’
b. Zamira.di-waj
Zamira-abl
get’e
pot
xana.
break.aor
‘Zamira broke the pot accidentally/involuntarily.’
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In (7-b) the ablative, normally expressing Source, is used instead of ergative
case. As can be expected from the discussion in the previous chapter, the
change in form goes together with a change in meaning. The Agent in (7-a)
broke the pot, but she did this accidentally in (7-b).
Finally, spatial case can be used on arguments that are demoted. In a
standard transitive clause, the Agent is subject. In a passive construction,
the objects becomes the subject and the Agent an oblique, if expressed at
all. In many languages, this demoted Agent is marked with a spatial form,
as illustrated for West Greenlandic in (8-a).
West Greenlandic (Fortescue, 1984, 212)
(8) a. Qimmi-mit
dog-abl
aupan-niqar-puq.
attack-passive.3s-indic
‘He was attacked by the dog.’
b. Nuum-mit
Nuuk-abl
‘from Nuuk’
As (8-b) shows, the proper use of this marker is to express Source.
The four types of extension of the use of spatial case seem to differ in
the meaning contribution that spatial case makes. In the first type, it may
seem hard to speak of a meaning contribution, spatial case being the only
choice. We can only compare different construction pairs in the latter two
types, in which spatial case is used as an alternative form on an argument
that is otherwise assigned structural case. In (7), volitionality is canceled,
whereas in (8) prominence is lowered. In spite of these apparent differences
between the four types, I will argue that all these uses of spatial case can
be explained in the same terms of paradigmatic selection.
In the next section, I will first discuss the optional use of spatial case
in the structural domain, which will be explained by the suspension of
structural inferences.
5.3 The Suspension of Structural Expecta-
tions
In standard transitive clauses, structural case is used to express the argu-
ment structure. This is a perfectly viable strategy, encoding the argument
structure unambiguously and economically. In principle then, there is no
need to use spatial language here. So why would languages use spatial
182
5.3 The Suspension of Structural Expectations
case instead of structural case? In addition to an explanation in terms of
markedness, as for example proposed by (Ackerman & Moore, 2001; Kittila¨,
2009; Hopper & Thompson, 1980; Malchukov & de Swart, 2009; de Hoop
& Malchukov, 2007, 2008; Ganenkov, 2006; Ganenkov et al., 2008), I want
to argue that the use of spatial case as an alternative for structural case is
semantically motivated. In my account, semantic markedness and formal
markedness naturally go together. If some meaning is unexpected (seman-
tic markedness), the speaker needs to make this meaning explicit (formal
markedness) to make sure the hearer will get the right interpretation. Cru-
cially differently from the other approaches, I propose that this marked form
is not just more marked (which would assume predefined meaning pairs),
but inherently expresses the meaning aspects involved. By the use of spatial
case prototypical argument properties are suspended. Note however that
spatial case is not the only way to do so. Other markers that prototypically
involve inanimate performers can have a similar function. For example, the
use of instrumental case for demoted Agents, illustrated for Russian in (9),
is attested in different, nonrelated languages.
Russian (Palancar, 2002, 4)
(9) a. On
he
byl
was
prinjat
received.m
minstr-om.
minister-instr:m
‘He was received by the minister.’
b. Ona
she
udarila
hit.f
ego
him:acc
palk-oj.
stick-instr:f
‘She hit him with a stick.’
In this sense, I fully agree with Palancar (2002) who warns against the
overgeneralization of a spatial link between Agent and Source as proposed
by localist grammar, to be discussed below. Using spatial markers is only
one way to suspend animacy expectations, other markers that are typically
used with inanimates may serve this purpose as well.
I will first propose an account for case alternations that concern voli-
tionality. Subsequently, I will explain the use of spatial case for demoted
arguments.
5.3.1 Disabled Agents
Consider the following example from Agul in which adelative case is used
instead of ergative case.
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Agul (Ganenkov et al., 2008, 177)
(10) a. Baw.a
mother.erg
nek¯
milk.abs
at¯uzu-ne
pour.out-pst
‘Mother poured out the milk.’
b. Baw.a-fas
mother.erg-adel
nek¯
milk.abs
at¯uzu-ne
pour.out-pst
‘Mother accidentally spilled the milk.’
In the standard transitive construction (10-a), the Agent is volitional; in
the spatial argument construction (10-b), the Agent is unintentionally doing
something. By the use of adelative case, normally expressing Source, the
volitionality expectation for Agents is canceled.
Typically, such volitionality alternations concern Agents. This follows
logically from Dowty’s (1991) argument selection principle and proto-properties.
The argument selection principle states that in predicates with a grammat-
ical subject and object, the argument for which the predicate entails the
greatest number of Proto-Agent properties will be lexicalized as the sub-
ject, the argument having the greatest number of Proto-Patient properties
will be lexicalized as the direct object of the predicate (Dowty, 1991, 576).
Dowty’s lists of semantically independent proto-properties are repeated in
(11) and (12):1
(11) Proto-Agent properties
a. volitional involvement in the event or state
b. sentience (and/or perception)
c. causing an event or change of state in another participant
d. movement (relative to the position of another participant)
e. (independent existence)
(12) Proto-Patient properties
a. undergoes change of state
b. incremental theme
c. causally affected by another participant
d. stationary relative to movement of another participant
e. (no independent existence)
Note that according to these proto-properties, only typical As are humans.
Animate properties like volitionality and sentience are only entailed for
the Agent, not for the Patient. Therefore, if one wants to cancel animacy
1Some parts of this chapter have been discussed in the previous chapters already.
However, I think the different context warrants some repetition.
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expectations like volitionality, one needs a Proto-Agent to do so. There are
no animacy features to cancel for Proto-Patients. The use of spatial case
instead of structural case is thus mostly expected for subjects.
However, instead of entailments from Proto-Agent properties to humans
there also are inferences from humans to Proto-Agent properties. According
to Primus (2010) animacy is (unilaterally) implied by most of the Proto-
Agent properties. Only animates can be volitional and sentient. She ex-
plains the reverse inference from Agents to animacy by abductive reasoning
(see Levinson, 2000b, discussed in Chapter 1). By pragmatic inferenc-
ing, the informativity of the utterance is increased by strengthening the
meaning to a stereotypical exemplification. For example, unless explicitly
marked otherwise, if a human is doing something, (s)he probably is doing
so volitionally. For Primus (2010), this abductive reasoning explains why
animacy is used as a cue for agentivity in language performance. Human
arguments are strengthened with Proto-Agent inferences. If an argument
is human, (s)he will probably act volitionally, on purpose, etc. Now, why
is spatial case used to cancel these? Grounds prototypically are inanimates
(animates inconveniently walking away and therefore being rather useless
for localization purposes) and spatial case inherently expresses grounds. I
propose that spatial case is used to cancel Proto-Agent properties precisely
because of the incompatibility of the properties of ground and Agent. Pro-
totypical grounds are not sentient and cannot act purposefully. As I will
argue below, by using spatial case on an Agent, the speaker intends to reach
a compromise between Agent and ground properties.
As discussed in Section 4.1, according to Aristar (1996, 1997), cases
exhibit typing behavior. Spatial cases preferably combine with inanimates
and are dispreferred with human referents. On the other hand, other cases,
like dative, may prefer humans and disprefer nouns with inanimate refer-
ents. This is illustrated in the following example from Kuvi.
Kuvi (Aristar, 1996, 215)
(13) a. a¯yana-ki
woman-dat
‘to the woman’
b. ilu
house
ta-ki
P-dat
‘to the house’
c. a¯yani
woman.gen
taï-a
P-loc
‘at the woman’s place’
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d. ilut-a
house-loc
‘at the house’
One of the strategies that languages may apply if an object does not fit
the selection criteria of its case frame is to use a bridging morpheme. In
(13-b), the inanimate ‘house’ does not fit the selection criteria for the dative
case. Therefore, a bridging morpheme ta is used. This bridging morpheme
is not necessary for a typical dative case argument like ‘woman’ (13-a).
The other way around, humans are nontypical arguments of a locative case
and therefore a bridging morpheme, the adposition taï, is used in (13-c).
Clearly, this is not necessary for locative case arguments that are typical
places (13-d).
De Hoop and de Swart (2009) argue that these bridging morphemes
are really the overt expression of a type shift operation (see Partee, 1986).
Combining spatial case with a human NP results in a type mismatch which
is resolved by a type shift. Whereas humans are animate entities ea, spatial
cases select for inanimate entities ei. Bridging morphemes are of type 〈ei,
ea〉. They take an inanimate entity and map that onto an animate entity,
or take an animate entity and map that onto an inanimate one. By using
a bridging morpheme, the animacy features of some entity change in such
a way that it fits its function. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1.2
. . .
ei 〈ei,. . . 〉
spatial case
ea 〈ea,ei〉
bridging morpheme
Figure 5.1: Type shifting (predicate modification)
The bridging morpheme in Figure 5.1 takes an animate entity and turns
it into an inanimate one. The argument now fits the selection criteria
for spatial case, a function 〈ei,. . . 〉 which takes an inanimate entity (and
generally maps that onto a predicate or argument modifier). In addition to
such overt marking of a type shifting operation, arguments may undergo a
2I treat constituents like ‘the woman’ and ‘the house’ as being of type e here.
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type shift covertly. Then, a function forces its argument to give or take up
some properties without this being explicitly encoded (see Partee, 1986).
As an alternative to a complete type shift, I propose that a type mis-
match may result in a compromise. As discussed above, most Proto-Agent
properties are restricted to humans, which are type incongruent with spa-
tial (case) constructions. Humans are out of place in combination with spa-
tial case, which normally combines with inanimates and expresses ground
meaning. However, instead of changing completely from an animate to an
inanimate entity, the animate entity only gives up some of its most salient
animacy features, most probably the ones that are inappropriate in a spa-
tial function. Thus, by using a spatial case on a constituent with a human
referent, the speaker suspends standard Proto-Agent implicatures that are
especially inappropriate for grounds.
Most examples that I will discuss below to illustrate this type of ex-
tended use of spatial case come from Nakh-Daghestanian languages. The
only examples I found from other languages are from Guugu Yimidhirr,
Imbabura Guechua (discussed above), and Finnish (to be discussed below).
On the basis of their genealogical, geographical, and typological unrelated-
ness, however, I expect that there are more languages with this strategy;
the pattern simply is not well-described yet.
Ganenkov et al. (2008) discuss noncanonical Agent encoding in the
Nakh-Daghestanian language Agul. Agul is an ergative language with SOV
basic word order. Standardly, the Agent of a transitive verb (A) is marked
with ergative case (14-a), the Patient of a transitive verb (P) and subject
of an intransitive verb (S) are unmarked:
Agul (Ganenkov et al., 2008, 173)
(14) a. Dad-a
father-erg
guni
bread
Put’nu-ne
eat-past
‘Father ate bread.’
b. Ze
my
dad
father
mask¯aw.di-as
Moscow-inel
Xab
back
aldarkunaa.
return
‘My father has come back from Moscow.’
The standard spatial use of the adelative case is to express source meaning:
Agul (Ganenkov et al., 2008, 177)
(15) Cil.i-fas
wall-adel
hat¯-u
take.away-imp
cˇuwal!
sack.abs
‘Take away the sack from the wall!’
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This adelative case can be used instead of ergative case to mark what
Ganenkov et al. (2008) call non-canonical agents. They discern different
types and subtypes of non-canonical Agent constructions, of which the pre-
cise labels are of no importance here. All of these variants have in common
that Proto-Agent properties are canceled.
Since the use of spatial case cancels animacy entailments, there must
be an animacy entailment in the standard transitive construction to cancel.
But also, the resulting reading must be possible. Whereas it is easily con-
ceivable that someone spills milk accidentally, it is much harder to think
of someone accidentally writing a letter. It is not possible to use a spatial
argument here, as illustrated in (16):
Agul (Ganenkov et al., 2008, 179)
(16) a. Rusˇ.a
girl.erg
k’eˇZ
letter.abs
lik’i-ne
write-past
‘The girl wrote a letter.’
b. *Rusˇ.a-fas
girl.adel
k’eˇZ
letter.abs
lik’i-ne
write-past
‘The girl accidentally wrote a letter.’
It is possible again to mark reduced animacy on the Agents of such verbs
in causative constructions:
Agul (Ganenkov et al., 2008, 188)
(17) Baw.a
mother.erg
gada.ji-fas
boy-adel
sˇurpa
soup.abs
Put’as-s
eat-inf
q’u-ne
do-past
‘Mother made the boy eat the soup.’
In (17), the independence of the subordinate Agent is restricted by the
Agent of the matrix verb, which is marked by spatial case.
Ganenkov et al. (2008) argue that the causative construction with spa-
tial case is only allowed for subordinate verbs denoting controlled actions
or human causees. This is precisely what we would expect if spatial case
is used to cancel Proto-Agent properties, in this case, something like inde-
pendent involvement. Other causative constructions maintain ergative case
in the subordinate clause. If the causative construction with spatial case is
possible, Ganenkov et al. (2008, 188) note a semantic contrast for humans
between the causative construction in which a structural case is used and
that in which spatial cases are used. Whereas the use of the ergative case
leaves the opportunity for the autonomous acting of the causee open, the
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use of spatial case reduces its indepence of acting and underlines its sub-
ordination to the superordinate Agent. Thus, the choice of spatial case is
motivated by the goal of canceling Proto-Agent properties.
All examples of noncanonical Agent marking in Agul discussed by Ganenkov
et al. (2008) can be understood in this light. For example, in (18), the spa-
tial case marked Agent deliberately but mistakenly takes part in the event,
which is also a case of reduced agentivity.
Agul (Ganenkov et al., 2008, 183)
(18) a. Dad.a-fas
Father-adel
kurusˇk¯a
mug.abs
arPu-b
breakmsd
xu-ne.
become-past
‘Father (deliberately) broke the cup.’
(it turned out later that another cup should have been broken,
but father did not know that)
b. Za-fas
I-adel
usˇu-b
go-msd
xu-ne
become-past
ge-wur.i-n
that-pl-gen
Xul.a-s.
house-dat
‘I went to their place.’
(I knew that I should not visit them, but it so happened that
I had to do this)
Note that this construction exclusively allows agentive verbs, which entail
volitionality for the Agent. This is illustrated by the ungrammaticality of
the next examples:
Agul (Ganenkov et al., 2008, 183-184)
(19) a. *Gada.ji-fas
boy-adel
alurq’u-b
fall.down-msd
xu-ne.
become-past
‘It so happened that the boy fell down.’ (although he was not
supposed to do so)
b. *Rusˇ.a-fas
girl-adel
p¯adark¯a
gift.abs
agu-b
see-msd
xu-ne.
become-past
‘It so happened that the girl saw a gift.’
As (19) shows, it is not possible to use adelative case on the subjects of a
verb like ‘to fall’ or ‘to see’. These predicates do not entail volitionality for
their subject and therefore volitionality cannot be canceled.
The only construction in which it is slightly more difficult to claim that
animacy entailments are canceled is the possibilitive construction. This
construction may express both participant internal (20) and participant ex-
ternal possibility (21).
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Agul (Ganenkov et al., 2008, 186)
(20) Ze
my
gada.ji-fas
son-adel
was-s
you.sg-dat
ku¨mek
help.abs
ag’a-s
do-inf
xa-se.
become-fut
‘My son will be able to help you.’
(21) Ilsan.di-fas
person-adel
allah.t¯.i-qaj
Allah.comit
dua-s
compete-.inf
xa-fe-wa?
become-gener-q
‘Is it possible (permitted) for a human being to compete with Al-
lah?’
In these examples, it is the actuality of the event rather than the animacy
entailments for the Agent that is modified. The use of spatial case here
probably is an extension of the use described above. Indeed, this con-
struction is only allowed with animates, suggesting that it has to do with
decreased agentivity originally.
According to Ganenkov et al. (2008), canonical agentivity is encoded
by ergative case, whereas adelative covers an additional, coherent semantic
domain of noncanonical agentivity. They explicitly say that spatial cases in
these noncanonical Agent constructions “do not seem to show clear traces of
original locative semantics” (Ganenkov et al., 2008, 175). Thus, Ganenkov
et al. (2008) do not relate the use of a spatial case in the argument domain to
its original spatial meaning. Above, I have shown this can be done. Spatial
case is used because of its incompatibility with Proto-Agent properties.
Because of the type mismatch, a compromise is reached in which some
Proto-Agent properties are suspended.
Instead, explaining the structural use of spatial case as being a marked
alternative form that expresses a marked meaning, as Ganenkov et al. (2008)
propose for the examples above, seems to be the standard way to deal with
these case alternations. Following Horn (1984), the maxim generally is that
the marked (oblique) form goes with the marked meaning. This is also the
approach Hopper and Thompson (1980, discussed in Chapter 2) and de
Hoop and Malchukov (2008) adopt.
Consider again the example from Lezgian in (22). De Hoop and Malchukov
(2008, 574) explain this pattern with Bidirectional Optimality Theory.
Lezgian (Haspelmath, 1993, 292)
(22) a. Zamira.di
Zamira.erg
get’e
pot
xana.
break.aor
‘Zamira broke the pot.’
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b. Zamira.di-waj
Zamira-abl
get’e
pot
xana.
break.aor
‘Zamira broke the pot accidentally/involuntarily.’
Both constructions violate the constraint Economy that says to avoid
morphological marking (see Kiparsky, 2004), as both involve morpholog-
ical case. The constraint Id, discussed in the previous chapter, says that
“strong” subjects should be marked with ergative case. Because of this,
both the combination of ergative case with a non-volitional A and the com-
bination of oblique case with a volitional A violate the constraint Id. Thus,
the combinations of volitional A with Ergative case and non-volitional A
with the oblique case both become optimal in the first round of optimiza-
tion.
In another, actually subsequent but earlier published, paper, de Hoop
and Malchukov (2007) analyze (22) in terms of a difference in markedness of
form. Following Woolford (2001), adelative case, or any non-structural case,
is said to be more marked than ergative case, or any other structural case,
which is illustrated by ranking *Adel higher than *Erg in Tableau 18.
Subject *Adel *Erg Id
, [erg, +volitional] *
[erg, -volitional] *
[adel, +volitional] * *
, [adel, -volitional] *
Tableau 18: More advanced BiOT analysis of symmetrical DSM in Lezgian
The optimal form can combine with either a volitional or a non-volitional
reading from a unidirectional point of view. It seems impossible to decide
what the first super-optimal pair is in a bidirectional perspective, since there
are two equally optimal candidates now. However, it is possible to deter-
mine the first super-optimal pair in a different way, by the mechanism of
“backwards bidirectional reasoning” (Lestrade, 2006). By taking into con-
sideration the other two candidate pairs with the suboptimal form, de Hoop
and Malchukov (2007, 1649) determine the preferred interpretation for the
suboptimal form. Of the two candidate pairs with the adelative form, the
one expressing a non-volitional meaning is better. The adelative case prefers
to be linked to the non-volitional reading because a volitional reading would
violate the identification constraint of de Hoop and Malchukov (2007) that
states that a volitional reading must be expressed by Ergative case. Thus,
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if the ergative form is really indifferent with respect to its interpretation,
we can let the adelative form choose. By bidirectional reasoning applied
backwards we can now determine the interpretation of the preferred form.
Thus, de Hoop and Malchukov (2007) use markedness to explain the use
of spatial case in the argument domain.3 All nonstructural cases are more
marked than structural cases and therefore their corresponding markedness
constraints will always be ranked higher than the constraint that penalizes
the use of structural case.
Note that in such approaches the use of spatial case remains unmotivated
and that volitional-nonvolitional meaning pairs have to be assumed. That
is, any nonstructural case could have been used to express the marked
meaning. In my approach, however, the spatial case in (22) inherently
cancels human Proto-Agent inferences because of the incompatibility of
Proto-Agent and ground properties. In other words, I do not have to assume
predefined meaning pairs.
Now, consider the example of Finnish. The normal use of Finnish abla-
tive case is the expression of source meaning, as in (23):
Finnish (Kracht, 2003)
(23) Ha¨n
He
menee
walks
laiva-lta.
ship-abl
‘He is going/walking from the ship.’
However, in (24) it is used to mark a nonvolitional Agent.
Finnish (Kittila¨, 2009, 359)
(24) Minu-lta
Isg-abl
puto-si
drop-3sg.past
kuppi.
cup.nom
‘I (accidentally) dropped a/the cup.’
The default way of expressing a transitive event in Finnish is to use nom-
inative case on the subject and partitive on the object. For Kittila¨ (2009),
the use of any other case indicates a lower degree of transitivity. He ex-
plicitly says that “[e]ven though semantic cases are usually more intimately
associated with the expression of semantic content (such as location or in-
strument), it is hard to associate them directly with the expression of any
specific transitivity feature.” (Kittila¨, 2009, 364). For him then, the use of
3In fact, de Hoop and Malchukov (2008) do not argue that an oblique case marks non-
prominent arguments in this example, but use the constraint Id to argue that structural
case preferably combines with prominent arguments.
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ablative case in (24) is just the Finnish instance of a cross-linguistic strat-
egy to formally mark what is semantically marked. Needless to say, I think
ablative case is selected on purpose here, to mark the unvolitionality of the
Agent.
As explained above, spatial case is used to cancel Proto-Agent prop-
erties and is therefore expected to apply to (transitive) subjects mostly.
Sometimes however, human properties can be canceled at the Patient too.
Consider the following example from Diyari (Australian). According to
Austin (1981, 155-156), the meaning difference between this transitive con-
struction and its antipassive counterpart is not always clear and the two
constructions seem to have the very same meaning.4
Diyari (Austin, 1981, 153)
(25) a. Nat”u
1sg.erg
n”an”a
3sg.nonfem.O
wil”a
woman.abs
kal
˙
ka-yi.
wait.for-pres
‘I wait for the woman.’
b. Nan”i
1sg.nom
kal
˙
ka-t”adi-yi
wait.for-ap-pres
n”aNkaNu
3sg.nonfem.loc
wil”a-n”i.
woman-loc
‘I wait for the woman.’
Nevertheless, I think it can be explained by the suspension of animacy
properties. The theme of a waiting predicate may not be aware of the fact
that she is being waited for. As we have seen for Proto-Agent entailments
above, this lack of sentience can be expressed by spatial case. Probably, the
alternation in (25) is not a real-time alternation that expresses differences in
awareness but a predicate that is at the border of the set of predicates that
are encoded with transitive constructions (cf. the Hindi example (25) in
Section 2.4). This type of non-optional use will be discussed in Section 5.4.
In the next section, I will first discuss the optional use of spatial case on
arguments to mark lower prominence.
5.3.2 Demoted Agents
In the examples in the previous section, the properties under discussion
concerned characteristics for an Agent. Proto-Agent properties that are
especially inappropriate for grounds are canceled by the use of spatial con-
structions. However, recall from the definition of Comrie (1981, 107) that
4Dependent on their combinatorial possibilities with a set of transitivers, main verbs
in Diyari are classified into five mutually exclusive groups (Austin, 1981). The alternation
described here holds for class 2B verbs.
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subject is a multifactorial notion, the second part to it being that it typi-
cally is topic. As I will show now, also topicality is hard to reconcile with
spatial constructions. Consider the following example:
Spanish (adapted from Palancar, 2002, 34-35)
(26) a. El
the.masc
escalador
climber
salt-o´
jump-3sg.past
d-el
Source-the.masc
pico
peak
ma´s
more
alto.
high
‘The climber jumped from the highest peak.’
b. Pedro
Peter
i-ba
go-3sg:impf
acompan˜-ado
accompany-past.prt
de
Source
su
3poss
madre.
mother
‘Peter was accompanied by his mother.’
The marker de that normally expresses Source (26-a) is used in (26-b) to
mark the demoted Agent, i.e. an Agent that is no longer the subject of the
sentence.
Comrie (1981, 107) proposes a multifactorial definition of subject that
says that subjects prototypically represent the intersection of Agent and
topic. That is, the clearest examples of subjects are Agents which are also
topics. The definition is stated in terms of prototypes rather than neces-
sary and sufficient criteria for identification, allowing for non-agentive, non-
topical subjects. Now consider again the definitions of figure and ground
by Talmy, discussed in Section 3.2.
(Talmy, 2000, 312):
(27) a. The figure is a moving or conceptually movable entity whose
path, site, or orientation is conceived as a variable, the partic-
ular value of which is the relevant issue.
b. The ground is a reference entity, one that has a stationary
setting relative to a reference frame, with respect to which the
figure’s path, site, or orientation is characterized.
As these definitions show, the relation between figure and ground is asym-
metrical: The location of the ground should be known to the hearer to
successfully locate the figure. The inequality in status of the two is made
explicit by the following list of properties they may have:
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Talmy (2000, 183)
(28) figure
– has unknown spatial (or temporal) properties to be determined
– more movable
– smaller
– geometrically simpler (often pointlike) in its treatment
– more recently on the scene/in awareness
– of greater concern/relevance
– less immediately perceivable
– more salient, once perceived
– more dependent
(29) ground
– acts as a reference entity, having known properties that can char-
acterize the primary object’s unknown
– more permanently located
– larger
– geometrically more complex in its treatment
– earlier on the scene/in memory
– of lesser concern/relevance
– more immediately perceivable
– more background, once primary object is perceived
– more independent
For grounds, Svorou (1993, 11) adds the properties of having cultural signif-
icance and being frequently encountered, which, in practice, often turn out
to be related. Levinson and Wilkins (2006a, 515) show that for a sample
of languages the figure prototypically is indeed a relatively small, manipu-
lable, inanimate, movable and independent object in close contiguity with
a relatively large, relatively stationary (fixed or immobile) ground object.
Grounds are very much the opposite of subjects. Grounds typically are
backgrounded, inanimate referents entities of less concern, whereas subjects
typically are human and in the center of attention. By giving subjects the
form of a ground, that is, by marking them with the spatial case, subjects
become more like grounds. The resulting demoted Agent meaning is of
course precisely the intended meaning of the speaker. Again, in this view,
the choice for a spatial case is motivated semantically, not just by formal
markedness.
The semantic motivation for the use of spatial case as a marker of
demotion can actually be tested. Palancar (2002) studies the origin of
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Agent markers (not case markers per se), comparing functional syncretisms
between the marker for the transitive subject (Ergative) and the passive
Agent. That is, he describes which other functions the markers for the two
functions may have. Like me, Palancar takes a, what he calls, semantic
position in the study of these markers. He argues for a conceptual and se-
mantic motivation for the choice of particular markers to express a demoted
Agent, if, of course, it cannot be reduced to coincidence or genetic origin
(Palancar, 2002, 3-4). The semantic position contrasts with the syntactic
position in which the exact marker on the Agent of a passive construction
is irrelevant and only its oblique status is considered of interest. The study
of Palancar (2002) offers a nice opportunity to compare the syncretism pat-
terns for the markers of demoted Agents with those of the Ergative. If
my account is right, we expect more syncretisms with spatial functions for
the markers of passive Agents than for the Ergative markers. Although in
principle, other markers that typically combine with nonprominent inani-
mates will do to encode demoted Agents too, by my account spatial case
is expected in syncretisms for markers of demoted Agents rather than in
syncretisms for Ergative markers. (Note that spatial case is expected as an
alternative marker for the Ergative in alternations marking suspension of
Proto-Agent properties, as discussed in Section 5.3.1. It is not expected,
however, in a syncretism.)
Palancar (2002) studies 176 markers from 148 languages. The numbers
in Table 5.1 do not add up because syncretisms are not exclusive. That is,
the syncretism of passive Agent with Source does not say that there may
not be another function, like Cause, involved in a three-way syncretism
between Cause, Source, and passive Agent.
As the numbers in Table 5.1 show, we can conclude that indeed spatial
case is mostly involved in the syncretism of markers for passive Agents (66,
versus 26 Ergative syncretisms). Syncretisms of ergative markers are less
frequent in the first place and mostly involve nonspatial functions.
5.4 Paradigmatic Selection
In the introduction to this chapter, I distinguished two kinds of extension
of spatial arguments, the obligatory and the optional use. In the previous
section, I discussed the latter use only. In this section, I will bring the two
together again using the ideas of Ackerman and Moore (2001).
Recall that Dowty’s argument selection principle says that of two pred-
icate arguments the one with most Proto-Patient properties will become
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passive agent Ergative
non-spatial functions
Cause 46 (33%) 22 (27%)
Causee 18 (13%) 1 (1%)
Dative 19 (14%) 3 (4%)
Instrument 33 (24%) 43 (52%)
other 23 (15%) 14 (17%)
total 139 (100%) 83 (100%)
spatial functions
Source 31 (47%) 5 (19%)
Goal 8 (12%) 2 (8%)
Place 18 (27%) 17 (65%)
VIA 8 (12%) 2 (8%)
TOWARD 1 (2%) 0 (0%)
total 66 (100%) 26 (100%)
Table 5.1: Functional syncretisms with Agent markers (Palancar, 2002)
O, the one with more Proto-Agent properties will become A. Ackerman
and Moore (2001) proposed to oppose this, what they call, syntagmatic
selection principle with a paradigmatic one. Like the first principle, it com-
pares degrees of proto-agentivity and proto-patientivity and determines the
alignment of grammatical encoding. The difference between the two is
that syntagmatic selection is concerned with the relative proto-properties
of co-arguments of a single predicate, whereas the paradigmatic selection
principle compares relative proto-properties of the same argument across
related predicates.
Figure 5.2 represents the familiar syntagmatic selection principle of
Dowty (Ackerman & Moore, 2001, 61-62). As illustrated for the second
predicate only, of the arguments of a predicate, the one that is most Proto-
Agentlike will become A, the one that is most Proto-Patientlike will become
O.
Figure 5.3 presents the paradigmatic selection principle (Ackerman &
Moore, 2001, 61-62). This time, it is not the arguments of a predicate that
are compared but it is the predicate itself that is compared to other predi-
cates. According to Ackerman and Moore (2001, 141), a semantic contrast
in degree of agentivity within a class of related predicates should correspond
to an encoding alternation between canonically marked (e.g. nominative)
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preda arg1 arg2
predb arg1 arg2
most Proto-Agentlike most Proto-Patientlike
→A →O
predc arg1 arg2
Figure 5.2: Syntagmatic selection
subjects and other more oblique encodings. Similarly, and illustrated in
Figure 5.3, a semantic contrast in degree of patienthood within a class of
related predicates corresponds to an encoding alternation between canoni-
cally marked (e.g. accusative) objects and other more oblique encodings.
preda arg1 arg2
most proto-patientlike
→A →O
predb arg1 arg2
less proto-patientlike
→A →IO
predc arg1 arg2
least proto-patientlike
→A →OBL
Figure 5.3: Paradigmatic selection
The idea of Ackerman and Moore (2001) accounts for example for the
fact that cross-linguistically, experiencer verbs have a nondefault argument
structure, as illustrated in the following examples from Spanish:
Spanish (Trevino 1990, cited in Ackerman & Moore, 2001, 65)
(30) a. Los perros lo molestan siempre que llega ebrio.
‘The dogs harass him (DO) every time he comes home drunk.’
b. Los perros le molestan (*siempre que llega ebrio.
‘Dogs bother him (IO) (*every time he comes home drunk).’
In (30-a) the more Proto-Patientlike experiencer is encoded as a direct
object. Its Proto-Patienthood is illustrated by the possibility to combine
with a temporal adverbial, illustrating a change of state. This is not possible
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for the less Proto-Patientlike experiencer in (30-b). In accordance with
the paradigmatic selection principle, this latter experiencer is encoded as
an indirect object. (Note that Ackerman and Moore (2001) predict that
nonprototypical arguments are marked in a more oblique way. That is, any
nonstructural case will do and the choice for specific spatial cases remains
unmotivated in their account.)
In conclusion, whereas the syntagmatic selection principle makes uses of
the proto-properties of the arguments of the same predicate, the paradig-
matic selection principle compares the proto-properties of the arguments
of different predicates. The four types of spatial argument constructions I
distinguished in the introduction can all be explained by the latter prin-
ciple. Verbs that obligatorily assign spatial case to their arguments must
be compared with verbs that assign structural case. Spatial Agents like
experiencers have less Proto-Agent properties than structural Agents, and
therefore not all Proto-Agent inferences apply. The optional marking of ar-
guments with spatial case almost always goes together with a difference in
meaning that can be described as difference in proto-properties too. Here,
spatial Agents often lack properties like volitionality. Similarly, the spatial
marking of demoted Agents can thus be explained. The Agents become
grounds, i.e. backgrounded reference objects, rather than topics. In sum,
the obligatory and optional use of spatial case on arguments can be under-
stood by the paradigmatic selection principle. In addition to the proposal
of Ackerman and Moore (2001), I think the choice for the nonstructural
marker is motivated. Spatial case is used to mark the fact that one of the
arguments is less human, or rather, that some human inference does not go
through.
5.5 Structural Directionality
My contribution to the structural use of spatial case in this chapter only
concerns the suspension of argument expectations as described in the previ-
ous sections. However, I am sympathetic toward an account that goes even
further in the motivation of the choice for specific spatial case. In this sec-
tion, I will briefly show how localist thinking may explain some additional
variation.
Localist grammar concerns the syntax of relations that are typically ex-
pressed by case inflections (but also by adpositions or structural position) in
which the relations are motivated semantically (see Anderson, 2006, 2009,
1971; Croft & Cruse, 2004). A case is understood as (a form for) a set of
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semantic relations, defined by spatial concepts. In fact, all semantic rela-
tions are to be interpreted localistically. The only grammatical relation is
the subject, which is the neutralization of semantic relations. For example,
the Agent is understood as the ‘source of the action’, that is, as a spatial
source without the spatial meaning. Similarly, Patients are understood as
the ‘goal of the action’ (Anderson, 2006, 131). In this view, the world is
conceptualized by spatial metaphor.
In localist grammar, a transitive event is thought of as an energy flow
that goes from an Agent to a Patient. In fact, this relation is also present in
the well-known definition of transitivity by Hopper and Thompson (1980).
(31) “Transitivity can be characterized as an activity which is carried
over or transferred from an agent to a patient” (Hopper & Thomp-
son, 1980, 251)
In the definition in (31), a transitive event originates at the Agent, and
ends at the Patient. Thus, the “structural” directionality meaning differs
between Agents and Patients. Agents are Sources, Patients are Goals. As
a result, if spatial marking is used for arguments, Agents are expected to
combine with Source markers and Patients are expected to combine with
Goal markers. Whatever the exact motivation for the use of spatial case
instead of structural case, localist grammar would say that Source cases are
chosen for Agents and Goal cases are chosen for Patients simply because
Agents are Sources and Patients are Goals.
Now, we can observe that in most examples discussed above Goal mark-
ers are used for Patients and Source markers for Agents (whereas Place can
be used for both, leaving structural directionality underspecified). Also the
apparent counterexample in the introduction of a Goal Agent in Imbabura
Guechua (Quechua) can be accounted for.
Imbabura Guechua [Quechua] (Rice & Kabata, 2007)
(32) a. Wasi-man-mi
house-all-validator
ri-ju-ni.
go-prog-1sg
‘I am going to the house.’
b. Maria
Maria
n˜uca-man
1sg-all
pata-ta
potato-acc
yanu-chi-rca.
cook-caus-3.past
‘Maria let me cook potatoes.’
In (32-a) the standard spatial use of the allative case as a marker of Goal
meaning is shown. In (32-b), this goal marker is used on the Agent of
‘to cook’, going against the supposed identity between Source and Agent.
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However, in causative constructions, there could be said to be two predicates
semantically and therefore two instances of structural directionality: that
of the matrix predicate (DO, LET, MAKE) and that of the subordinate
predicate (‘to cook’, in (32)). The Agent of the subordinate predicate at
the same time is the Patient of the matrix predicate. Thus, the subordinate
Agent aligns with a Goal at this higher level (cf. also Rice & Kabata, 2007,
491). Differently (and more generally) put, the use of the causative marker
licenses the addition of a superagent that causes the (lower) Agent to do
something. Because the latter now loses one or more Proto-Agent properties
(e.g. instigation, volitionality, control), it no longer qualifies for ergative
case (see Ackerman & Moore, 2001).
In addition, localist grammar may explain the use of specific direction-
ality meanings with verbs of emotion and perception. In principle, the
structural directionality of a clause is determined by the verb semantics. In
standard transitive clauses the energy flow is from the Agent to the Patient.
Some verbs however have a different structural directionality.
Structural directionality can be seen as a variant of fictive motion (Talmy,
2000). In pure fictive motion, a form expressing a change of place is used
in a situation in which there is no actual motion, nor support of actual
motion. An example is given in (33-a).
(33) a. That mountain range goes from Canada to Mexico.
b. This road goes from Modesto to Fresno.
In (33-a), the mountain range itself of course goes nowhere. In the less pure
but more well-known example (33-b), the road itself again does not move
but does support motion.
Talmy’s line of sight is a version of fictive motion that refers to an
intangible, directed line emerging from the visual apparatus of an animate
or mechanical entity. Examples are I looked down into the well and I slowly
looked toward the door. This is the type of fictive motion that is central
in Huumo (2006, 141), who defines it as a dynamic cognitive relationship,
i.e., a relationship that consists of a change by a stimulus into or out of the
cognitive presence of the experiencer.
Consider the following example from Kolyma Yukaghir.
Kolyma Yukaghir (Maslova, 2003)
(34) Met
I
me¯m-
¯
get
bear-abl
iNla¯-je.
become.afraid-intr.1sg
‘I became afraid of the bear.’
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If we think of fear as an abstract entity that originates at the Stimulus, the
bear, and arrives at the Perceiver, we can again understand this use of a
source case by fictive motion. An equivalent expression with a “standard”
structural directionality would be the bear scares me. (Note by the way
that the use of spatial case can again be motivated by the cancellation of
Proto-Agent inferences. The source of the fear does not have to be aware
of its frightfulness.)
Another example of fictive motion is from Chalawal in (35).
Chalawal (Ganenkov, 2006, 190)
(35) a. I˜c
˙
-da-Xe
spring-obl-all
w-uR
masc-send.past
de:
I.erg
o-w.
this-masc
‘I sent him to the spring.’
b. Di-Xe
I-all
haPa
see.past
di-w
I-masc
ima.
father
‘I saw my father’
The marker -Xe that normally expresses Goal and (35-a) is used on the
Perceiver in (35-b). The use of exactly this directionality distinction again
can be explained by fictive motion.
In a more or less similar account in terms of structural directionality,
Stolz (1992) proposes to look at control instead of fictive motion. Stolz
(1992, 108) explains the extension from Place/Source cases to ergative case
in Australian languages by interpreting the Agent as the place from which
the control of an event is performed.
Similarly, Croft (1991) develops a causal order model in which thematic
roles are ordered in a causal chain. In this chain, antecedent roles like
Cause, Instrument, and Comitative, precede the object; subsequent roles
like Benefactive and Recipient follow it. The object itself is the endpoint or
result of the causal chain. For example, in a baking event Sam baked a cake
for Jan, the Agent Jan precedes the object and the creation of the object
brings about some benefit that affects Jan (Croft, 1991, 185). One could
easily align such causal chains with (spatial) directionality.
Unfortunately, the way in which structural directionality is perceived
cannot always be told a priori. In (35), the view of my father apparently
comes to me. However, we could also analyze such a situation in terms
of me looking at my father, that is, with the opposite directionality. As a
result, this approach may be considered too strong.
More seriously, Palancar (2002) gives an example of a demoted Agent
marked with Goal case with the verb to eat.
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Nigerian Arabic (Owens 1993, 157-158; cited in Palancar, 2002)
(36) a. Fi
Place
ye´rwa
Yerwa
masˇe´e-t
went-1sg
le
Goal
be´et
house
rafiig-´ı.
friend-1sg.poss
‘In Maiduguri (sic.) I went to my friend’s house.’
b. Al-a´kil
def-food
ma
not
bin’a´kil
eaten
le-´ı
Goal-me
‘This food can’t be eaten by me.’
We could maybe say that in this example the food ‘comes to me’ and
therefore the structural directionality is toward the Agent. However, as the
numbers in Table 5.1 above show, the use of Goal case for demoted Agents
is not exceptional. Of course, there is no reason for all languages and all
speakers to conceive the structural directionality of some predicate in the
same way, and idiosyncratic perceptions in principle should be allowed.
Generally, however, to many different ad hoc explanations are dispreferred.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the use of spatial case in the argument do-
main. Most other accounts explain this use in terms of markedness and, as
a result, are indifferent with respect to the precise case alternative. Instead,
I have argued that the choice for spatial cases is semantically motivated.
Spatial case expresses grounds, i.e., inanimate and backgrounded reference
objects. By forcing a constituent with a human referent into a spatial
case construction, the argument has to give up some properties that are
especially inappropriate for grounds. Thus, by using a spatial case on an
argument, the speaker suspends animacy inferences and cancels topicality.
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Conclusion
I have given a functionally motivated account of spatial case using empir-
ical evidence from corpus studies and typological comparison. The main
objective of this study was to show how the use and development of spatial
case and morphological case in general follow from very general principles.
I started this thesis by defining spatial case as a suffix that expresses spa-
tial meaning. In Chapter 2 I have studied the formal side of this definition;
in Chapter 3 I looked into the meaning part.
In Chapter 2 I motivated the synchronic use and diachronic development
of case by principles of economy, generalization, and cooperativity. It is
impossible to capture in language all the semantic details that are out there
in the world. Therefore, one of the main tasks of language is to impose an
ordering and categorization of our fuzzy world in order to enable us to talk
about it. By making generalizations about objects and events the speaker
can economically formulate the meaning she wants to communicate. The
task for the hearer is to recognize the generalizations and to enrich the
interpretation proper of their markers.
Because of the frequent use that follows from their general applicabil-
ity the markers of these generalizations acquire an even more general and
predictable meaning that leads to their phonological and morphosyntactic
reduction in a grammaticalization process. Morphological case is the end
result of this process. It is among the most frequently used constructions
of language, with the shortest form and most general meaning possible.
More specifically, I have argued that this general meaning of a case
marker is a semantic role; a language-specific generalization about relations
between events and event participants. In a particular event, each event
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participant has a very specific meaning. For communicating this event,
however, a semantic role is used. By using semantic roles the speaker can
economically encode the function of an argument. By enriching the inter-
pretation of the semantic role with the semantics of the predicate the hearer
can unpack the information again.
Only when semantic roles are used frequently enough, their markers will
develop into case markers. Since the number of semantic roles is inversely
related with the frequency of their use, the number of cases is restricted.
Most predicates have a small set of semantic roles with which they typ-
ically occur. Because these argument functions are so predictable, they do
not have to be identified by a semantic role marker, they only have to be
kept apart. The structural use of case discriminates between the semantic
roles that are most prominent for a particular predicate. For reasons of
economy, it suffices to mark one of these prominent arguments only. Thus
what is called nominative in an accusative language and absolutive in an
ergative language is often the absence of case. Structural case is a high-level
generalization about the relation of the prominent arguments with respect
to their predicate in terms of Proto-Agent properties. Because of the close
interpretation relationship between Patient and predicate, the accusative
case marker developed into a marker of syntactic dependency.
In Chapter 3 I have discussed the importance of frequency for the use
and development of case in the spatial domain. I have decomposed spa-
tial meaning into a dimension of configuration, which expresses the relative
position in space between two objects and a dimension of directionality,
which expresses the development of this configuration in time. The direc-
tionality dimension was shown to consist of only three basic distinctions
only, which follows from the analysis of directionality in terms of a change
of configuration over time. Place directionality is the absence of a change
in configuration; Goal directionality is a change into some configuration,
and Source directionality is a change out of some configuration. All other
directionality meanings are derived from this basic set. I have shown that
this analysis correctly predicts an implicational scale of directionality dis-
tinctions in which derived meanings are only expected to be expressed by
spatial case if the more basic distinctions are too.
In contrast to the directionality dimension, the configuration domain is
much more complex, consisting of different ordering principles that lead to
a larger set of language particular configuration contrasts. Because of the
higher token frequency of directionality distinctions in comparison with that
of the contrasts of configuration, the markers of directionality are expected
to develop into case markers before those of configuration. This prediction
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was also shown to be correct by a number of studies. Firstly, I have shown
that a configuration distinction in spatial case paradigms is secondary to
a directionality distinction. That is, a configuration distinction is only
expressed by spatial case if directionality is too. Secondly, for languages
with two spatial constructions that differ in their degree of grammaticaliza-
tion, the more grammatical one was shown to express directionality mainly,
whereas the more lexical one was shown to express configuration. Within
more lexical spatial constructions such a division of labor was also attested.
In complex spatial prepositions that are assigned spatial case themselves, it
is usually the adposition that expresses configuration and its case form that
determines directionality. Finally, in a study of the case forms of spatial
adpositions in Finnish and Hungarian I have shown that spatial case does
not make a configuration distinction in such constructions. If the spatial
case paradigm of a language distinguishes basic configuration meanings, this
distinction becomes redundant in the combination with spatial adpositions
that are specialized in the expression of configuration.
In Chapter 4 I have shown how differential case marking, which is rel-
atively well-known for the structural use of case, applies in the same way
to the spatial domain. I have used insights from the study of the optional
use of spatial case to account for the phenomenon in general. I proposed
that in principle, all types of differential case marking can be explained by
predictability. The use of case can be judged unnecessary, which explains
why case marking is sometimes omitted. This economical use is restricted
by other rules of grammar, which were shown to be the result of fossiliza-
tion, which is a process in which the results of optimization processes lead
to independent constraints. My account straightforwardly explained lesser
known types of differential case marking in which the discourse setting and
structural information is taken into account.
Finally, in Chapter 5 I have discussed the extended uses of spatial case,
more specifically its use as a marker of structural arguments. Being the
result of a grammaticalization process, spatial case is easy to exploit for
other purposes too. In most accounts the structural use of spatial case is
explained in terms of syntactic markedness only. However, I have argued
that the choice of spatial case in the argument domain is semantically mo-
tivated. By forcing a predicate argument with a human referent into a
spatial case construction, a compromise is reached in which the argument
has to give up some properties that are especially incompatible with spatial
meaning. Thus, by using spatial case on an argument, the speaker suspends
animacy inferences like volitionality and sentience.
207

Bibliography
Abbott, M. (1991). Macushi. In D. C. Derbyshire & G. K. Pullum (Eds.),
Handbook of Amazonian languages (Vol. 3, p. 23-160). Berlin and
New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Ackerman, F., & Moore, J. (2001). Proto-properties and grammatical encod-
ing. A correspondence theory of argument selection. Stanford: CSLI.
Aikhenvald, A. Y. (2003). A grammar of Tariana. Cambridge, etc.: Cam-
bridge University press.
Aissen, J. (2003). Differential object marking: Iconicity versus economy.
Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 21, 435-483.
Ambrazas, V. J. (1997). Lithuanian grammar. Lithuania: Baltos Lankos.
Anderson, J. (1971). The grammar of case: Towards a localistic theory.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Anderson, J. (2006). Modern grammars of case. Oxford: Oxford University
press.
Anderson, J. (2009). Case in localist case grammar. In A. Malchukov &
A. Spencer (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of case (p. 121-135). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Anderson, R. E. (1982). Speech imagery is not always faster than visual
imagery. Memory and Cognition, 10 (4), 371-380.
Bibliography
Anttila, A., & Fong, V. (2000). The partitive constraint in Optimality
Theory. Journal of Semantics, 17, 281-314.
Aristar, A. R. (1996). The relationship between dative and locative:
KuryÃlowicz’s argument from a typological perspective. Diachronica,
XIII (2), 207-224.
Aristar, A. R. (1997). Marking and hierarchy. Types and the grammatical-
ization of case markers. Studies in Language, 21 (2), 313-368.
Asbury, A. (2008). The morphosyntax of case and adpositions. Ph.D. thesis,
University of Utrecht.
Asher, R., & Kumari, T. (1997). Malayalam. London and New York:
Routledge.
Austin, P. (1981). A grammar of Diyari, South Australia. Cambridge, etc.:
Cambridge University Press.
Baayen, H. (2008). Analyzing linguistic data: A practical introduction to
statistics using R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barbara´, F. (1944). Manual o vocabulario de la lengua Pampa. Buenos
Aires: Emece´ Editores.
BarDdal, J. (2001). Case in Icelandic – A synchronic, diachronic and
comparative approach. Ph.D. thesis, Lund University.
BarDdal, J. (2009). The development of case in Germanic. In J. BarDdal &
S. L. Chelliah (Eds.), The role of semantic, pragmatic, and discourse
factors in the development of case. Studies in language companion
series (Vol. 108, p. 123-159). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Beaver, D., & Lee, H. (2004). Input-output mismatches in OT. In R. Blut-
ner & H. Zeevat (Eds.), Optimality theory and pragmatics (p. 112-
153). Basingstoke, etc.: Palgrave/Macmillan.
van Bergen, G., & de Hoop, H. (Eds.). (2009). Topics cross-linguistically
(special theme issue). The Linguistic Review, 26 (2/3).
210
Bibliography
van den Berg, H. (1995). A grammar of Hunzib. Mu¨nchen and Newcastle:
Lincom Europa.
Bickel, B. (2008). A refined sampling procedure for genealogical control.
Language Typology and Universals, 61, 221-233.
Bickel, B., & Nichols, J. (2009). Case marking and alignment. In
A. Malchukov & A. Spencer (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of case (p.
304-321). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bielec, D. (1999). Polish. An essential grammar (2nd ed.). London: Rout-
ledge.
Bierwisch, M., & Schreuder, R. (1992). From concepts to lexical items.
Cognition, 42, 23-60.
Blake, B. J. (1977). Case marking in Australian languages. Canberra:
Australian Institute of Aboriginal studies.
Blake, B. J. (1994). Case (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Blutner, R. (2007). Optimality theoretic pragmatics and the explica-
ture/implicature distinction. In N. Burton-Roberts (Ed.), Advances
in pragmatics (p. 45-66). Basingstoke, etc.: Palgrave/MacMillan.
Blutner, R., de Hoop, H., & Hendriks, P. (2006). Optimal communication.
Stanford: CSLI.
Bohnemeyer, J., & Stolz, C. (2006). Spatial reference in Yukatek Maya: A
survey. In S. C. Levinson & D. Wilkins (Eds.), Grammars of space.
Explorations in cognitive diversity (p. 273-310). Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Bowerman, M., & Choi, S. (2003). Space under construction: Language-
specific spatial categorization in first language acquisition. In D. Gen-
tner & S. Goldin-Meadow (Eds.), Language in mind (p. 387-428).
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: the MIT press.
Bray, D. (1986). The Brahui language. Delhi: Gian Publishing House.
211
Bibliography
Bresnan, J., Cueni, A., Nikitina, T., & Baayen, H. R. (2007). Predicting
the dative alternation. In G. Bouma, I. Kra¨mer, & J. Zwarts (Eds.),
Cognitive foundations of interpretation (p. 69-94). Amsterdam: Royal
Netherlands Academy of Science.
Bruce, L. (1984). The Alamblak language of Papua New Guinea (East
Sepik). Canberra: Department of Linguistics, Research School of
Pacific Studies, Australian National University.
Brunetti, L. (2009). On the semantic and contextual factors that determine
topic selection in Italian and Spanish. The linguistic review, 26 (2/3),
261-290.
Bulatova, N., & Grenoble, L. (1999). Evenki. Mu¨nchen and Newcastle:
Lincom Europa.
Butt, M. (2006). Theories of case. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
press.
Butt, M. (2007). Why case? (Handout, Workshop on Empirical approaches
to morphological case, Stanford)
Butt, M., & King, T. H. (2003). Case sytems: Beyond structural distinc-
tions. In E. Brandner & H. Zinsmeister (Eds.), New perspectives on
case theory (p. 53-88). Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Butt, M., & King, T. H. (2004). The status of case. In V. Dayal &
A. Mahajan (Eds.), Clause structure in South Asian languages (p.
153-198). Dordrecht: Springer.
Butt, M., & Poudel, T. (2007). Distribution of the ergative in Nepali.
(Manuscript, University of Konstanz)
Bybee, J. L. (1985). Morphology: A study of the relation between meaning
and form. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Bybee, J. L. (2008). Formal universals as emergent phenomena. In J. Good
(Ed.), Linguistic universals and language change (p. 108-121). Ox-
ford: Oxford University press.
212
Bibliography
Bybee, J. L., Perkins, R., & Pagliuca, W. (1994). The evolution of gram-
mar. Tense, aspect, modality in the languages of the world. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Carroll, M., Lambert, M., Natale, S., Starren, M., & van Stutterheim,
C. (in press). Being specific: The role of aspect in event construal
when grounding events in context. A cross-linguistic comparison of
advanced second language learners. In S. Haberzettl (Ed.), Dynamics
of learner varieties (p. xx-xx). Berlin: De Gruyter.
Carstairs, A. (1983). Paradigm economy. Journal of Linguistics, 19, 115-
125.
Casasola, M., & Cohen, L. B. (2002). Infant categorization of containment,
support and tight-fit spatial relationships. Developmental Science,
5 (2), 247-264.
Chafe, W. L. (1976). Givenness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects,
topics, and point of view. In C. N. Li (Ed.), Subject and topic (p.
25-56). New York, San Francisco, and London: Academic Press, Inc.
Chapman, S., & Derbyshire, D. C. (1991). Paumari. In D. C. Derbyshire
& G. K. Pullum (Eds.), Handbook of Amazonian languages (Vol. 3,
p. 161-352). Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Chelliah, S. L. (1997). A grammar of Meithei. Berlin and New York:
Mouton de Gruyter.
Chomsky, N. (1981). Lectures on government and binding. Dordrecht:
Foris.
Christiansen, M. H., & Chater, N. (2008). Language as shaped by the
brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31 (5), 489-509.
Colarusso, J. (1989). East Circassian (Kabardian dialect). In B. G. Hewitt
(Ed.), The indigenous languages of the Caucasus. The North West
Caucasian languages (Vol. 2, p. 261-355). Delmar, New York: Cara-
van Books.
Comrie, B. (1981). Language universals & linguistic typology (2nd ed.).
213
Bibliography
Chicago: University of Chicago press.
Comrie, B. (2005). Chapter 98/99. Alignment of case marking. In
M. Haspelmath, M. Dryer, D. Gil, & B. Comrie (Eds.), The world
atlas of language structures (CD-ROM version). Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity press.
Comrie, B., & Polinsky, M. (1998). The great Daghestaninan case hoax.
In A. Siewierska & J. J. Song (Eds.), Case, typology and grammar (p.
95-114). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Creissels, D. (2006a). Encoding the distinction between location, source
and destination. A typological study. In M. Hickmann & S. Robert
(Eds.), Space in languages: Linguistic systems and cognitive categories
(p. 19-28). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Creissels, D. (2006b). Suffixes casuels et postpositions en hongrois. Bulletin
de la socie´te´ de linguistique de Paris, 101 (1), 225-272.
Creissels, D. (2009a). Non-spatial functions of spatial forms in Northern
Akhvakh. (handout, Non-spatial functions of spatial forms in East
Caucasian, Helsinki, August 29)
Creissels, D. (2009b). Spatial cases. In A. Malchukov & A. Spencer (Eds.),
The Oxford handbook of case (p. 609-625). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Croft, W. (1991). Syntactic categories and grammatical relations. The cog-
nitive organization of information. Chicago and London: University
of Chicago press.
Croft, W., & Cruse, D. A. (2004). Cognitive linguistics. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Dahl, O. (2008). Animacy and egophoricity: Grammar, ontology and
phylogeny. Lingua, 118 (2), 141-150.
Davidson, D. (2001). The logical form of action sentences (1967). In Essays
on actions and events (p. 105-122). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
214
Bibliography
DeLancey, S. (1981). An interpretation of split ergativity and related
patterns. Language, 57 (3), 626-657.
den Dikken, M. (2006). On the functional structure of locative and direc-
tional PPs. (Manuscript, CUNY)
Dixon, R. (1972). The Dyirbal language of North Queensland. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Dixon, R. (1979). Ergativity. Language, 55 (1), 59-138.
Dixon, R. (1994). Ergativity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University press.
Dowty, D. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language,
67 (3), 547-619.
Dryer, M. S. (2005). Chapter 85. Order of adposition and noun phrase.
In M. Haspelmath, M. Dryer, D. Gil, & B. Comrie (Eds.), The world
atlas of language structures (CD-ROM version). Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Ernestus, M., Baayen, R. H., & Schreuder, R. (2002). The recognition of
reduced word forms. Brain and Language, 81 (1-3), 162-173.
E´va, H. (1990). Grammatical relations in Gamo: a pilot sketch. In R. J.
Hayward (Ed.), Omotic language studies (p. 356-405). London: Uni-
versity of London, School of Oriental and African studies.
Fillmore, C. J. (1968). The case for case. In E. bach & R. T. Harms
(Eds.), Universals in linguistic theory (p. 1-88). New York etc.: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
Fong, V. (1997). The order of things: What directional locatives denote.
Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University.
Forker, D. (2010). Non-local uses of local cases in the Tsezic languages.
Linguistics, 48 (5), 1083-1110.
Fortescue, M. (1984). West Greenlandic. London, Sydney, and Dover:
Croom Helm.
215
Bibliography
Frank, P. (1985). A grammar of Ika. Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsyl-
vania.
Ganenkov, D. (2006). Experiencer coding in Nakh-Daghestanian. In L. Ku-
likov, A. Malchukov, & P. de Swart (Eds.), Case, valency, and tran-
sitivity (p. 179-202). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Ganenkov, D., Maisak, T., & Merdanova, S. (2008). Non-canonical agent
marking in Agul. In H. de Hoop & P. de Swart (Eds.), Differential
subject marking (p. 173-198). Dordrecht: Springer.
Gentner, D., & Bowerman, M. (2009). Why some spatial semantic cat-
egories are harder to learn than others: The typological prevalence
hypothesis. In J. Guo, E. Lieven, N. Budwig, S. Ervin-Tripp, K. Naka-
mura, & S. Ozcaliskan (Eds.), Crosslinguistic approaches to the psy-
chology of language: Research in the tradition of Dan Isaac Slobin (p.
465-480). New York: Psychology Press.
Givo´n, T. (1976). Topic, pronoun, and grammatical agreement. In C. N.
Li (Ed.), Subject and topic (p. 149-188). New York, San Francisco,
and London: Academic Press, Inc.
Givo´n, T. (1985). Ergative morphology and transitivity gradients in Newari.
In F. Plank (Ed.), Relational typology (p. 89-108). Berlin, New York,
and Amsterdam: Mouton Publishers.
Goldberg, A. E. (1995). Constructions. A construction grammar approach
to argument structure. Chicago: University of Chicago press.
Goldberg, A. E. (2006). Constructions at work. The nature of generalization
in language. Oxford: Oxford University press.
Gordon, L. (1986). Maricopa morphology and syntax. Berkeley and Los
Angeles and London: University of California press.
Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, Mass. and
London: Harvard University Press.
Gries, S. T. (2008). Statistik fu¨r Sprachwissenschaftler. Go¨ttingen: Van-
denhoeck & Ruprecht.
216
Bibliography
Gries, S. T. (2009). Dispersions and adjusted frequencies in corpora: further
explorations. In S. T. Gries, S. Wulff, & M. Davies (Eds.), Corpus
linguistic applications: current studies, new directions. Amsterdam:
Rodopi.
Grimm, S. M. (2005). The lattice of case and agentivity. Unpublished
master’s thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Gruzdeva, E. (1998). Nivkh. Mu¨nchen: Lincom Europa.
Guirardello, R. (1999). A reference grammar of Trumai. Houston: Rice
University.
Haiman, J. (1980). Hua: A Papuan language of the Eastern Highlands of
New Guinea. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Hale, A., & Shrestha, K. P. (2006). Newar (Nepal Bhasa). Mu¨nchen and
Newcastle: Lincom Europe.
Hansson, G. O. (2007). Productive syncretisms in Saami inflectional mor-
phology. In I. Toivonen & D. Nelson (Eds.), Saami linguistics (p.
91-135). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Hardman, M. (2000). Jaqaru. Mu¨nchen and Newcastle: Lincom Europe.
Harris, A. C., & Campbell, L. (1995). Historical syntax in cross-linguistic
perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haspelmath, M. (1993). A grammar of Lezgian. Berlin and New York:
Mouton de Gruyter.
Haspelmath, M. (1997). From space tot time. Temporal adverbials in the
world’s languages. Mu¨nchen: Lincom Europa.
Haspelmath, M. (2003). The geometry of grammatical meaning: Semantic
maps and cross-linguistic comparison. In M. Tomasello (Ed.), The
new psychology of language (Vol. 2, p. 211-243). New York: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Haspelmath, M. (2007). Pre-established categories don’t exist: conse-
217
Bibliography
quences for language description and typology. Linguistic Typology,
11 (1), 119-132.
Haspelmath, M. (2008). Creating economical morphosyntactic patterns in
language change. In J. Good (Ed.), Linguistic universals and language
change (p. 185-214). Oxford and New York: Oxford University press.
Haviland, J. B. (1979). Guugu Yimidhirr. In R. Dixon & B. Blake (Eds.),
Handbook of Australian languages (p. 27-180). Canberra: ANU Press.
Hawkins, J., & Cutler, A. (1988). Processing factors in morphological
asymmetry. In J. Hawkins (Ed.), Explaining language universals (p.
280-317). Oxford: Blackwell.
Hegedu˝s, V. (2008). Hungarian spatial PPs. Nordlyd: Tromsø Working
Papers in Linguistics, 33 (2), 220-233.
Heine, B., Claudi, U., & Hu¨nnemeyer, F. (1991). Grammaticalization. A
conceptual framework. Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press.
Heine, B., & Kuteva, T. (2002). World lexicon of grammaticalization.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University press.
Herskovits, A. (1986). Language and spatial cognition. An interdisciplinary
study of the prepositions in English. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge Uni-
versity press.
Hewitt, B. (1995). Georgian: a structural reference grammar. Amsterdam:
John Benjamins.
Hoekstra, T. (1988). Small clause results. Lingua, 74 (2/3), 101-139.
Hoffmann, J. (1903). Mundari grammar. Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat
Press.
Hogeweg, L. (2009). Word in process. On the interpretation, acquisition,
and production of words. Ph.D. thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen.
de Hoop, H. (1996). Case configuration and noun phrase interpretation.
218
Bibliography
New York and London: Garland Publishing.
de Hoop, H., & de Swart, P. (2009). Not quite my type: A comparison of
type shifting involving animacy and definiteness. (Paper presented at
workshop on Cases, animacy and semantic roles, Helsinki (Finland),
August 26.)
de Hoop, H., & Lamers, M. (2006). Incremental distinguishability of subject
and object. In L. Kulikov, A. Malchukov, & P. de Swart (Eds.), Case,
valency and transitivity (p. 269-287). Amsterdam and Philadelphia:
John Benjamins.
de Hoop, H., & Malchukov, A. (2007). On fluid differential case marking:
A bidirectional OT approach. Lingua, 117, 1636-1656.
de Hoop, H., & Malchukov, A. (2008). Case-marking strategies. Linguistic
Inquiry, 39 (4), 565587.
de Hoop, H., & Swart, P. de (Eds.). (2008). Differential subject marking.
Dordrecht: Springer.
de Hoop, H., & Zwarts, J. (2009). Case in formal semantics. In
A. Malchukov & A. Spencer (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of case (p.
170-184). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hopper, P. J., & Thompson, S. A. (1980). Transitivity in grammar and
discourse. Language, 56 (2), 251-299.
Hopper, P. J., & Traugott, E. C. (2003). Grammaticalization (2nd ed.).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horn, L. (1984). Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based
and R-based implicature. In D. Schiffrin (Ed.), Meaning, form, and
use in context: Linguistic applications (p. 11-42). Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press.
Hovdhaugen, E. (2004). Mochica. Mu¨nchen and Newcastle: Lincom Europe.
Hualde, J., & Urbina, J. O. de. (2003). A grammar of Basque. Berlin and
New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
219
Bibliography
Huumo, T. (2006). “I woke up from the sofa”: Subjective directionality in
Finnish expressions of a spatio-cognitive transfer. In M.-L. Helasvuo
& L. Campbell (Eds.), Grammar from the human perspective. Case,
space and person in Finnish (p. 41-66). Amsterdam and Philadelphia:
John Benjamins.
Iggesen, O. A. (2005). Chapter 49. Number of cases. In M. Haspelmath,
M. Dryer, D. Gil, & B. Comrie (Eds.), The world atlas of language
structures (CD-ROM version). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Iwasaki, S. (2002). Japanese. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Ben-
jamins.
Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and cognition (8 ed.). Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Jackendoff, R. (1990). Semantic structures. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Ja¨ger, G. (2007). Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study.
Language, 83 (1), 74-109.
Ja¨ger, G., & van Rooij, R. (2007). Language structure: Psychological and
social constraints. Synthese, 159 (1), 99-130.
Karlsson, F. (1986). Frequency considerdations in morphology. Zeitschrift
fu¨r Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung, 39,
19-28.
Kenesei, I., Vago, R. M., & Fenyvesi, A. (1998). Hungarian. London:
Routledge.
Kimball, G. (1985). A descriptive grammar of Koasati. Ph.D. thesis, Tulane
University.
Kiparsky, P. (2001). Structural case in Finnish. Lingua, 111, 315-376.
Kiparsky, P. (2004). Blocking and periphrasis in inflectional paradigms. In
G. Booij & J. van Marle (Eds.), Yearbook of morphology (p. 113-135).
Dordrecht: Springer.
220
Bibliography
Kiss, K. E. (1998). Identificational focus versus information focus. Lan-
guage, 74 (2), 245-273.
Kittila¨, S. (2008). Animacy effects on differential Goal marking. Linguistic
Typology, 12, 245-268.
Kittila¨, S. (2009). Case and the typology of transitivity. In A. Malchukov &
A. Spencer (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of case (p. 356-365). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Koopman, H. (2000). Prepositions, postpositions, circumpositions and
particles: The structure of Dutch PPs. In H. Koopman (Ed.), The
syntax of specifiers and heads (p. 204-260). London: Routledge.
Kornfilt, J. (1997). Turkish. London: Routledge.
Kornfilt, J. (2003). Scrambling, subscrambling, and case in Turkish. In
S. Karimi (Ed.), Word order and scrambling (p. 125-155). Malden,
MA/Oxford: Blackwell.
Kracht, M. (2002). On the semantics of locatives. Linguistics and Philos-
ophy, 25 (2), 175-232.
Kracht, M. (2003). Against the feature bundle theory of case. In E. Brand-
ner & H. Zinsmeister (Eds.), New perspectives on case theory (p. 165-
190). Stanford: CSLI.
Kracht, M. (2008). The fine structure of spatial expressions. In A. Asbury,
J. Dotlacˇil, B. Gehrke, & R. Nouwen (Eds.), The syntax and seman-
tics of spatial P [Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics today 120] (p. 35-62).
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Kratzer, A. (1996). Severing the external argument from its verb. In
J. Rooryck & L. Zaring (Eds.), Phrase structure and the lexicon (p.
109-138). Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer.
Krifka, M. (1998). The origins of telicity. In S. Rothstein (Ed.), Events
and grammar (p. 197-235). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Kulikov, L. (2006). Case systems in a diachronic perspective: A typological
221
Bibliography
sketch. In L. Kulikov, A. Malchukov, & P. de Swart (Eds.), Case,
valency, and transitivity (p. 23-48). Amsterdam and Philadelphia:
John Benjamins.
Kurby, C., & Zacks, J. (2007). Segmentation in the perception and memory
of events. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12 (2), 72-79.
Kutscher, S. (2010). When ‘towards’ means ‘away from’: The case of
directional-ablative syncretism in the Ardes¸en variety of Laz (South-
Caucasian). (Manuscript, Humboldt University Berlin)
Lakusta, L., & Landau, B. (2005). Starting at the end: the importance of
goals in spatial language. Cognition, 96, 1-33.
Lamers, M. J. A. (2001). Sentence processing: Using syntactic, semantic,
and thematic information. Ph.D. thesis, University of Groningen.
Landau, B., & Lakusta, L. (2009). Spatial representation across species:
geometry, language, and maps. Current opinion in neurobiology, 19,
12-19.
Langacker, R. (1991). Descriptive application (Vol. 2). Stanford: Stanford
University press.
Leavitt, R. M. (1996). Passamaquoddy Maliseet. Mu¨nchen and Newcastle:
Lincom Europa.
Leer, J. A. (1991). The schetic categories of the Tlingit verb. Ph.D. thesis,
University of Chicago.
Lehmann, C. (1985). Grammaticalization: Synchronic variation and di-
achronic change. Lingua e stile a, XX (3), 303-318.
Lehmann, W. (1976). From topic to subject in Indo-European. In C. N. Li
(Ed.), Subject and topic (p. 445-456). New York, San Francisco, and
London: Academic Press, Inc.
Lemmens, M. (2002). The semantic network of Dutch posture verbs. In
J. Newman (Ed.), The linguistics of sitting, standing, and lying (p.
103-139). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
222
Bibliography
Lestrade, S. (2006). Adpositional case. Unpublished master’s thesis, Rad-
boud University Nijmegen.
Lestrade, S. (2008). The correspondence between directionality and tran-
sitivity. In A. Asbury, J. Dotlacˇil, B. Gehrke, & R. Nouwen (Eds.),
The syntax and semantics of spatial P [Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics
today 120] (p. 149-174). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Ben-
jamins.
Lestrade, S. (2010). Finnish case alternating adpositions: A corpus study.
Linguistics, 48 (3), 603-628.
Lestrade, S., & de Hoop, H. (2009). Case and tense. (Manuscript, Radboud
University Nijmegen)
Lestrade, S., de Schepper, K., Westelaken, S., & de Hoop, H. (2009).
Preposition stranding everywhere. (Manuscript, Radboud University
Nijmegen)
Lestrade, S., de Schepper, K., & Zwarts, J. (2009). The space within the
PP. (Manuscript, Radboud University Nijmegen)
Lestrade, S., & de Swart, P. (to appear). Individuation and semantic role
interpretation in the adpositional domain. (To appear in Marco Garcia
and Patrick Brandt (Eds), Transitivity. Form, Meaning, Acquisition,
and Processing)
Levelt, W. J. M. (1989). Speaking. From intention to articulation. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press.
Levin, B. C. (1993). English verb classes and alternations: a preliminary
investigation. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago press.
Levinson, S. C. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Levinson, S. C. (2000a). H.P. Grice on location on Rossel Island. In
S. S. Chang, L. Liaw, & J. Ruppenhofer (Eds.), Proceedings of the
25th annual meeting of the Berkeley linguistic society (p. 210-224).
Berkeley: Berkeley linguistic society.
223
Bibliography
Levinson, S. C. (2000b). Presumptive meanings. The theory of generalized
conversational implicature. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Levinson, S. C. (2003). Space in language and cognition: Explorations in
cognitive diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levinson, S. C., Meira, S., & the Language and Cognition Group. (2003).
‘Natural concepts’ in the spatial topological domain. Adpositional
meanings in crosslinguistic perspective: an exercise in semantic ty-
pology. Language, 79, 485-516.
Levinson, S. C., & Wilkins, D. P. (2006a). Patterns in the data: to-
wards a semantic typology of spatial description. In S. C. Levinson
& D. Wilkins (Eds.), Grammars of space. Explorations in cognitive
diversity (p. 512-552). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levinson, S. C., & Wilkins, D. P. (2006b). The background to the study of
the language of space. In S. C. Levinson & D. Wilkins (Eds.), Gram-
mars of space. Explorations in cognitive diversity (p. 1-23). Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Li, C. N., & Thompson, S. A. (1976). Subject and topic: A new typology
of language. In C. N. Li (Ed.), Subject and topic (p. 457-490). New
York, San Francisco, and London: Academic Press, Inc.
Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Hoffman, H. S., & Griffith, B. C. (1957).
The discrimination of speech sounds within and across phoneme
boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54 (5), 358-368.
Lieber, R. (2006). The category of roots and the roots of categories: What
we learn from selection in derivation. Morphology, 16, 247-272.
van Lier, E. (2009). Parts of speech and dependent clauses: A typological
study. Ph.D. thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Lorimer, D. (1935). The Burushaski language. Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co.
Lukas, J. (1937). A study of the Kanuri language. London, etc.: Oxford
University Press for the International Institute of African Languages
& Cultures.
224
Bibliography
MacKenzie, J. L. (1978). Ablative-locative transfers and their relevance for
the theory of case-grammar. Journal of Linguistics, 14, 129-156.
Maienborn, C. (2001). On the position and interpretation of locative mod-
ifiers. Natural Language Semantics, 9, 191-240.
Malchukov, A. (2005). Case pattern splits, verb types and construction
competition. In M. Amberber & H. de Hoop (Eds.), Competition
and variation in natural languages. The case for case (p. 73-118).
Amsterdam etc.: Elsevier.
Malchukov, A. (2006). Transitivity parameters and transitivity alterna-
tions. Constraining co-variation. In L. Kulikov, A. Malchukov, &
P. de Swart (Eds.), Case, valency, and transitivity (p. 329-357). Am-
sterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Malchukov, A., & de Hoop, H. (to appear). Tense, aspect and mood based
differential case marking. (to appear in Lingua)
Malchukov, A., & de Swart, P. (2009). Differential case marking and
actancy variations. In A. Malchukov & A. Spencer (Eds.), The Oxford
handbook of case (p. 339-355). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Malchukov, A., & Narrog, H. (2009). Case polysemy. In A. Malchukov &
A. Spencer (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of case (p. 518-534). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Maling, J. (2009). The case tier: A hierarchical approach to morphological
case. In A. Malchukov & A. Spencer (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of
case (p. 72-87). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mallinson, G., & Blake, B. J. (1981). Language typology: Cross-cultural
studies in syntax. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Mansveld, F. R., & Waleson, R. (1970). Latijnse leergang. Grammatica.
Groningen: Wolters-Noordhof.
Marantz, A. (1984). On the nature of grammatical relations. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT press.
225
Bibliography
Maslova, E. (2003). A grammar of Kolyma Yukaghir. Berlin and New York:
Mouton de Gruyter.
McMurray, B., Aslin, R., Tanenhaus, M., Spivey, M., & Subik, D. (2008).
Gradient sensitivity to within-category variation in words and sylla-
bles. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 34 (6), 1609-1631.
Mehler, J., Sebastian-Galle´s, N., Altmann, G., Dupoux, E., Christophe, A.,
& Pallier, C. (1993). Understanding compressed sentences: The role
of rhythm and meaning. In A. M. G. P. Tallal, R. R. Llinas, & C. von
Euler (Eds.), Temporal information processing in the nervous system:
Special reference to dyslexia and dysphasia. Annals of the new york
academy of sciences (Vol. 682, p. 272-282). New York: The New York
Academy of Sciences.
Meinhof, C. (1930). Der Koranadialekt des Hottentottischen. Berlin: Diet-
rich Reimer.
Mel’cˇuk, I. A. (1986). Toward a definition of case. In R. Brecht & J. Levine
(Eds.), Case in Slavic (p. 35-85). Columbus OH: Slavica Publishers.
Merlan, F. (1982). Mangarayi. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing
Company.
Moravcsik, E. A. (2009). The distribution of case. In A. Malchukov &
A. Spencer (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of case (p. 231-245). Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press.
Moshinsky, J. (1974). A grammar of Southeastern Pomo. Berkeley, Los
Angeles, and London: University of California Press.
Mous, M. (1992). A grammar of Iraqw. Ph.D. thesis, University of Leiden.
Mu¨ller, G. (2002). Free word order, morphological case, and sympathy
theory. Resolving Conflicts in Grammar [Linguistische Berichte 11].
Næss, A˚. (2003). Transitivity: from semantics to structure. Ph.D. thesis,
Radboud University Nijmegen.
226
Bibliography
Nedjalkov, I. (1997). Evenki. London and New York: Routledge.
Nettle, D. (2002). Linguistic diversity. Oxford: Oxford University press.
Nikitina, T. (2008). Pragmatic factors and variation in the expression
of spatial goals: The case of into vs. in. In A. Asbury, J. Dotlacˇil,
B. Gehrke, & R. Nouwen (Eds.), The syntax and semantics of spatial
P [Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics today 120] (p. 175-196). Amster-
dam: John Benjamins.
Nikitina, T. (2009). Subcategorization pattern and lexical meaning of
motion verbs: A study of the source/goal ambiguity. Linguistics,
47 (5), 1113-1141.
Nikolaeva, I. (2002). The Hungarian external possessor in a European
perspective. In C. Hasselblatt & R. Blokland (Eds.), Finno-Ugrians
and Indo-Europeans: Linguistic and literary contacts (p. 272-285).
Maastricht: Shaker.
Noonan, M. (2008). Patterns of development. Patterns of syncretism of re-
lational morphology in the Bodic languages. In J. BarDdal & S. Chelia
(Eds.), The role semantics and ethics in the development of case (p.
261-282). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
O’Keefe, J. (1996). The spatial prepositions in English, vector grammar,
and the cognitive map theory. In P. Bloom, M. A. Peterson, L. Nadel,
& M. F. Garrett (Eds.), Language and space (p. 277-316). Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Owens, J. (1985). A grammar of Harar Oromo. Hamburg: Buske.
Palancar, E. L. (2002). The origin of agent markers. Studia typologica
(Vol. 5). Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Pandharipande, R. V. (1997). Marathi. London: Routledge.
Pantcheva, M. (2010). The syntactic structure of locations, goals, and
sources. Linguistics, 48 (5), 1043-1082.
Parsons, T. (1994). Events in the semantics of English: A study in sub-
227
Bibliography
atomic semantics. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT press.
Partee, B. H. (1986). Noun phrase interpretation and type-shifting princi-
ples. In J. Groenendijk, D. de Jongh, & M. Stokhof (Eds.), Studies in
discourse representation theory and the theory of generalized quanti-
fiers (p. 115-143). Dordrecht: Foris. (Reprinted in Paul Portner and
Barbara H. Partee (Eds.) Formal semantics. The essential readings
(p. 289-323). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing (2002))
Pederson, E. (2006). Spatial language in Tamil. In S. C. & D. Wilkins
(Eds.), Grammars of space. Explorations in cognitive diversity (p.
400-436). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Plank, F. (Ed.). (1995). Double case. Agreement by Suffixaufnahme. New
York and Oxford: Oxford University press.
Poudel, T. (2007). Ergativity and stage/individual level predications in
Nepali and Manipuri. (Manuscript, University of Konstanz)
Primus, B. (1998). The relative order of recipient and patient in the lan-
guages of Europe. In A. Siewierska (Ed.), Constituent order in the
languages of Europe (p. 421-473). Berlin: de Gruyter.
Primus, B. (1999). Cases and thematic roles. Ergative, accusative and
active. Tu¨bingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
Primus, B. (2003). Protorollen und Verbtyp: Kasusvariaton bei psychischen
Verben. In M. Hummel & R. Kailuweit (Eds.), Semantische Rollen
(p. 377-401). Tu¨bingen: Narr.
Primus, B. (2010). Animacy, generalized semantic roles, and differential
object marking. (Manuscript, University of Cologne)
Prince, A., & Smolensky, P. (1993/2004). Optimality Theory: Constraint
interaction in generative grammar. Oxford: Blackwell.
Pullum, G. K., & Scholz, B. C. (2007). Systematicity and natural language
syntax. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 7 (21), 375-402.
Pustejovsky, J. (1995). The generative lexicon. Cambridge, MA and Lon-
228
Bibliography
don: The MIT Press.
R Development Core Team. (2005). R: A language and environment for
statistical computing. Vienna, Austria. (ISBN 3-900051-07-0)
Ramchand, G. (2002). Aktionsart, L-syntax and selection. In H. Verkuyl
(Ed.), Perspectives on aspect (p. 1-15). Utrecht: OTS. (online pro-
ceedings)
Rice, S., & Kabata, K. (2007). Crosslinguistic grammaticalization patterns
of the ALLATIVE. Linguistic Typology, 11, 451-514.
van Riemsdijk, H., & Huijbrechts, R. (2007). Location and locality. In
S. Karimi, V. Samiian, & W. K. Wilkins (Eds.), Phrasal and clausal
architecture (p. 339-364). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Romero-Figeroa, A. (1997). A reference grammar of Warao. Mu¨nchen and
Newcastle: Lincom Europe.
Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd
(Eds.), Cognition and categorization (p. 28-49). Hillsdale, New Jersey:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Rude, N. (1987). Studies in Nez Perce grammar and discourse. Ph.D.
thesis, University of Oregon.
Saffran, J. R., Newport, E. L., & Aslin, R. N. (1996). Word segmentation:
The role of distributional cues. Journal of memory and language, 35,
606-621.
Saltarelli, M. (1988). Basque. London, New York, and Sydney: Croom
Helm.
Schanidse, A. (1982). Grammatik der altgeorgischen Sprache (H. Fa¨hnrich,
Trans.). Tbilissi: Staatsuniversita¨t Tbilissi.
Scott, G. (1978). The Fore language of Papua New Guinea. Canberra:
Pacific Linguistics.
Seiler, H. (1977). Cahuilla grammar. Banning, CA: Malki Museum Press.
229
Bibliography
Seiler, W. (1985). Imonda, a Papuan lanuage. Canberra: Department of
Linguistics, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National
University.
Senft, G. (Ed.). (2004). Deixis and demonstratives in Oceanic languages.
Canberra: Pacific Linguistics.
Sinha, C., & Kuteva, T. (1995). Distributed spatial semantics. Nordic
journal of linguistics, 18, 167-199.
Smolensky, P., & Legendre, G. (2006). The harmonic mind. Cambridge:
MIT press.
Sohn, H.-M. (1994). Korean. London and New York: Routledge.
Stassen, L. (2009). Predicative possession. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Stefanowitsch, A., & Gries, S. T. (2003). Collostructions: Investigating
the interaction of words and constructions. International Journal of
Corpus Linguistics, 8 (2), 209-243.
Stefanowitsch, A., & Rohde, A. (2004). The goal bias in the encoding
of motion events. In G. Radden & K.-U. Panther (Eds.), Studies in
linguistic motivations. Cognitive linguistic research 28 (p. 249-268).
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Stiebels, B. (2002). Typology des Argumentlinkings. O¨konomie und Expres-
sivita¨t. Studia grammatica (Vol. 54). Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Stolz, T. (1992). Lokalkasussysteme. Aspekte einer strukturellen Dynamik.
Wilhemlsfeld: Gottfried Egert Verlag.
Sulkala, H., & Karjalainen, M. (1992). Finnish. London: Routledge.
Svenonius, P. (2006). The emergence of axial parts. Nordlyd, Tromsø
Working Papers in Language & Linguistics, 33 (1), 49-77.
Svenonius, P. (2008). Projections of p. In A. Asbury, J. Dotlacˇil, B. Gehrke,
& R. Nouwen (Eds.), The syntax and semantics of spatial P [Lin-
230
Bibliography
guistik Aktuell/Linguistics today 120] (p. 63-84). Amsterdam: John
Benjamins.
Svorou, S. (1993). The grammar of space. Amsterdam and Philadelphia:
John Benjamins.
de Swart, P. (2007). Cross-linguistic variation in object marking. Ph.D.
thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen.
de Swart, P. (in prep.). Sense and simplicity: Bidirectionality in differen-
tial case marking. In A. Benz & J. Mattausch (Eds.), Bidirectional
Optimality Theory. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
de Swart, P., Lamers, M., & Lestrade, S. (Eds.). (2008). Animacy, Ar-
gument Structure, and Argument Encoding (special issue). Lingua,
118.
Sweep, J. (2009). Metonymy without a referential shift. In B. Botma &
J. van Kampen (Eds.), Linguistics in the Netherlands 2009 (p. 103-
114). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benamins.
Talmy, L. (1975). Semantics and syntax of motion. In J. P. Kimball (Ed.),
Syntax and semantics (Vol. 4, p. 181-238). New York and London:
Academic Press.
Talmy, L. (1985). Lexicalizations patterns: Semantic structure in lexical
forms. In T. Shopen (Ed.), Language typology and syntactic descrip-
tion (Vol. 3). Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
Talmy, L. (2000). Toward a cognitive semantics. Cambridge and London:
MIT Press.
Trask, R. (1979). On the origin of ergativity. In F. Plank (Ed.), Ergativity:
Toward a theory of grammatical relations (p. 269-311). New York:
Academic press.
Tsunoda, T. (1985). Remarks on transitivity. Journal of Linguistics, 21,
385-396.
Vainikka, A. (1993). The three structural cases in Finnish. In A. Holmberg
231
Bibliography
& U. Nikanne (Eds.), Case and other functional categories in Finnish
syntax. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Vajda, E. J. (2004). Ket. Mu¨nchen and Newcastle: Lincom Europe.
Wheeldon, L. R., & Levelt, W. J. (1995). Monitoring the time course of
phonological encoding. Journal of memory and language, 34, 311-334.
Williams, E. (1981). Argument structure and morphology. The Linguistic
Review, 1 (1), 81-114.
Williams, J. (1932). Grammar notes and vocabulary of the language of
the Makuchi indians of Guiana. St. Gabriel-Mo¨dling near Vienna:
Anthropos.
Woolford, E. (2001). Case patterns. In G. Legendre, J. Grimshaw, &
S. Vikner (Eds.), Optimality-theoretic syntax (p. 509-545). Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT press.
Woolford, E. (2007a). Aspect splits as contextual faithfulness. (Manuscript,
University of Massachusetts)
Woolford, E. (2007b). Lexical case, inherent case, and argument structure.
Linguistic Inquiry, 37, 1-20.
Wunderlich, D. (1997). Cause and the structure of verbs. Linguistic Inquiry,
28 (1), 27-68.
Wunderlich, D., & Laka¨mper, R. (2001). On the interaction of structural
and semantic case. Lingua, 111, 377-418.
Yang, N., & van Bergen, G. (2007). Scrambled objects and case marking
in Mandarin Chinese. Lingua, 117, 1617-1635.
Yip, M., Maling, J., & Jackendoff, R. (1987). Case in tiers. Language, 63,
217-250.
Zacks, J., Braver, T., Sheridan, M., Donaldson, D., Snyder, A., Ollinger, J.,
Buckner, R., & Raichle, M. (2001). Human brain activity time-locked
to perceptual event boundaries. Nature neuroscience, 4 (6), 651-655.
232
Bibliography
Zacks, J., & Tversky, B. (2001). Event structure in perception and concep-
tion. Psychological bulletin, 127 (1), 3-21.
Zaenen, A., Maling, J., & Thra´insson, H. (1985). Case in grammatical func-
tions: the Icelandic passive. Natural language and linguistic theory,
3, 441-483.
Zeevat, H. (2000). The asymmetry of Optimality Theoretic syntax and
semantics. Journal of Semantics, 17, 243-262.
Zeevat, H. (2007). Simulating recruitment in evolution. In G. Bouma,
I. Kra¨mer, & J. Zwarts (Eds.), Cognitive foundations of interpretation
(p. 175-194). Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences.
Zipf, G. K. (1965). Human behavior and the principle of least effort. An
introduction to human ecology. New York and London: Hafner pub-
lishing company.
Zu´n˜iga, F. (2000). Mapudungun. Mu¨nchen and Newcastle: Lincom Europe.
Zwarts, J. (1997). Vectors as relative positions: A compositional semantics
of modified PPs. Journal of Semantics, 14, 57-86.
Zwarts, J. (2004). Competition between word meanings: The polysemy of
(A)Round. In C. Meier & M. Weisgerber (Eds.), Proceedings of SuB8
(p. 349-360). Konstanz: University of Konstanz Linguistics Working
Papers.
Zwarts, J. (2005a). Prepositional aspect and the algebra of paths. Linguis-
tics and Philosophy, 28, 739-779.
Zwarts, J. (2005b). The case of prepositions: Government and composition-
ality in German PPs. (Paper presented at the 21st Annual Meeting
of the Israel Association for Theoretical Linguistics, Haifa, June 23,
2005)
Zwarts, J. (2008a). Aspects of a typology of direction. In S. Rothstein
(Ed.), Theoretical and crosslinguistic approaches to the semantics of
aspects (p. 79-106). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
233
Bibliography
Zwarts, J. (2008b). Priorities in the production of prepositions. In A. As-
bury, J. Dotlacˇil, B. Gehrke, & R. Nouwen (Eds.), The syntax and
semantics of spatial P [Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics today 120]. Am-
sterdam: John Benjamins.
Zwarts, J. (2010). A hierarchy of locations: Evidence from the encoding of
direction in adpositions and cases. Linguistics, 48 (5), 983-1010.
Zwarts, J., Hogeweg, L., Lestrade, S., & Malchukov, A. (2009). Semantic
markedness in gender opposition, blocking and fossilization. Language
Typology and Universals, 62 (4), 325-343.
Zwarts, J., & Winter, Y. (2000). Vector space semantics: A model theo-
retic analysis of locative prepositions. Journal of logic, language and
information, 9, 169-211.
234
Appendix
A. Spatial Case Inventories
A1. Spatial case markers in my sample
Notes:
1. a only with animates, i only with inanimates, l only on locational
nouns or place names, np not productive
2. in case of (phonological) variants only one series is represented
3. if the language has different markers for singular and plural only sin-
gular is represented
lng case form dir config
Alamblak adessivei -kor place at
Alamblak adessivei -kor goal at
Alamblak allativei -ko goal at
Alamblak referent -pn(e¨) place at
Alamblak referent -pn(e¨) source at
Alamblak referent -pn(e¨) goal at
Alamblak specific-setting -n place at
Alamblak specific-setting -n place on
Alamblak specific-setting -n place in
Alamblak general-setting -nan(e¨) place at
Alamblak general-setting -nan(e¨) place in
Alamblak via -oha via at
Basque locative -(t)an place
Basque allative -(ta)ra goal
Appendix
lng case form dir config
Basque ablativei -tik source
Basque ablativea -gantik source
Basque ablativei -tik via
Basque ablativea -gantik via
Basque directional -rantz toward
Basque terminative -raino up to
Burushaski elative -ulum source in
Burushaski inessive -υlo place in
Burushaski inessive -υlo goal in
Burushaski ablative -tsυm source at
Burushaski dative -@r goal at
Burushaski locative -∆l² place at
Burushaski locative -∆l² goal at
Burushaski superessive -∆t² place on/at/in
Burushaski superessive -∆t² goal on
Burushaski approximative -xa(sˇiő@r) goal on
Burushaski superessive2 -ts² place on/at
Burushaski superessive2 -ts² goal on (+contact)
Dyirbal ablative -Nunu source
Dyirbal locative -(N)ga place
Dyirbal allative -gu goal
Evenki ablative -duk source
Evenki elative -gi:t source
Evenki locative -(du)la goal
Evenki allative -t(i)ki direction
Evenki allative/-
locativenp
-klV place near
Evenki allative/-
prolativenp
-kli via along
Evenki prolative -(du)li via
Harar Oromo dative lengthening source
Harar Oromo locative -tti, length-
ening
place
Harar Oromo locative -tti, length-
ening
goal
Hua inessive -vi’,-vina place in
Hua inessive -vi’,-vina goal in
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lng case form dir config
Hua ablative -vi’ri’,-
vingari
source in
Hua locative -ro’,-roga place
Hua locative -ro’,-roga goal
Hua elative -ro’ri’,
-rogari’
source at
Hua locativel -kaiga place
Hua locativel -kaiga goal
Hungarian ablative -to´l source at
Hungarian adessive -na´l place at
Hungarian allative -hoz goal at
Hungarian elative -bo´l source in
Hungarian inessive -ban place in
Hungarian illative -ba goal in
Hungarian delative -ro´l source on
Hungarian superessive -(o)n place on
Hungarian sublative -ra goal on
Hungarian terminative -ig up to
Hunzib dative -V place in
Hunzib dativeelative -V-s source in
Hunzib dative-
translative
-V-ň’ via in
Hunzib approximative-
dativea
-g(o) to at
Hunzib addesivea -g(o) at
Hunzib superessive -ň’o place above
Hunzib subessivenp -ň place under
Hunzib contactive -ń place contact
Hunzib allativea -d@r goal at
Hunzib comitative -gˇur-s place next to
Ika locative -se source
Ika locative -se place
Ika allative -ek1 goal
Ika allative -ek1 place far away
Imonda source -iane´i source
Imonda locativei -ia,-m place
Imonda locativea -naia,-m place
Imonda goal -m goal
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lng case form dir config
Kanuri locative -mben place at
Kanuri locative -mben via at
Kanuri ablative -(nyi)n,-lan place in/on
Kanuri dative -ro goal
Koasati locative -fa place
Koasati allative -fon goal
Koasati inessive -hayo´ in
Lithuanian locative -(j)e
Highland inessive -e´ place
Highland illative -an˜ goal
Lowland inessive -e´,-je,-se place in
Lowland illative -an˜ goal in
Lowland adessive -´ıep(i) place at
Lowland allative -o´p(i) goal at
Malayalam locative -il,-tt@ place
Malayalam locative -il,-tt@ goal
Malayalam toward -oott@ toward
Malayalam dative -kk@ goal
Malayalam allative -ileekk@ goal
Mangarayi ablative -gana source
Mangarayi locative -yan place
Mangarayi locative -yan goal
Mangarayi allative -l
˙
ama goal
Mangarayi pergressive -(yi)wa via
Meithei ablative -t@ source
Meithei locative -t@gi place
Mundari ablative -ate source
Mundari locative -re place
Mundari allative -te goal
Mundari delative -ta´te source
Mundari approximative -ta(re) place
Mundari directional -ta´te goal
Nez Perce ablative -(p)kin’ix source
Nez Perce locative -pe place
Nez Perce allative -(p)x goal
Passama-
quoddy
locative -(ihku)k
Amur Nivkh locative -(u/i)n(e) place
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lng case form dir config
Amur Nivkh ablative -(u)γe source
Amur Nivkh ablative -uγe place
Amur Nivkh dative -(to)X goal
Amur Nivkh limitative -toγo up to
West Green-
landic (WG)
ablative -mi(i)t source
WG locative -mi place
WG allative -mut goal
WG prosecutive -kutt place
WG prosecutive -kutt source
WG prosecutive -kutt goal
WG prosecutive -kutt via
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A2. Stolz (1992)
language case label form dir config
Inuktitut locative -me¯ place
Inuktitut terminative -mu¯n goal
Inuktitut vialis -kun path
Quechua allative -man˙ goal
Quechua ablative -pita source
Quechua locative -cˇu goal
Quechua limitative -kama upto
Basque inessive -an place
Basque ablative -atik source
Basque directional -ara goal
Basque allative1 -arantz toward
Basque allative2 -araino upto
Yukaghir lative -(N)in goal
Yukaghir locative -ge place
Yukaghir prosecutive -gen along
Yukaghir ablative -get source
Dhargari locative -da place
Dhargari allative -kud
˙
a place
Dhargari ablative -wad
˙
i place
Romani locative -e place
Romani locative -e goal
Romani ablative -¨ır source
Turkish dative -e goal
Turkish locative -de place
Turkish abltive -den source
(Old) Lituanian inessive.sg -e` place in/at
(Old) Lituanian inessive.pl -uose` place in/at
(Old) Lituanian illative.sg -an˜(a) goal in/at
(Old) Lituanian illative.pl -u´osn(a) goal in/at
(Old) Lituanian adessive.sg -´ıep(i) place on
(Old) Lituanian adessive.pl -u´osemp(i) place on
(Old) Lituanian allative.sg -o´(i) goal on
(Old) Lituanian allative.pl -ump(i) goal on
Osttocharisch (G) perlative -n-a¯ path
Osttocharisch (G) allative -n-ac goal
Osttocharisch (G) ablative -n-a¨s
˙
source
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language case label form dir config
Osttocharisch (G) locative -n-am
˙
place
Hungarian inessive -bVn place in
Hungarian illative -bV goal in
Hungarian elative -bV´l source in
Hungarian superessive -Vn place on
Hungarian sublative -rV goal on
Hungarian delative -rV´l source on
Hungarian adessive -nVl place at
Hungarian allative -hVz goal at
Hungarian ablative -tV´l source at
Hungarian terminative -ig goal
Awar case -t’ place in
Awar case -t’e goal in
Awar case -t’a source in
Awar case -t’an path in
Awar case -t’exun goal2 in
Awar case -t’axun source2 in
Awar case -k
¯
place at
Awar case -k
¯
e goal at
Awar case -k
¯
a source at
Awar case -k
¯
an path at
Awar case -k
¯
exun goal2 at
Awar case -k
¯
axun source2 at
Awar case -k◦ place under
Awar case -k◦e goal under
Awar case -k◦a source under
Awar case -k◦an path under
Awar case -k◦exun goal2 under
Awar case -k◦axun source2 under
Awar case -da place on
Awar case -de goal on
Awar case -dasa source on
Awar case -dasan path on
Awar case -dexun goal2 on
Awar case -dasaxun source2 on
Ingush inessive-illative -e place
Ingush inessive-illative -e goal
Ingush ablative -γ source
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Ingush allative -ga goal
Ingush elative -e¯ra source
Ingush ablativeIII -gara source
Ingush directional -gah
˙
a
Ingush delative -gah
˙
ara
Tabassaran inessive1 -f place in
Tabassaran elative1 -fan source in
Tabassaran illative1 -fna goal in
Tabassaran in1 -findi toward in
Tabassaran inessive2 -’ place at/next to
Tabassaran elative2 -’an source at/next to
Tabassaran illative2 -’na goal at/next to
Tabassaran in2 -’indi toward at/next to
Tabassaran adessive1 -’ place at
Tabassaran ablative1 -’an source at
Tabassaran allative1 -’na goal at
Tabassaran at1 -’indi toward at/next to
Tabassaran adessive2 -h place at/next to
Tabassaran ablative2 -han source at/next to
Tabassaran allative2 -hna goal at
Tabassaran atdi2r -hindi toward at/next to
Tabassaran subessive -k place under
Tabassaran sublative -kan source under
Tabassaran sublative -kna goal under
Tabassaran sub -kindi toward under
Tabassaran postessive -k
¯
place behind
Tabassaran postlative -k
¯
an source behind
Tabassaran postlative -k
¯
na goal behind
Tabassaran post -k
¯
indi toward behind
Tabassaran interessive -k
˙
place between
Tabassaran interlative -k
˙
an source between
Tabassaran interlative -k
˙
na goal between
Tabassaran inter -k
˙
indi toward between
Tabassaran superessive -’il place on
Tabassaran superlative -’ilan source on
Tabassaran superlative -’ilna goal on
Tabassaran super -’ilindi toward on
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A3. Blake (1977, Australian languages)
Notes:
1. NPN Non-Pama-Nyungan, DR Daly River languages, K Kimberleys
languages, PN Pama-Nyungan
2. Blake (1977) distinguishes between case forms for PN and case suffixes
for the other families
family lng locative allative ablative
NPN Tiwi kaÈi,kapi loc
NPN Yiwa1dja uka
NPN Maung tuka
NPN Gunwinggu kore loc peP
NPN Ngandi gi gic¸ kun˜N,wala
NPN Rembarnga tjtja P kaP wala
NPN Dalabon (Ngalkbon) kaP haĳ/pul waluN,yen
NPN Nunggubuyu rutj,tutj dat kala wala
NPN Warndarang yaNa nyiji wala
NPN Alawa erg ru ryunu
NPN Yanyula la Nka (n)ta lu
NPN Djingili mpili Nka Nkami
NPN Wambaya erg nmantji nNa
NPN Murinjbada Na2a dat
NPN Nungali erg
NPN Djamindjung erg
NPN Ngaliwuru erg
DR Malag-Malag yinNa an,na many
DR Djeraid unNen tiny
DR Madngala yente tiny
DR Gamor yente loc
DR Maridhiel naNa Nanan
DR Maranunggu yena loc yaNana
DR Ami yena loc
DR Manda loc
DR Bungu-Bungu pene loc meke
DR Wadjingi pene meke
DR Ngangikurrunggur nide nimbi
DR Ngengomeri nimpi
K Yawdjibara nanja Nuru ka
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K Worora nanja Nuru alp,njine
K Unggumi wiren Nuru giya alma,walu
K Umida Nuru naka
K Ngarinjin ra Nu,yu naNaka walu
wula
K Munumburu ra gu naNaka walu
K Woljamidi re gu naNaka walu
K Wunambal Nuntalu gu laNa
K Gambere Nuntalu gu yaNa
K Gunan Nuntalu gu yaNa
K Forrest river Nuntalu gu naNka
PN Ngarla Nka kan
˙
i kat
˙
i Nur
˙
a
PN Njamal la Nka kan
˙
i kat
˙
i
PN Bailgo (baljgu) Nka wali wat
˙
ayi tja n
˙
i
PN Bandjima la Nka wali kat
˙
a
kur
˙
a
Nur
˙
u
PN Yindjibarndi La Nka Ta wali wat
˙
a
kat
˙
a
Nu n
˙
u yaNu
PN Ngarluma La Nka Ta t”at
˙
a kat
˙
i
kuru
Nur
˙
u n
˙
i
PN Dhalandji Na kuruna war-
ala
Nur
˙
u pan
˙
t
˙
i
PN Bayungu Nura kuruna la pan
˙
t
˙
i
PN Thargari ka Ta ra ku(d
˙
a) at
˙
i ad
˙
i
PN Yinggarda la Nka ta kurunu yitja pan
˙
t
˙
i Nur
˙
u
PN Nhanda la Nkaĳ (N)kuĳwur
˙
a Nu
PN Wadjuk ak aN
PN Nyungar ak a
PN Mirninj
PN Warnman kat
˙
i
PN Gugada Nka Ta (ku)(tu) Nun
˙
i
PN Bidjandjadjara Nka Ta la (ku)(tu) Nur
˙
i tjanu
tja mat
˙
atji
PN Bindubi Nka ku tu tjanu Nuru
PN Yulbaridja Nka la tja kat
˙
i kut
˙
i
wara
tja(nu)
PN Njangumarda NV tji(ri) kat
˙
i kun
˙
u
wara
Nu(l
˙
u) n
˙
i
PN Garadji Nka kati Nuru
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PN Walbiri l
˙
a Nka kura Nul
˙
u
PN Djaru la Nka kura wura
lawu
Nkawu Nulu
PN Walmadjiri Na l
˙
a Nun
˙
i
PN Adjnjamadhanha Na dat Nun
˙
i
PN Wayaga erg t
˙
an
˙PN Bularnu ka lu (k)al
˙
u Nul
˙
u
PN Warluwara ka lu (k)al
˙
u Nul
˙
u
PN Aljawara erg uwala ii
˙
tiya
PN Aranda erg una ula Na
PN Andegerebinha erg wan
˙
a wal
˙
a it”iya
PN Galgadungu pia t”i kun”a yan”a loc + Nu
PN Yalarnnga ya Nka wampa loc + Nu
PN Wangga-Yudjuru na nuNu minya
PN Bidha-Bidha ina inu inya
PN Arabana Na,ra ruku
PN Wanggangguru Na,ra ruku
PN Dieri n
˙
i ya nru
PN Yanruwantha yi dat Nura
PN Yawarawarga nyi dat Nura
PN Ngamini mu dat Nuntu
PN Wangkumara laNa dat anru
PN Badjiri la dat mani
PN Baagandji na
PN Narinyari uNai dat anmant
PN Djadjala ata k(a) aN
PN Madi-Madi (k)aN (k)ata k(a) (k)uNa
PN Wemba-Wemba (k)aN (k)ata k(a) (k)aN
PN Awabagal kinpa taku kaku ta + piruN
PN Gadhang ka ta dat akai
PN Dhangadi ya ra ta dat akai
PN Gumbainggir a ra ya wa dat (i)n(y)a
PN Gidabal Ta ya la pa: Nu
PN Bandjalang Ta ya ku Nu
PN Minjung pa ma
paima
e, al kal tjil paya
PN Duungidjawu
PN Wiradjuri la ta tja ra li tji ri
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PN Wangaybuwan ka dat
PN Yuwaaliyaay mi
PN Muruwari (N)ka,Ta dat Na
PN Kunggari Na t”ari par
˙
i
PN Gugu-Badhun Nka Ta dat Numay
PN Warungu Nka Ta dat Numay
PN Djirbal Nka ka Ta dat Nunu
PN Djaabugai la NTa loc Nu(num)
mu(ntu)
PN Yidinj la Ta loc mu
PN Gugu-Yimidhir pi wi loc Nan
PN Gugu-Yalandji nta mpa Nu mun
PN Kuku-Yaĳu Nuna,la
PN Gundjen erg dat Nand,am
PN Lardil Ne ((k)i)ya-t”ur Nand,am
PN Yugulda erg (ki)l
˙
u inapa,walitja
PN Wik Munkan erg ant (ant)am
PN Kurtjar erg dat nam(aN)
PN Ritharngu Nar
˙
a liĳ Nur
˙
uĳ,
kuNua
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B. Language samples
B1. Languages in the PCaseBase (Lestrade et al., 2009)
language (family) reference
Alamblak (Sepik (Hill)) Bruce (1984)
Basque (isolate) Hualde and Urbina (2003)
Brahui (Dravidian (Northern)) Bray (1986)
Burushaski (isolate) Lorimer (1935)
Cahuilla (Uto-Aztecan (Tacic)) Seiler (1977)
Evenki (Altaic (Tungusic)) Nedjalkov (1997)
Finnish (Uralic (Finnic)) Sulkala and Karjalainen (1992)
Gamo (Afro-Asiatic (Omotic)) E´va (1990)
Georgian (Kartvelian) Hewitt (1995)
Harar Oromo (Afro-Asiatic (E Cushitic)) Owens (1985)
Ika (Chibchan (Aruak)) Frank (1985)
Jaqaru (Aymaran) Hardman (2000)
Kabardian (Northwest Caucasian) Colarusso (1989)
Ket (Yeniseian) Vajda (2004)
Kolyma Yukaghir (Yukaghir) Maslova (2003)
Korana (Khoisan (Central)) Meinhof (1930)
Lezgian (Nakh Daghestanian (Lezgic)) Haspelmath (1993)
Macushi (Cariban) Abbott (1991); Williams (1932)
Malayalam (Dravidian (Southern)) Asher and Kumari (1997)
Mapudungun (Araucanian) Zu´n˜iga (2000)
Marathi (Indo-European (Indic)) Pandharipande (1997)
Meithei (Sino-Tibetan (Kuki-Chin-Naga)) Chelliah (1997)
Mochica (isolate) Hovdhaugen (2004)
Newar (Sino-Tibetan (Bodic)) Hale and Shrestha (2006)
Paumar´ı (Aruan) Chapman and Derbyshire (1991)
Polish (Indo-European (Slavic)) Bielec (1999)
Puelche (isolate) Barbara´ (1944)
SE Pomo (Hokan (Pomoan)) Moshinsky (1974)
Tlingit (Na-Dene (Tlingit)) Leer (1991)
Trumai (isolate) Guirardello (1999)
Turkish (Altaic (Turkic)) Kornfilt (1997)
Warao (isolate) Romero-Figeroa (1997)
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B2. Languages in my spatial case sample
language (family) reference
Alamblak (Sepik) Bruce (1984)
Basque (Basque) Hualde and Urbina (2003)
Burushaski (Burushaski) Lorimer (1935)
Dyirbal (Australian) Dixon (1972)
Evenki (Altaic) Bulatova and Grenoble (1999)
Harar Oromo (Afro-Asiatic) Owens (1985)
Hua (Trans-New Guinea) Haiman (1980)
Hungarian (Uralic) Kenesei, Vago, and Fenyvesi (1998)
Hunzib (Nakh-Daghestanian) van den Berg (1995)
Ika (Chibchan) Frank (1985)
Imonda (Border) Seiler (1985)
Kanuri (Nilo-Saharan) Lukas (1937)
Koasati (Muskogean) Kimball (1985)
Lithuanian (Indo-European) Ambrazas (1997)
Malayalam (Dravidian) Asher and Kumari (1997)
Mangarayi (Austronesian) Merlan (1982)
Meithei (Sino-Tibetan) Chelliah (1997)
Mundari (Austro-Asiatic) Hoffmann (1903)
Nez Perce (Penutian) Rude (1987)
Nivkh (Nivkh) Gruzdeva (1998)
Passamaquoddy-Maliseet (Algic) Leavitt (1996)
West Greenlandic (Eskimo-Aleut) Fortescue (1984)
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C. Case and Region (see Iggesen, 2005)
Table 6.6: Case inventory size of languages per region
region inventory number of
size languages
Africa 0 7
2-4 26
5-9 7
10+ 0
Eurasia 0 22
2-4 17
5-9 28
10+ 14
North America 0 17
2-4 7
5-9 12
10+ 1
Pacific 0 28
2-4 3
5-9 14
10+ 6
South America 0 9
2-4 5
5-9 11
10+ 2
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Bekijk het volgende Hongaarse voorbeeld:
Hongaars
(1) A
het
ko¨nyv-et
boek-accusatief
az
de
asztal-ra
tafel-superlatief
teszem.
ik.leg
‘Ik leg het boek op de tafel.’
In dit voorbeeld worden twee naamvallen gebruikt. De accusatief -et en
de superlatief -ra. In hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift leg ik uit dat beide
naamvallen, of beter gezegd, beide gebruiken van naamval, eenzelfde ver-
klaring kennen. De accusatieve naamval wordt meestal structureel gebruikt,
wat wil zeggen dat het de syntactische functie van het woord aangeeft ten
opzichte van een ander woord, het hoofd. In dit geval is het hoofd de
persoonsvorm teszem ‘(ik) leg’. De accusatief geeft aan dat het boek direct
object van dit werkwoord ‘leggen’ is. Naamval heeft in dit gebruik vrijwel
geen betekenis. Veel talen gebruiken bijvoorbeeld zowel voor het directe
object van ‘helpen’ als dat van ‘slaan’ dezelfde accusatieve naamval, terwijl
de rol van de objecten in de gebeurtenissen die beschreven worden na-
tuurlijk compleet anders is. Ruimtelijke naamval heeft daarentegen vaak
wel een duidelijke betekenis. De superlatief in het Hongaars betekent ‘naar
op’. Deze naamval is bepaald niet zo onbepaald als de accusatief. Voor
‘naar in’ heeft het Hongaars bijvoorbeeld de inessief -ba, en voor ‘van op’
de superelatief -ro´l. De superlatief kan deze betekenissen niet uitdrukken.
Omdat het structurele gebruik zo van het ruimtelijke gebruik verschilt,
worden de twee vaak gescheiden in verschillende soorten. Ik laat zien dat
beide het resultaat zijn van hetzelfde grammaticalisatieproces en eigenlijk
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alleen maar gradueel verschillen. In een grammaticalisatieproces worden
veelgebruikte woorden steeds korter en algemener. Korte en algemene woor-
den zijn gemakkelijker in het gebruik (vergelijk het honderd keer zeggen van
woonvereniging met het honderd keer zeggen van die) en vaker van toepas-
sing (vergelijk het aantal keer dat je op een dag naar iets kunt verwijzen
met woonvereniging met het aantal keer dat je die kunt gebruiken). Omdat
deze woorden vaker gebruikt worden, worden ze nog korter en algemener.
Uiteindelijk worden ze zelfs zo kort en algemeen dat ze niet meer zelfstandig
gebruikt kunnen worden, maar alleen nog maar in combinatie met andere
woorden, die we´l zelf verwijzen. Merk op dat het generalisatieproces dat
onderdeel uitmaakt van dit grammaticalisatieproces eigenlijk al veel eerder
begint. De wereld kent een oneindige variatie aan objecten en gebeurtenis-
sen waar wij alleen maar zinnig over kunnen praten door te categoriseren.
In die zin is een naamval niets bijzonders.
Dat woorden korter worden komt door een combinatie van twee principes:
Economie (“zeg dingen zo kort mogelijk”) en Voorspelbaarheid (“begrijp
ook wat niet gezegd hoeft te worden”). We kunnen de dingen die we willen
zeggen sneller bedenken dan uitspreken en de dingen die we horen sneller
begrijpen dan ze uitgesproken worden. Dat maakt het uitspreken de lang-
zaamste kameel van de communicatiekaravaan. Het hele proces kan het
best versneld worden door de woorden die we het meest gebruiken zo kort
mogelijk te maken. Dat levert uiteindelijk de grootste winst op. Maar alle
veelgebruikte woorden zomaar inkorten maakt natuurlijk onverstaanbaar.
Dat kan alleen met die woorden die door hun context of algemene beteke-
nis voorspelbaar zijn. Omdat de hoorder zo ongeveer al weet wat er gezegd
gaat worden heeft hij bij deze woorden voldoende aan minder aanwijzingen.
De betekenis die naamval uitdrukt is inderdaad voorspelbaar. Naamval
drukt de rol van een deelnemer in de beschreven gebeurtenis uit. De functie
van het boek in (1) is ‘het ding dat door mij op tafel wordt gelegd’. Als
een naamval functies echt zo specifiek zou uitdrukken zou hij maar zelden
worden gebruikt en dus niet snel grammaticaliseren. Daarbij, als we alle
functies zo specifiek zouden moeten benoemen zouden we nooit aan een
fatsoenlijk gesprek toekomen. Daarom worden deze functies door talen
gecategoriseerd in semantische rollen, generalisaties over veel specifiekere
functies. Voorbeelden van semantische rollen zijn ‘degene die de handeling
uitgedrukt door het werkwoord ondergaat’ (Patiens) en ‘het ding dat je
gebruikt om de handeling uitgedrukt door het werkwoord uit te voeren’
(Instrument). De accusatief is – in de meeste gebruiken en bijvoorbeeld in
(1) – een zeer algemene naamval die alleen nog maar zegt dat zijn drager de
minst actieve van de standaardrollen die bij het werkwoord horen vervult.
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De superlatief is een minder abstracte generalisatie en drukt een van de
meestvoorkomende ruimtelijke betekenissen uit.
Voor mijn onderzoek, en in hoofdstuk 3, gaat het bij ruimtelijke beteke-
nis steeds om een relatief beweeglijk ding dat in de ruimte wordt geplaatst
ten opzicht van een ander, stabieler ding. Er zijn vele andere vormen van
ruimtelijke betekenis en taal, maar naamval is, zoals hierboven gezegd, een
markeerder van relaties. Ik laat zien dat ruimtelijke betekenis uit twee di-
mensies bestaat. Configuratie betreft de relatieve positie van een object
ten opzichte van een ander object en directionaliteit de verandering van
deze positie in de loop van de tijd. Door directionaliteit op deze manier
te definie¨ren doe ik recht aan de intu¨ıtie dat een verandering van plaats
altijd een verandering van tijd inhoudt. Maar belangrijker nog: op deze
manier zijn er maar drie basisbetekenissen mogelijk. Terwijl talen enorm
blijken te verschillen in de soort ruimtelijke relaties die zij markeren, is
het aantal mogelijke veranderingen van die relaties beperkt. Als er niets
verandert hebben we te maken met Plaats; als iets eerst in een bepaalde
relatie tot iets anders stond maar daarna niet meer hebben we Bron, en het
tegenovergestelde van Bron is Doel. Deze analyse doet allerlei voorspelling-
en. Zo zijn er bijvoorbeeld meer onderscheidingen in configuratie dan in
directionaliteit en daarom worden de laatste vaker gebruikt en met verder
gegrammaticaliseerde middelen uitgedrukt. Verder drukt ruimtelijke naam-
val altijd eerst een onderscheid in directionaliteit uit en pas daarna config-
urationele betekenis. Deze voorspellingen blijken na toetsing inderdaad te
kloppen.
De volgende twee hoofdstukken gaan over het optionele gebruik van
naamval en het gebruik van ruimtelijke naamval om niet-ruimtelijke beteke-
nis uit te drukken. Een verhaal over naamval is eigenlijk niet compleet
als het deze gebruiken niet kan verklaren. In hoofdstuk 4 laat ik zien
dat ruimtelijke naamval in sommige talen weggelaten kan worden als de
betekenisbijdrage die het zou maken te verwaarlozen is. Vergelijkbare ana-
lyses zijn al eerder voorgesteld voor structurele naamval, maar het principe
blijkt algemener. In hoofdstuk 5 tenslotte bespreek ik het gebruik van
ruimtelijke naamval op argumenten met menselijke referenten. Omdat
mensen van nature erg beweeglijk zijn, zijn het onhandige objecten om
andere objecten mee te lokaliseren. De combinatie van een ruimtelijke uit-
drukking en een mens is dan ook ongebruikelijk, en kan ongepast en in
sommige talen zelfs ongrammaticaal zijn. Wanneer zo’n combinatie toch
gebruikt wordt, kan daarmee een specifieke betekenis uitgelokt worden.
Wanneer bijvoorbeeld het onderwerp van de zin niet met de normale struc-
turele naamval is gemarkeerd maar in plaats daarvan met een ruimtelijke
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naamval, ontstaat de interpretatie dat de handeling niet expres maar per
ongeluk wordt uitgevoerd. Daarmee wordt als het ware een compromis
bereikt tussen de ruimtelijke naamval die gewoonlijk is voorbehouden aan
stabiele, levenloze objecten en de verwijzing naar een mens met een eigen
wil.
Kortom, naamval is een veelgebruikte, betekenisvolle generalisatie over
functies en ruimtelijke betekenis bestaat altijd uit twee dimensies, een die de
relatieve positie van een object ten opzichte van een ander object beschrijft
(configuratie) en een die de verandering van deze positie in de loop van
de tijd beschrijft (directionaliteit), waarbij deze tweede dimensie drie ba-
siswaarden kent: Plaats, Bron en Doel. Een lange zin, maar wel een die de
essentie van mijn proefschrift weergeeft.
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